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This special issue on eyewitness identification includes some of theworld’s premier researchers and commentators, along with some of theirbest students. The six articles provide judges with easy-to-understand,
state-of-the-art information on various social-science perspectives relevant to
eyewitness identification tailored to a judicial readership. 
In his introductory article, James Doyle provides judges with an argument
for why you should care about what social scientists have documented in their
research. It is followed by an article by Laura Smalarz and Gary Wells that
reviews eyewitness research, focusing on mistaken identifications and false
certainty by witnesses. Their reviews point out the need for judges to be vig-
ilant in making sure that eyewitness identifications are accurate. 
Accurate identifications are the subject of the article by Richard Wise and
Martin Safer, who present a method for analyzing the accuracy of eyewitness
testimony that can help judges in ensuring
correct outcomes for defendants. It is a chal-
lenging task for judges. 
Fiona Gabbert and her colleagues from the
United Kingdom and U.S., Daniel Wright,
Amina Memon, Elin Skagerberg, and Kat
Jamieson, discuss their research, and the
research of others, showing that eyewitness
memory can be influenced by post-event
information, with advice to police and attor-
neys (and judges) regarding how they can try
to protect against faulty identifications by 
witnesses. 
A cross-national team of researchers from New Zealand and the U.S.,
Jeffrey Foster, Maryanne Garry, and Elizabeth Loftus, provide a brief report on
recent research studies they conducted showing that repeated erroneous
information can influence witnesses and jurors, once again raising the prob-
lems of faulty eyewitness identifications.  
Similarly, Brian Bornstein and Joseph Hamm report on several studies they
conducted that show how judges can use jury instructions to protect against
errors in eyewitness identifications. 
The challenge is great for judges, but we owe it to defendants and victims
to get it right.
I close by noting that we have reprised the cover photo used in a 1999 issue
of Court Review that also looked at the legal and scientific issues involved with
eyewitness testimony.—Alan Tomkins
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The American Judges Association Executive Committeehad a fascinating discussion last spring. Like many thingsin life the topic wasn’t planned; it just happened. The dis-
cussion began with reflection: what does the American Judges
Association stand for? What is it that our association can do to
justify judges joining? The answer was simple: The mission of
the AJA is to make better judges. And so we modified our motto.
Yes, the AJA will continue to be the Voice of the Judiciary®, but
our goal is not just to be a voice for judges, but
also to seek to make better judges.
This edition of Court Review is as important as
any we have ever published because the entire
focus is on helping judges better understand and
deal with eyewitness-identification issues. I
hope you do two things with it. First, take the
time to read this issue. Second, after you read it,
share this issue of Court Review with a colleague
who is not currently a member of the AJA.
Better yet, share the edition and offer your col-
league a free one-year membership. Just send an email with
your colleague’s name and address and email it to Shelley
Rockwell (srockwell@ncsc.org). For AJA to be an effective voice
and an influence on making better judges, we need to expand
our membership.
Justice William J. Brennan, Jr. once wrote, “[t]here is almost
nothing more convincing than a live human being who takes the
stand, points a finger at the defendant, and says ’That’s the
one!’” Any trial judge knows all too well just how right Justice
Brennan was. Researcher Elizabeth Loftus demonstrated  the
strength of eyewitness testimony in a mock-trial experiment:
some jurors heard a case with an eyewitness, some without.
With no eyewitness, only 18% of jurors gave guilty verdicts;
with an eyewitness, the guilty rate rose to 72%. Even when the
identification was impeached with strong evidence, the guilty
rate was still 68%. But since Justice Brennan wrote, social sci-
entists have proven that eyewitness identification is not only
powerful—it also is often unreliable. 
Despite this, the United States Supreme Court limited the
constitutional challenges to eyewitness testimony in a case
decided earlier this year. A man named Barion Perry had been
detained at the crime scene, handcuffed after being suspected
of breaking into cars. Without specifically being asked by
police to identify the suspect, a neighbor pointed out Perry
from a nearby window as the alleged thief. In an opinion writ-
ten by Justice Ginsburg, the Court held that there was no due-
process violation when law-enforcement officers haven’t
engaged in any improper conduct, and officers hadn’t arranged
for neighbor’s identification of the handcuffed defendant. Even
so, Justice Ginsberg did warn police and prosecu-
tors to be careful about the trustworthiness of eye-
witness testimony, and Justice Sotomayor issued a
forceful dissent.
Although the United States Supreme Court has
decided the due-process issue at the federal level,
other issues—how to treat eyewitness testimony,
what instructions to give, and what judges can
learn from social scientists—remain alive.
Faced with these problems, the New Jersey
Supreme Court devoted considerable time to
examining what judges should do about eyewitness testimony.
As a result, New Jersey jurors will be getting instructions from
judges encouraging them to consider eyewitness testimony
more skeptically. Also new are evidence-gathering rules
spelling out how law enforcement and other investigators
should record details on how an identification is made. While
some proponents of the New Jersey rules claim that these
changes will strengthen the justice system, save money, and
reduce appeals, the real issue is this: Can we tolerate convict-
ing and incarcerating people for crimes in which they are actu-
ally innocent?
In an article written right before the oral argument in Barion
Perry’s case Adam Liptak of the New York Times said, “Every
year, more than 75,000 eyewitnesses identify suspects in crimi-
nal investigations. Those identifications are wrong about a
third of the time, a pile of studies suggest.” The system of jus-
tice inherently involves human error and it always will.  As
Katharine Graham once said, “A mistake is just another way of
doing things.”  The goal of good judges must be to get it right
all of the time.  This issue of Court Review is our contribution
toward reaching that goal.
Court Review - Volume 48 3
President’s Column
On the Road to Making Better Judges™
Kevin S. Burke
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Over a century ago, Dean John Henry Wigmore pub-lished a famous demolition of pioneering psychologistHugo Munsterberg in the Illinois Law Review.1
Munsterberg had complained in his best seller, On the Witness
Stand, that while other disciplines and professions were hus-
tling to learn the lessons about eyewitness memory that his
new field of experimental psychology was beginning to teach,
“the lawyer alone is obdurate.”2 Munsterberg charged that the
lawyers chose traditional primitive ignorance over scientific
enlightenment. Wigmore could not sit still for that. His satiri-
cal response is still remembered by psychologists as the blood-
thirsty slaughter of psychology as a discipline by the greatest
evidence scholar that the Anglo-American tradition ever pro-
duced: a grisly paradigm of the kind of welcome social scien-
tists should expect from the legal system and its practitioners.
If this is what you get from the great Wigmore, researchers rea-
soned, just imagine the treatment you will receive from an
ordinary legal tribesman.
Wigmore’s withering cross-examination of the wretched
“Professor Muensterberg” in this article is so lengthy and so
humiliating that there are moments when a slightly creepy
sadistic pleasure seems to be animating the dean. But sadism
wasn’t the problem. The problem was Wigmore’s cloddish pro-
fessorial attempts at humor—Wigmore’s sarcasm created a mis-
impression that he tried to correct for the rest of his life.
Wigmore did want to issue a call to order: to correct
Munsterberg’s overstatements and to address Munsterberg’s
misapprehensions about legal practice. But Wigmore was far
from an enemy of psychology as a discipline; he was actually
one of psychology’s earliest advocates, the best legal friend that
psychology had. 
The real purpose of Wigmore’s article was to illuminate the
potential in a law and psychology relationship and to throw his
prestige behind its inception. Wigmore’s goal was to herald the
day when the lawyers and psychologists could move forward
in “a friendly and energetic alliance in the noble cause of jus-
tice.”3 Yes, Munsterberg had jumped the gun in announcing
the immediate utility of such an alliance; Wigmore thought
that was still on the distant horizon. Even so, Wigmore looked
forward to the day of its arrival, and he was confident that day
would come. “When the psychologists are ready for the
courts,” he announced in a subsequent piece, “the courts will
be ready for the psychologists.”4
Various signs and portents—among them, this special
issue—indicate that the courts finally are ready to mobilize the
lessons taught by Munsterberg and his heirs; or at least that the
courts are ready to take steps to get ready. This is an important
moment in the vexed history of the law and eyewitness psy-
chology relationship. 
To understand where we are it helps to understand a little
about both how we got here and where we could be going. The
“friendly and energetic alliance” will have more than one path
to choose from as it moves ahead. The path that realizes the
fullest potential of the alliance is not the most obvious path,
and finding it will require a new examination of the deep
nature of the catalyst—the devastating catalog of DNA exoner-
ations in eyewitness cases—that is pushing us forward. 
Something more than a minor adjustment to judicial prac-
tice is called for here: this is an opportunity for judicial lead-
ership.
DIAGNOSES AND PROBABILITIES 
Hugo Munsterberg’s pronouncements on the usefulness of
contemporary psychology were overconfident and premature,
but they were also remarkably prescient in anticipating future
research. Munsterberg began to explain some of eyewitness
memory’s mechanisms and some of its particular dangers. He
showed, for example, that humans do not have a permanent
stable memory capacity like a videotape or a DVR available to
be summoned for accurate replay whenever required. He
showed that memory was malleable and reconstructive.5 He
also showed how forensic evaluations of memory evidence
could go astray. For example, he showed that a witness’s con-
fidence was an unreliable indicator of the witness’s accuracy.6
But for current purposes, Munsterberg’s method was as impor-
tant as his findings. 
Munsterberg’s signature tool (at least for public display) was
the staged demonstration. A man interrupts a lecture; he yells;
he fires a gun; later, the audience of eyewitnesses is questioned
about the event. Next, inaccuracies in the audience’s responses
are totaled. The number of errors in the witnesses’ responses is
shocking. Lots of eyewitnesses make lots of mistakes. These
results grabbed attention, but they were not terribly useful for
the legal system. They indicated that there were many mistakes,
Ready for the Psychologists:
Learning from Eyewitness Errors
James M. Doyle
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and they argued for an increased general skepticism about eye-
witness accounts. But, as Wigmore pointed out, the legal sys-
tem’s concern is not with the general reliability of witnesses as
a class; it is with the reliability of particular verdicts in individ-
ual cases. The legal problem arose in separating the mistaken
from the correct—not the rate of mistakes, but their distribu-
tion. There, Munsterberg had little or nothing practical to offer.
When Robert Buckhout picked up Munsterberg’s fallen ban-
ner in the 1970s, he relied on a modernized version of the
same approach.7 For example, he induced a New York televi-
sion station to broadcast a staged crime and invite viewers to
make choices from a staged lineup. The number of correct
identifications this process yielded was lower than would have
been achieved by random guessing.8 But while his method may
have been similar, Buckhout’s temperament was very different
from Munsterberg’s. Munsterberg was an academic who
retreated when faced with Wigmore’s onslaught. Buckhout
knew his science, but he was a happy warrior, a cheerful agita-
tor who carried the battle into the courts and into the popular
media. He not only accepted opposition, he gloried in it. 
He published an accessible survey article on eyewitness
error in Scientific American.9 He testified on the unreliability of
eyewitness testimony in the trial of California radical Angela
Davis and was instrumental in winning her acquittal. He seized
every opportunity to comment in the media (for example,
opining on the case of a butcher identifying his own pork
chops from a pork-chop lineup) where the lessons of eyewit-
ness psychology could be taught. His science was aligned with
his politics. He believed that criminal defendants, particularly
poor and minority indigent defendants, were getting screwed
by the legal system’s complacent reliance on an antique view of
how memory worked. He made an enormous impact, and he
almost immediately rallied two groups of partners.
The first group was a cohort of idealistic younger psycholo-
gists, like Elizabeth Loftus, who were anxious to see their sci-
ence have an impact in the world. Loftus attacked the eyewit-
ness issue in a radically different way: she “did science” in the
form of rigorously controlled experiments, changing one vari-
able while holding all others constant. The results she began to
produce were striking. She showed, for example, that when
questions about a white barn were introduced into interroga-
tions of witnesses who had viewed a film of an auto accident,
over 20% of those viewers later reported seeing a white barn
although in fact there had been no white barn in the film.10
This was a crucial finding for eyewitness cases: it showed that
eyewitness memory not only decayed, but also changed. It
showed how a witness could not only forget the right man but
also—after being unknowingly influenced by viewing mug
shots or show-ups (which operate as “post-event information”
like the white barn in an interview question)—could remem-
ber the wrong man. 
Loftus’s findings mounted
quickly, and they went to the
heart of the eyewitness experi-
ence. Taken together they indi-
cated that in an eyewitness case,
the memory of the witness is for
all practical purposes the scene
of the crime. They showed that
memory evidence was in effect
“trace evidence”: difficult to col-
lect, easy to contaminate, but
impossible to test for contamina-
tion after any contamination has occurred. At the same time,
Loftus’s scrupulous scientific methods were winning her work
admission to the blue-ribbon, peer-reviewed academic journals,
and encouraging younger academic psychologists to extend
and challenge her research. You could study eyewitnesses and
have a scholarly career. Experimental findings such as Loftus’s
(unlike the demonstrations of Munsterberg and Buckhout)
could be replicated or falsified. The number of published stud-
ies multiplied.11
And at this point, Buckhout’s second group of recruits, the
desperate criminal defense lawyers, joined in. Buckhout’s testi-
mony in the Angela Davis case got their attention, and his
Scientific American article quickly circulated through the
defense bar. Elizabeth Loftus published her popular general
audience account of eyewitness science, Eyewitness
Testimony,12 at about this time, and that was buttressed by an
influential Stanford Law Review comment written by Frederick
Woocher (a trained psychologist, then in law school), which
provided a blueprint for arguments for conveying psychologi-
cal science through expert witnesses. Defense lawyers began to
demand the admission of expert testimony by Loftus,
Buckhout, and their colleagues, aimed at debunking faith in
eyewitness evidence.
This point of entry was bad luck for anyone who hoped for
a “friendly and energetic alliance.” That wasn’t obvious at the
time. Persistent litigation over admissibility did help to keep
the issue of eyewitness science alive in the courts, and feed-
back from skeptical courts did help to provoke new, better-tar-
geted research. But these benefits came at a steep price. 
The initial environment has affected discussions of eyewit-
ness science ever since. Admissibility questions arise at the
most acutely adversarial moments of the criminal process, and
their resolution (at least in the eyes of the advocates) may
determine who wins and who loses. Prosecutors—goaded by
inflammatory rhetoric from Buckhout—quickly denounced
eyewitness findings as enemy pseudoscience: a trick designed
to let criminals go free by unnerving credulous lay jurors and
sliming all eyewitnesses, most of who were right, and many of
who were crime victims. For many prosecutors—then and
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now—eyewitness science is sim-
ply a shield for the guilty. For
many judges, the cumulative
price of the skirmishing over
marginally interesting science
the experts offered seemed enor-
mous in terms of hours, dollars,
and distended docket backlog. 
While the battles over admis-
sibility of expert testimony con-
tinued to grind on, another of
Buckhout’s recruits, Gary Wells,
was engineering a paradigm shift.13 Wells admired Loftus and
accepted her findings as good science, but he also pointed out
their limited utility. 
Precisely because Loftus was a scrupulous scientist, she iso-
lated and studied a single factor (e.g., the wording of a ques-
tion, the stress of the event, the presence of post-event infor-
mation) at a time. Wells noted that these studies yielded sta-
tistical results that could tell you what happened eight times
out of ten, but could not tell you whether this case was one of
the eight, or one of the two. Even worse, every criminal event
incorporates many factors, not just one, and there was no sci-
ence-based mechanism for combining these factors and assess-
ing their interactions. From Wells’s point of view, offering post-
hoc diagnosis of eyewitness error from the witness stand was
the wrong way to mobilize the solid (but inherently probabil-
ity-based) science that Loftus and a generation of their col-
leagues were producing.14
Wells successfully argued for the new orientation that has
dominated criminal justice policy discussions about eyewit-
nesses for the past decade. He noted that some factors Loftus
had studied (e.g., lighting, age of witness, stress of event) are
not under the criminal justice system’s control. He called these
“estimator variables.” But he also noted that there were other
factors (e.g., lineup construction, lineup administration, wit-
ness interview technique) that the system’s actors do have
power over. If you understood how these “system variables”
could be modernized, you could reduce the rate of error. Wells
argued that preventing mistakes by identifying new best prac-
tices in investigation would be better than trying to catch mis-
takes from the witness stand after they happened. A torrent of
research followed, exploring and refining new elements of “sys-
tem-variable” design. The task of psychological science in this
conception was the prevention of eyewitness errors as evidence
was being produced, not the retrospective inspection of eyewit-
ness testimony to see if an error had occurred. That research has
now coalesced around the “double-blind sequential” photo-
array and lineup protocol discussed later in this issue. 
Then, just as that research matured, the DNA exoneration
cases arrived. The eyewitness cases dominated the lists of
wrongful convictions; the system-variable research was well
developed, and its salience was immediately obvious.
Influential actors such as Attorney General Janet Reno were
eager to apply the researchers’ lessons.15 Expert-witness litiga-
tion does continue, and a gradual but definite trend toward the
admission of eyewitness expert testimony in trials has gained
momentum in the courts.16 But the policy conversation has
turned toward prevention: toward the design of system-vari-
able “best practice” reforms of lineup and other investigative
procedures. An accelerating wave of jurisdictions has been
adopting the science-based eyewitness-evidence protocols.
If this is where we are, then where are we going? The
answer to that question will depend in part on how we under-
stand the lessons of the DNA eyewitness exoneration cases. 
THE WRONG MAN AND THE WRONG PATIENT
Wigmore’s “friendly and energetic alliance” received a dra-
matic push forward from the exoneration cases, but it would
be a mistake to settle for the most obvious lessons that the eye-
witness wrongful convictions seem to offer.
Smalarz and Wells are not wrong when they write that “[a]n
increasingly strong case can be made for the argument that
mistaken-eyewitness identification is the primary cause of the
conviction of the innocent in the United States,”17 but their
familiar formulation uses “cause” in a shorthand sense that
may mask both the complexity of the issue and the opportuni-
ties for mobilizing science in reform that the collision of eye-
witness psychology and the DNA exonerations provide. 
One very good way to see those complexities and opportu-
nities is to examine contemporary medicine’s encounter with
its own version of the problem.
Just as the criminal justice system is haunted by the fact that
it sometimes convicts the wrong man, medicine is haunted by
the fact that it sometimes operates on the wrong patient. But
when modern medical researchers began to look carefully into
wrong-patient events, they uncovered surprising insights. For
example, one intensive examination of a wrong-patient surgery
discovered not just one but at least seventeen errors. The
patient’s face was draped so that the physicians could not see
it; a resident left the lab assuming the attending physician had
ordered the invasive surgery without telling him; conflicting
charts were overlooked; and contradictory patient stickers
were ignored. But the crucial point for the researchers was that
no single one of the seventeen errors they catalogued could have
caused the wrong-patient surgery by itself.18
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Analysis showed not only mistakes by individual doctors
and nurses, but also latent systemic problems.
Communications among staff were terrible; computer systems
did not share information. When teams failed to function, no
one was surprised or bothered because of a culture of low
expectations that “led [staff] to conclude that these red flags
signified not unusual, worrisome harbingers but rather mun-
dane repetitions of the poor communication to which they
become inured.”19 Deviations from good practice had become
normal, and a tragedy resulted.
What this meant to medical reformers was that the lessons
of closely studied events such as the Chernobyl meltdown and
the space shuttle Challenger launch disaster could be applied
to healthcare. Like those tragedies, the wrong-patient surgery
was an “organizational accident.” No single error is sufficient
to cause an organizational accident; the errors of many indi-
viduals (“active errors”) converge and interact with system
weaknesses (“latent conditions”), increasing the likelihood
that individual errors will do harm. The practitioners and orga-
nizations involved in these tragedies did not choose to make
errors—they drifted into them.20 The disasters required no vil-
lains; they involved normal people, doing normal work, in
normal organizations.21 They suffered, in Charles Perrow’s
memorable phrase, “normal accidents.”22 Like the Challenger
launch decision, the medical tragedies were caused by “mis-
take[s] embedded in the banality of organizational life.”23
These insights apply to a wrong-man conviction.24 Our tra-
ditional wrongful-conviction narrative (the witness picked the
wrong guy; the cops and the D.A. believed her; so did the jury)
is not adequate. Nor is it adequate to isolate the performance
of one operator or the imperfections one investigative tech-
nique employed in the case—for example, the traditional non-
blind, simultaneous lineup—as either a sole cause or a silver-
bullet solution. 
Lots of things have to go wrong before the wrong man is
convicted. Yes, the witness has to choose the wrong man from
an array, but the police have to put him into the array in the
first place and design the format of the array and the execution
of the identification. Forensic evidence on the crime scene
could have been overlooked or, although properly collected
and tested in the lab, distorted in the courtroom presentation.
Cell-phone records, Metrocard data, or other alibi information
could have been ignored. Tunnel vision, augmented by clear-
ance rate and caseload pressures from above, may have over-
whelmed the investigators and the prosecutors. Poorly funded
or untrained defense counsel may have failed to investigate
alternative explanations or to execute effective cross-examina-
tion. The witness erred; the cops erred; the technicians erred;
the prosecutors erred; the defense erred; the judge and the jury
erred; the appellate court erred, too. No single one of these
errors would have been enough without the others. The errors
combined and cascaded; then
there was a tragedy—and a “no-
villains” tragedy at that.
When we ask who is respon-
sible for a wrongful conviction,
the right answer is usually
“everyone involved,” to one
degree or another—if not by
making a mistake, then by fail-
ing to catch one. And “every-
one” includes not only cops and
lawyers at the sharp end of the
system, but also legislators, policymakers, funders, and appel-
late judges far from the scene of the events who dictated the
conditions under which the sharp-end operators work. Look
twice at the DNA-exposed wrongful convictions and you see
that, as Charles Perrow noted, “[T]ime and again, the operator
is confronted by unexpected and usually mysterious interac-
tions among failures, [so that] saying that he should have
zigged instead of zagged is possible only after the fact.”25 This
is as true of a whole spectrum of criminal justice errors—mis-
taken releases, prisoners lost in prisons, and cold cases that
stayed cold too long—as it is of wrongful convictions.
The habit of treating horrific wrongful convictions as sin-
gle-cause events, and then totaling up, ranking, and prioritiz-
ing these causes, has produced useful innovations such as the
double-blind sequential protocol and, in some places, has led
those reforms to be integrated into practice, but it does not
really engage the deeper nature of the problem. The solutions
it has generated stop short of fundamentally improving future
system reliability. 
All new sets of best practices or checklists have to opera-
tionalized and executed, and they have to be maintained, mon-
itored, evaluated, and perhaps junked and replaced when envi-
ronments change or science advances. No new set of best iden-
tification practices can cover every circumstance, so an irre-
ducible zone of discretion always survives, and operators are
forced to manage life within that zone. From the moment it is
written, every new checklist is under immediate and constant
assault from clearance-rate pressure, docket-list backlog, and
other environmental factors. “Drift” toward failure remains a
threat to our new best practices just as it was to their discred-
ited predecessors. No one had more checklists than NASA;
NASA launched Challenger anyway.
Many tragic mishaps could never have been predicted (and
cannot now be explained) by reference to the features of indi-
vidual component parts. These tragedies are “emergent”
events, results of the “greater than the sum of its parts” prop-
erties inherent in all systems.26 Going “down and in” to find a
broken component will not be enough to explain these hap-
penings; we also have to go “up and out” to assess the envi-
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ronment that chose the com-
ponent, allowed the compo-
nent to fail, and made the fail-
ure catastrophic.27 Making
good design choices between
alternative single components
of the criminal process (e.g.,
between “simultaneous” and
“sequential” lineups) will aid
progress but it won’t finally
answer the challenge. 
It is axiomatic in high-relia-
bility organizations that optimizing individual components is a
poor route to overall system quality.28 The double-blind
sequential-lineup protocol is a more conservative screening test
for guilt, but it isn’t a perfect one.29 Individual cases with idio-
syncratic histories will still have to be decided. Even after mod-
ernizing reforms, judges will still have to answer the question
that medicine asks when offered a more conservative screening
test for, say, prostate cancer or breast cancer: What does the rest
of our system do with this new pattern of test results? 
Could a “friendly and energetic alliance” of science and
legal procedure give us new tools to “screen out” the higher
number of cases that less conservative show-ups or traditional
simultaneous lineups currently “screen in?” Or give us alter-
native ways to apprehend the perpetrators “missed” in the new,
more conservative sequential lineups? To help judges gauge
the impact of minor variations from accepted “best practice”?
To develop a “forward-looking accountability” that helps us
understand past mistakes to prevent future ones? 
The answer to all of these questions will be “no” unless the
judiciary plays an informed part. If eyewitness science does
advance Wigmore’s “noble cause of justice,” it won’t happen in
a single clap of thunder; it will happen as working judges apply
the science with delicacy, to small details, in many decisions,
and throughout the lives of many cases.
PRODUCERS AND INSPECTORS
Detectives speak of making cases; lawyers speak of trying
them. The police operate a production stage in which they
construct the case; the lawyers are elements of an inspection
stage, during which the legal system evaluates the investiga-
tors’ product. 
Judges can have an important impact on improving both the
production stage and the inspection stage if they master the
basics of the eyewitness science. Something like that happened
in medicine. When medical reformers accepted the “organiza-
tional accident” model of “iatrogenic” (caused by doctors or
treatment) injuries to patients and understood that they were
system errors, and not just the work of “bad apples,” they
opened a window both on a more comprehensive understanding
of past events and a more productive way to move forward as a
profession to prevent future tragedies. Wrongful convictions are
“iatrogenic” too, and judges can do something about them. 
Direct judicial intervention in the business of producing
evidence in eyewitness cases dates from at least the Warren
Court’s exclusionary-rule cases in the 1970s. As several con-
tributors to this issue point out, the scientific findings of recent
decades have substantially undermined the Warren’s Court’s
analysis of the problem. The sort of conscious police miscon-
duct that can be deterred by exclusion is not the predominate
issue, and the “reliability” test that the Warren Court instituted
is largely obsolete. A modern approach to “best practices” in
collecting eyewitness-memory evidence is plainly called for,
and to their credit the law-enforcement authorities that must
execute any best practices are moving to use science-based
principles to renovate their procedures.30
In this new context, exclusive reliance on the “nuclear
option” of complete suppression of identification testimony
every time some investigator varies marginally from the new
“best practices” will be unworkable. This doesn’t mean that
mistakes are inconsequential, but it does seem clear that judges
will only rarely face one simple “in/out” decision about eyewit-
ness testimony,31 while they will frequently (often many times
within the same case) face smaller opportunities to exercise dis-
cretion about the admissibility of elements of testimony, the
control of experts, the drafting of limiting instructions, and the
provision of cautionary instructions,32 to deal with variances
from the new accepted practices. Judges’ careful, graduated
responses to the impacts of suboptimal practices will become
crucial to their supervision of the production phase of cases.33
The accuracy of these responses will depend on the indi-
vidual judge’s knowledge of the basics of the science of mem-
ory, not on the judge’s mastery of broad lines of precedential
appellate authority.34 It is important, to take one example, that
judges understand that the “strength” of a memory is a crucial
factor in calculating the harm likely to have been caused by a
suboptimal investigative practice. A “strong memory” formed
in a lengthy encounter in bright light in calm conditions will
be less affected by later procedural shortcomings than a
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“weak” memory formed in a fleeting, violent episode. But it is
also crucial that the judges making assessments understand
the sources of “strength of memory” and remember that
“strength of memory” is not the same as “witness confidence.”
Often, witnesses’ self-reports of “strength” indicate only mem-
ory contamination, not meaningful memory “strength.”35
The final inspection stage of the criminal process—the jury
trial—does address the diagnostic problem that Gary Wells
emphasized in his path-breaking “system-variable” article: the
riddle of how to combine the psychological factors present in an
event and investigation that impact eyewitness reliability. The
trial uses an ancient but flexible aggregating device: narrative.
Jurors do not count and weigh piles of factors, or apply Bayesian
formulae to arrive at probabilities; they generate and assess sto-
ries.36 In the minds of the jurors, the psychological factors inter-
act over time as a narrative unfolds. This feature of our inspec-
tion stage also has a fundamental political importance: the lay-
citizen jury’s one-time concentration on a specific unique narra-
tive provides a bracing challenge to the official practitioners’
endemic tendency to believe that since we know the odds in our
fields we can simply play those odds. The professionals tend to
believe that if we know what happens 90% (or 80%, or even
51%) of the time, then we know what to do 100% of the time. If
things go right under the story model, every accused gets an
individualized jury judgment, not a roll of the probabilistic dice. 
An important part of the trial judge’s role is to manage the
“story-model” core of the jurors’ work, and the science of iden-
tification indicates that eyewitness cases present particularly
difficult problems in this regard. This task doesn’t require a
Ph.D. in psychology, but it does require more than reading
appellate-suppression and expert-testimony precedents.
Many jurors, if left to their own devices, will default to a
“videotape” story—the witness recorded the event like a cam-
era, stored it on a permanent tape, and is now replaying it—
that is contradicted by the scientific truth that memory evi-
dence is malleable “trace evidence.” It is also pretty clear that
traditional tools such as cross-examination will be insufficient
to convey much of the new science of memory because the
jurors’ vulnerability is not on the level of specific missing
pieces of data (e.g., “the witness was/was not confident”) but
on the level of the general background interpretive principles
that no cross-examiner can reach (e.g., “confidence means
accuracy”) no matter how clever his or her questions.37
The “estimator variable” story of the crime event must be
complemented by the “system variable” story of the investiga-
tion before the story-model inspection can be effective. The
eyewitness research indicates that in administering the story
model, judges will have to attend to not only general juror
“common-sense” principles that may be mistaken, but also
specific pieces of data that scientists have learned are necessary
to the story-testing process but that upstream operators have
not preserved or disclosed.
These data will not be available
unless science-informed judges
act to make them available. 
This means that judges must
incorporate into their daily prac-
tice the recognition that the pro-
duction and the inspection
stages of an eyewitness-based
prosecution are reciprocally
related. Inevitably, while the
judges “downstream” are trying
to adjust for the exigencies of
upstream investigative operations, the “upstream” law-enforce-
ment operators are trying to adjust their conduct in anticipation
of the inspection that awaits their cases downstream. 
It is axiomatic in medicine and other industries that end-of-
process inspection schemes, although necessary components of
their systems, are poor routes to overall system quality.38
Practitioners who are subject to inspection are resourceful in
both avoiding the inspection altogether or in gaming the
inspection when they cannot avoid it. Those being inspected
usually end up owning the process, and their primary goal is
usually their own safety. Criminal-justice-system operators are
not immune to these tendencies. The fact that only a tiny por-
tion of criminal cases receives jury scrutiny certainly has some-
thing to do with the costs of jury trials in terms of time and
money, but it also reflects professional practitioners’ disinclina-
tion to submit to inspection by unpredictable lay jurors, espe-
cially when that inspection takes place in an exposed zero-sum
courtroom contest where one side wins (and one side loses)
everything.
Here’s an example. There is a segment of the eyewitness-
exoneration list that catalogs trial prosecutors’ failures to turn
over exculpatory material. It does not show that those prose-
cutors lusted to frame known innocents, but rather it illumi-
nates an impulse to shape the adversary trial inspection stage
so that it comes out (from the prosecutors’ perspective) the
“right” way. Sometimes, prosecutors don’t disclose eyewitness
exculpatory material because they simply don’t understand
what factors are influential in eyewitness performance.
Sometimes, prosecutors withhold information to convict the
men the prosecutors believe are guilty without interference
from “red herrings” that defense lawyers might manufacture
out of dissonant facts. 
The trial prosecutors in the wrongful-conviction Brady
cases, like workers in most production processes, evidently
adopted a “covert work system.”39 They decided to evade for-
mal disclosure requirements and buried alternative narratives
because they believed sharing the exculpatory facts would
interfere with achieving what they saw as the “real” goal tac-
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itly assigned to them by offi-
cials (or the public) to whom
they were accountable.
Turning a blind eye to these
practices encourages
upstream tunnel vision by
rewarding practitioners’ sur-
render to tunnel vision with a
“cleaner” trial inspection for
the hypothesis that they pre-
maturely decided is accurate.
Tunnel vision is a “cause” of wrongful convictions, but tunnel
vision is also an effect of the sharp-end operators’ discomfort
with the demands of the end-stage inspection machinery. A
resulting wrongful conviction is an “organizational accident”:
the police make the wrong choice; the prosecutors buy it too
quickly; and the defense and the jury are crippled in their
inspectors’ roles.
One of the lessons of the eyewitness-exoneration cases is
that judges must develop (and incorporate in their inspection-
stage calculations) an awareness of the gravitational pull away
from comprehensive and transparent investigation that is
always acting on production-stage practitioners. Science-con-
scious judges can put a brake on this rush down the “organi-
zational-accident” tunnel by making it clear that they know
what matters in eyewitness-evidence collection and that they
will insist on detailed documentation and disclosure. The story
model of aggregating eyewitness factors cannot work if details
(e.g., confidence-boosting comments, exposure to co-wit-
nesses, neglected alternative suspects) are not available to be
considered as part of the story. Diagnosing eyewitness errors
requires weighing not just catastrophic contradictions (e.g.,
the defendant is tall, the crime-night police report described a
midget) but also small narrative details (e.g., brief exposures to
co-witness accounts, or mug-book pictures of the defendant)
that accumulate and ultimately constitute the story of inadver-
tently corrupted eyewitness memory traces. 
The categorical exclusion of identification evidence because
of misconduct may become less frequent as law enforcement
gradually absorbs and adapts the modern “system variable”
science. But pretrial hearings that will allow the trial judge to
assess (on some basis other than laconic police reports) the
source and quality of the eyewitness evidence that is not
excluded and to decide which judicial tools—for example, in
limine edits of evidence, cautionary instructions—will assist
the jurors’ story-model inspection and will become more
important.40 Unless alert and informed judges play an active
role in protecting these aspects of story-model testing, sharp-
end practitioners worried about inspections will simply shift
from “don’t turn it over” to “don’t write it down,” a practice
that will end up hampering not only inspectors, but their fel-
low investigator-producers, who could be exploring alternative
theories and correcting their tunnel vision.
JUDICIAL-SYSTEM LEADERS: BEYOND INSPECTION
There is no arrangement of gears and switches in criminal
justice, no system in that sense that we can reach for and fix
with a wrench or a hammer. But, like it or not, the world of
criminal justice is a complex functioning ecosystem like a
pond or a swamp where well-meaning actions on this coast can
have disastrous, unanticipated impacts on the far shore.
Ignoring this fact will fulfill the axiom that the cause of prob-
lems is solutions. Judges cannot dictate all the choices made by
the system’s other actors, but they can influence them. In fact,
the nature of the system guarantees that judges cannot avoid
influencing those choices. Even judicial silence and inaction
will always have an impact.
There is opportunity as well as danger in this interdepen-
dency of criminal justice’s operators. A recent episode in the
history of the “friendly and energetic alliance” provides an
example. Law-enforcement practitioners were intrigued in the
aftermath of the DNA exonerations by the potential of the
“double-blind sequential” system-variable approach, but they
were uncomfortable that it had not been tested in the field. A
well-meaning, go-it-alone attempt by the general counsel of
the Chicago Police Department to conduct a field study to fill
the gap resulted in a kind of scientific travesty.41 But when an
actual alliance of science and law enforcement was formed by
a team composed of researchers, the Police Foundation, the
Center for Problem-Solving Policing, and the American
Judicature Society to design and execute a scientifically rigor-
ous field examination of the issue, it largely vindicated the
hopes of the advocates of that reform. 
In the process of organizing the study the researchers devel-
oped—and the frontline practitioners tested the practicality
of—a laptop-housed program that allows for both the effective
administration and the meticulous documentation of double-
blind sequential eyewitness-identification procedures. Seen
from the system level, this is an example of errors spurring us
to learn how the conditions facing the sharp-end investigators
and the inspecting trial courts could both be substantially
improved by an investment made by officials distant from the
scene in cooperatively identifying and disseminating a rela-
tively simple (and relatively inexpensive) technological
improvement. As we enter an era in which every patrol car will
have a laptop and every court will face subtle eyewitness evi-
dentiary issues, this is a development that all of the operators
jointly responsible for eyewitness “organizational accidents”
can work together to accelerate. Recognizing that the judiciary
doesn’t draft law-enforcement budgets or vote on law-enforce-
ment appropriations isn’t quite the same thing as saying that the
judiciary can’t find ways to signal its support for such an effort. 
But it is also worth focusing for a moment on the practice of
nonblaming learning from error, apart from that practice’s
immediate products. 
Working steadily on “organizational-accident” error analy-
sis can create an increased system consciousness among the
practitioners who staff the components of the criminal process.
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A disciplined commitment to non-blaming, team analysis of
error can lay the foundation for mobilizing the new ideal of
continuous quality improvement that is transforming the cul-
ture of contemporary medicine in criminal justice.
Inspection of the prosecution’s case during an adversary
trial before a lay jury is a permanent feature of our system. It
expresses fundamental American convictions about the rela-
tionship between the accused individual and the state. But the
goal of the trial process is to protect this innocent citizen from
the state. The DNA exonerations have raised concerns about
the adversary trial’s weaknesses even in that specific role,42 but
no one ever claimed that the trial’s role is to analyze the inves-
tigative and charging processes and make them more reliable
in future cases. A jury that believes that it has caught a faulty
investigation says “not guilty” and nothing more. Appellate
courts review the legal procedures; they do not reconsider the
facts, and their review is entirely backward looking. Both are
necessarily uninformative. 
The criminal justice system currently lacks the capacity for
“forward-looking accountability”43 that not only catches past
mistakes, but also anticipates and precludes future ones. 
The challenge for the judiciary presented by a new “organi-
zational-accident” understanding of how eyewitness errors
happen is not protecting a presumptively safe system from the
misconduct of sloppy (or even evil) human components—the
approach taken by the Warren Court in its misconduct-based
suppression cases. The challenge judges will confront is how
to invigorate and support a culture of constant, routine atten-
tion to safety and reliability in the criminal process. 
The missing weapon in our approach to error is not the
once-in-a-decade, blue-ribbon panel of dignitaries at the
chief justice and superintendent level, convened to redesign
the architecture of the criminal justice system. We have
examples of that vehicle now, and the judiciary has played a
leading role in several of them.44 When the goal is changing
structural elements of the system by legislation or rulemak-
ing, the political heft of those high-ranking players can be
useful, even essential.45
What we are missing is a consistent commitment to regular,
routine review of known errors and “near misses,” conducted
by experienced practitioners and stakeholders (for example,
victims’ rights professionals) supplemented where appropriate
by subject-matter experts and (at least in the beginning) by
specialists in analyzing the sources of system error and in the
error-review process itself. As Lucien Leape argued in his sem-
inal essay Error in Medicine:
The emphasis is on routine. Only when error is accepted
as an inevitable, although manageable, part of everyday
practice will it be possible to shift from a punitive to a
creative frame of mind that seeks out and identifies the
underlying system failures.46
For many reasons the best
hope for breathing life into the
“friendly and energetic alliance
in the noble cause of justice”
may lie in the judiciary: in
judges who exercise their
power to convene criminal jus-
tice stakeholders outside their
familiar adversary bunkers. The
alliance can serve the noble
cause not only by asking the
system’s actors to do a better
job playing “Whac-A-Mole”
and catching past errors one at a time, but also by asking them
to uncover and address the abiding latent weaknesses of the
system that will survive to cause future errors. 
What if, when the next wrongful eyewitness conviction is
revealed, the local judiciary amazes the world by calling for a
dispassionate, all-stakeholders examination of the error? Or
what if, when DNA results come back from the lab six months
after an arrest and show that law enforcement arrested the
wrong guy on the night of the crime, the judges suggest that a
team examination of this “near miss” might pay dividends,
both in terms of what worked and what nearly didn’t? 
Just as all aviation-industry participants and the public
expect the National Transportation Safety Board to convene a
mixed team of specialists to give an account of what happened
when a plane goes down, criminal practitioners and the public
could learn to expect that we will marshal a team including an
investigator or patrol supervisor, a prosecutor, a forensic sci-
entist, a defender, a judge, a victims’ representative, and the
jurisdiction’s risk management officers, joined by additional
specialists as needed, in a nonblaming process of dissecting the
record of what happened and sharing the account they have
developed. The goal would be to understand the gritty facts, to
do the sort of clinical fact-finding that inevitably suffers when
everyone in a turf-conscious, blue-ribbon group is anxiously
looking over his or her shoulder at potentially sweeping and
unwelcome law reforms. 
Continually working on improving system reliability means
changing the system’s culture, not just its architecture.
Overhauling institutional arrangements, identifying best
lineup practices, and devising checklists, as difficult as these
tasks might be, are the easy parts. Working on changing the
culture means concentrating on giving a primary place to
workmanship and professionalism instead of blame and disci-
pline. It means learning—as medicine learned—to treat errors
as “sentinel events” to be studied, not as embarrassments to be
buried.
The history of the eyewitness cases illuminates the potential
in a coherent program of nonblaming learning from error that
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includes the evaluation of “near misses,” and offers rewards
both within local systems and across scattered systems. A com-
mon national template for error review, enacted locally and
informed and challenged by diverse local experiences, could
substantially mitigate the fragmentation of American criminal
justice. 
These advantages can be multiplied if a simple mecha-
nism—a clearinghouse, or a wiki-style community of practi-
tioners, researchers, and policymakers—could be developed
for distributing and commenting on the reports of errors.47
Reading of a distant system’s experience of completed acci-
dents can alert currently isolated practitioners to the operation
of dangerous latent features in their own local systems.
Reading studies of remote “near misses” can reveal both those
dangerous latent features and potential fail-safe devices or pro-
cedures that are not present locally, but which provided
resilience and kept the near miss in another jurisdiction from
becoming a tragic “hit.” It can counteract the tendency of
today’s best practice to calcify into a ceiling that blocks future
improvements.
After an exoneration it is often very easy to see in hindsight
where a wrong decision was made. But congratulating our-
selves on recognizing past bad choices won’t get us very far. We
have to learn why the last bad decision looked like a good deci-
sion from the perspective of the mistaken detective or prose-
cutor or defender or judge at the time it was made. If we don’t,
the root causes of the last tragedy will continue to lie in wait
for the next decision maker who comes along. Accounts of
eyewitness wrongful-conviction cases give striking evidence of
how much we could learn about latent system defects from a
close, all-stakeholders analysis that incorporates the scientific
contributions48 that follow in this issue and the operations-ori-
ented insights of the sharp-end participants who do the work
on the streets and in the courts. 
The judiciary is uniquely well placed to stake out the com-
mon ground on which criminal-justice-system actors could
meet, to invite the participants onto that ground, and to help
them to defend that ground against the short-term pressures
for public pillories filled with scapegoats. 
The DNA exonerations have killed the illusion of an infalli-
ble justice system forever. From now on, the legitimacy of the
criminal justice system in the public’s eye will depend signifi-
cantly on that system’s willingness to confront its own fail-
ures.49 We will never have an exact count of those failures, but
when the most careful analyses we can muster suggest that the
wrongful-conviction rate may be as high as 6-15% in sexual-
assault cases,50 the exact count becomes almost irrelevant. All
of us in criminal justice have some explaining to do, and we
could start by explaining our practices to each other, without
trying to point fingers and assign blame. 
We have some prevention to do as well. When medicine
adopted its new approach to iatrogenic “sentinel events” and
moved toward self-consciously creating a culture of safety, it
quickly saved 120,000 patients’ lives in eighteen months.51 The
eyewitness cases, with their wrongfully convicted defendants
and their wrongfully free perpetrators (and the later victims
those perpetrators find) make a strong argument that the crim-
inal justice system’s natural leaders—the judges—armed with
an important body of scientific knowledge available for appli-
cation, could do some leading in that direction. 
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Footnotes 
1. THE INNOCENCE PROJECT, available at http://www.innocence
project.org (last visited May 9, 2012).
2. Often, these are cases of sexual assault plus robbery, or sexual
assault plus murder, but sexual assault is the common element
because that is where the DNA evidence is found. 
3. A special issue of LAW & HUMAN BEHAVIOR (volume 4, issue 4) in
1980 devoted to eyewitness behavior illustrates this early work. 
4. The system-variable concept in eyewitness identification was first
introduced in 1978 as a way of focusing the research experiments
on methods to improve the accuracy of eyewitness identifications
rather than simply showing that eyewitness identifications are
often unreliable. Gary L. Wells, Applied Eyewitness Testimony
Research:  System Variables and Estimator Variables, 36 J.
PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 1546 (1978).
An increasingly strong case can be made for the argu-ment that mistaken-eyewitness identification is the pri-mary cause of the conviction of the innocent in the
United States. The strongest single body of evidence in support
of this proposition is the collection of cases in which forensic
DNA testing was used to exonerate people who had been con-
victed by juries and were serving hard time (some on death
row). These cases are well documented and tracked at the
Innocence Project website and, as of this writing, there were
267 fully exonerated cases, of which 203 (76%) were cases
involving mistaken-eyewitness identification.1
This set of DNA exoneration cases is extremely interesting
because simple math and logic indicate that the number of
undiscovered cases has to be much larger than 203. Consider
just two simple multiplying factors. First, these 203 exonerees
were the lucky ones for whom the DNA-rich biological evi-
dence was preserved post-conviction. Most cases that were
tried prior to the advent of forensic DNA testing can never be
tested because the biological evidence was never properly col-
lected or because it was destroyed, was lost, or has deteriorated
to a non-testable state. But perhaps the biggest factor of all is
that only a small fraction of cases can ever be solved with
forensic DNA testing to begin with. Virtually every DNA exon-
eration case among the 203 was a case of sexual assault.2 This
is not because sexual assault witnesses are poor eyewitnesses;
in fact, they are perhaps the best single category of eyewit-
nesses because they get a closer and longer look at the perpe-
trator than do victims of most other types of crimes. Instead,
the reason most DNA exonerations are almost exclusively
cases of sexual assault is because sexual-assault cases are the
ones that leave behind biological evidence (principally semen)
that can be tested for claims of innocence and exclusion. And
yet, sexual-assault cases account for fewer than 5% of all eye-
witness-identification cases. This fact alone means that the 203
exonerations figure needs to be multiplied by a factor of 20
(yielding 4,060 cases) to account for cases of eyewitness
misidentification for crimes in which there was likely no bio-
logical evidence. And even this number is a conservative esti-
mate because it assumes that the 203 discovered wrongful con-
victions represent the full number of wrongful convictions for
sexual-assault cases, which cannot be true because of the sex-
ual-assault cases for which the evidence was not properly col-
lected or was lost, was destroyed, or has deteriorated. Hence,
the 203 cases (which continue to grow) can only represent the
tip of a much larger problem. In addition, because forensic
DNA testing can only solve a small subset of criminal cases, it
means that we are still heavily dependent on eyewitness-iden-
tification evidence for solving crimes. 
Although members of the public and much of the legal sys-
tem generally think of the eyewitness-identification problem
as having been “discovered” via the forensic DNA exonera-
tions, psychological scientists were “blowing the whistle” on
eyewitness-identification evidence long before the advent of
forensic DNA testing, which only began in the 1990s. Starting
in the 1970s, cognitive and social psychologists began con-
ducting controlled experiments in which unsuspecting people
witness a staged crime and later have to try to identify the
“perpetrator” (actually an accomplice of the researchers) from
a lineup.3 Throughout the last half of the 1970s and continu-
ing to this day, psychological scientists have published these
experiments in peer-reviewed social science journals and have
derived a large number of conclusions and recommendations
based on a better understanding of how mistaken identifica-
tions happen. 
In the development of this social science literature on eye-
witness identification, psychological scientists have placed a
premium on a particular type of variable called a “system vari-
able.”4 System variables are those that affect the chances of
mistaken identification, but over which the criminal justice
system has control. For instance, a lineup in which the sus-
pect is the only one who fits the witness’s description of the
perpetrator increases the chances of a mistaken identification,
and this is under the control of the criminal justice system. In
contrast, there are variables that affect the chances of mis-
taken identification over which the criminal justice system
has no control but instead can only estimate their impact;
these are called “estimator variables.” An example of an esti-
mator variable is whether the race of the perpetrator matches
the race of the witness. Research consistently shows that
cross-race identifications are less reliable than are within-race
identifications, but the justice system cannot control whether
the race of the witness is the same versus different from the
race of the perpetrator. 
The system-variable versus estimator-variable distinction is
important because only system variables can inform the justice
system about ways to improve the accuracy of eyewitness iden-
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5. A sequential lineup is one in which the witness does not view all
members of the lineup at the same time (a simultaneous lineup)
but instead views one photo at a time and makes a decision on
that one before viewing the next. Research generally supports the
finding that the sequential procedure produces fewer mistaken
identifications. Nancy Steblay, Jennifer Dysart, & Gary L. Wells,
Seventy-Two Tests of the Sequential Lineup Superiority Effect:  A
Meta-Analysis and Policy Discussion, 17 PSYCHOL. PUB. POL’Y. & L.
99 (2011).
6. A double-blind lineup procedure is one in which the person
administering the lineup is unaware of which lineup member is
the person of interest and which are merely fillers so as to prevent
the types of influence on the witness that are mentioned later in
this article. See GARY L. WELLS, EYEWITNESS IDENTIFICATION:  A
SYSTEM HANDBOOK (1988).
7. Gary L. Wells, Amina Memon, & Steven Penrod, Eyewitness
Evidence: Improving Its Probative Value, 7 PSYCHOL. SCI. PUB. INT. 45
(2006).
8. For a broad, general treatment of eyewitness-identification
research, see HANDBOOK OF EYEWITNESS PSYCHOLOGY (VOL 2):
MEMORY FOR PEOPLE (Roderick C. L. Lindsay et al. eds., 2007).
9. Gary L. Wells, The Psychology of Lineup Identifications, 14 J.
APPLIED SOC. PSYCHOL. 89 (1984).
tifications. Numerous jurisdictions have adopted a particular
“package” of lineup-procedure reforms based on psychological
scientists’ system-variable research—states such as New Jersey,
North Carolina, Ohio, and Wisconsin as well as places like
Dallas, Denver, Minneapolis, Boston, and Tampa, among oth-
ers. This package of reforms includes better ways to select
lineup fillers, better instructions to witnesses prior to their
viewing a lineup, the use of a sequential lineup procedure,5 the
use of double-blind lineup procedures,6 and the securing of a
certainty statement at the time of identification (prior to the
opportunity for extraneous factors to affect the witness’s cer-
tainty). All of these reforms are meant to increase the reliabil-
ity of the identification and are based on empirical evidence
that these system factors are critical to the chances that the
identification is mistaken.
For the most part, these system-variable findings and rec-
ommendations have been directed at law-enforcement agencies
because they are the ones in control of the procedures that are
used to collect eyewitness-identification evidence. But, as we
argue in this article, trial judges also play a very important role.
There is no guarantee that a given eyewitness identification
came from a lineup that followed procedural recommendations,
but once that identification evidence is presented at trial, it
makes a strong and compelling case against the defendant.
Research has found that jurors are likely to accept eyewitness
testimony as accurate as long as the eyewitness is confident and
consistent.7 Thus, it is critical that identification evidence is
evaluated with scrutiny to ensure that only reliable identifica-
tions make it into the courtroom to be heard by a jury. 
Trial judges are the ultimate arbiters of whether to accept
identification evidence as reliable. Commonly, this is played
out in a suppression hearing in which the defense might argue
that the identification was obtained in a way that was so sug-
gestive or otherwise problematic that it should be suppressed.
Accordingly, our goal in this article is to report some key sci-
entific findings regarding eyewitness identification that are rel-
evant to the trial court’s function of assessing eyewitness-iden-
tification reliability. In doing this, it is useful to remember that
reliance on the suppression hearing and the ruling of the trial
court regarding admissibility was fully in play for the 203 mis-
taken identifications that resulted in convictions and the
unknown number of others that (due to the absence of DNA
evidence) will never be detected. Just as in those cases, about
the only thing standing between a mistaken identification and
wrongful conviction is the ability of the trial court to make
effective rulings on the reliabil-
ity of eyewitness identifications
in pretrial hearings. 
SOME CRITICAL SCIENTIFIC
FINDINGS
The scientific literature on
eyewitness identification is too
large and vast to fully summa-
rize here. There are a number of
extensive published treatments
that are useful for a more com-
plete understanding of these
issues.8 Here, we extract some
of the more useful general prin-
ciples that help us understand
how mistaken identifications
and false certainty (being certain but mistaken) occur. Then, in
the next section (the Manson Test) we relate some of these gen-
eral observations to the task of the trial judge. 
RELATIVE JUDGMENTS
One of the staple conceptualizations of eyewitness-identifi-
cation errors is called the relative-judgment process. This con-
ceptualization holds that witnesses tend to make identifica-
tions from a lineup based on their judgments about who looks
the most similar to their memory of the perpetrator relative to
the other lineup members. Although this process often leads
witnesses to make accurate identifications when the culprit is
present in the lineup, it creates a dangerous situation when the
lineup does not contain the actual culprit because there is
always someone who looks more like the culprit than do the
remaining lineup members.9 The absence of the culprit in a
lineup simply means that the police have focused their inves-
tigation on the wrong person. It is an extremely difficult task
for a witness to detect the absence of the perpetrator in a
lineup, in part because the relative-judgment process does not
provide a mechanism by which witnesses may decide to
“reject” the lineup. To the extent that witnesses assume that
the police are showing them a lineup that contains the perpe-
trator, witnesses relying on a relative-judgment process will
tend to make positive identifications in instances in which
they should be saying, “It’s none of them.” There is no way to
know how often the suspect in the lineup is actually the cul-
prit, but because there is no reasonable-cause criterion to place
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most part... 
system-variable 
findings and 
recommendations
have been
directed at law
enforcement
agencies[, but...]
trial judges also
play a very
important role.”
10. Gary L. Wells, What Do We Know About Eyewitness Identification?,
48 AM. PSYCHOLOGIST 553 (1993).  
11. This test, and the functional-size versus nominal-size distinction,
has been in use since 1979 among eyewitness researchers. Gary L.
Wells, Michael R. Leippe, & Thomas M. Ostrom, Guidelines for
Empirically Assessing the Fairness of a Lineup, 3 LAW & HUM.
BEHAV. 285 (1979).
12. “Mock witnesses” are actually not witnesses at all. They are sim-
ply people who are given the verbal description of the culprit that
was provided by the actual eyewitness, and their task is to guess
which person is the suspect in the case. 
someone in a lineup (police can
conduct a lineup based on a
mere hunch), the number of
culprit-absent lineups being
shown to witnesses could
potentially be quite high.
Indeed, in all of the DNA exon-
eration cases involving eyewit-
ness identifications, the actual
culprit was not in the lineup
and the witnesses made identi-
fications nevertheless.
Perhaps the best evidence of
the operation of the relative-
judgment process is from
experiments that use the
“removal without replacement”
procedure.10 This procedure involves showing witnesses to a
staged crime one of two lineups. Some witnesses view a lineup
that contains a picture of the culprit among a set of filler pho-
tos, and other witnesses view the exact same lineup except that
the photo of the culprit is removed and is not replaced with
another photo. If positive identifications of the culprit in the
culprit-present lineup are a result of true recognition rather
than a relative-judgment process, then all of the positive cul-
prit identifications should shift to “not there” responses when
the culprit is excluded from the lineup. In an experiment test-
ing this idea, 200 eyewitnesses to a staged crime were shown
either a culprit-present lineup or a lineup in which the culprit
was removed without replacement. As Table 1 shows, the
majority of the witnesses who identified the culprit in a cul-
prit-present lineup would simply have identified someone else
(primarily #2, whose rate of identification went from 13%
when the culprit was present to 38% when the culprit was
removed) if the culprit had not been present. Hence, it seems
that rather than choosing the culprit because they genuinely
recognized him, witnesses simply chose whichever person best
fit their memory of the perpetrator.
The degree to which the suspect seems to fit the witness’s
memory of the perpetrator is highly dependent on the proper-
ties of the lineup itself. For example, if a lineup is somehow
biased against the suspect (i.e., the suspect stands out in some
way or the fillers in the lineup do not fit the witness’s descrip-
tion of the culprit), then the suspect will be the one who, rel-
ative to the other lineup members, is the most similar to the
witness’s memory of the culprit. Given what we know about
the relative-judgment process, a biased lineup drastically
increases the chances that an innocent suspect will be mistak-
enly identified. Accordingly, researchers have made a sharp
distinction between the nominal size of a lineup, which refers
to the number of photographs that are in the set, and the func-
tional size of the lineup.11 The functional size refers to the
number of fillers who make viable alternatives to the suspect,
and is calculated by taking the reciprocal of the proportion of
“mock witnesses”12 who choose the suspect from the lineup.
For example, if 50 of 100 mock witnesses choose the suspect
from a six-person lineup, the reciprocal is 100/50 = 2.0, thus
the lineup has a functional size of only 2; if 20 picked the sus-
pect, functional size would be 100/20 = 5.0, and so on. When
a lineup includes members who do not fulfill their role as
acceptable alternates to the suspect, the lineup is effectively
smaller than its actual size, and the risk of mistaken identifica-
tion is increased. For example, a six-person lineup in which
only three members fit the witness’s description of the perpe-
trator increases the risk of mistaken identification from one in
six to one in three. In a biased lineup, a relative-judgment
process will be even more likely to result in a positive identifi-
cation of the suspect, regardless of whether the suspect is the
perpetrator of the crime. 
One way to help witnesses avoid relying solely on a relative-
judgment process during the identification task is to make them
aware that the actual culprit may not be present in the lineup.
Researchers have demonstrated that instructing witnesses that
the culprit “might or might not be present” (sometimes called
a warning or a pre-lineup admonition) can greatly decrease the
rate at which mistaken identifications occur. In the original
study of instruction effects, 78% of witnesses who were not
explicitly warned that the culprit might or might not be present
made mistaken identifications from a culprit-absent lineup; in
contrast, the mistaken-identification rate dropped to 33% when
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TABLE 1. RATES OF CHOOSING LINEUP MEMBERS WHEN A CULPRIT IS PRESENT VERSUS REMOVED
LINEUP MEMBER
1 2 3 4 5 6 NO CHOICE
CULPRIT PRESENT 3% 13% 54% 3% 3% 3% 21%
CULPRIT REMOVED (WITHOUT REPLACEMENT) 6% 38% –– 12% 7% 5% 32%
*Culprit is in position 3 for culprit-present lineup and removed (without replacement) for culprit-absent lineup.  
Source:  Gary L. Wells, What Do we Know About Eyewitness Identification?, 48 AM. PSYCHOLOGIST, 553, 561(1993).
13. Roy S. Malpass & Patricia G. Devine, Eyewitness Identification:
Lineup Instructions and the Absence of the Offender, 66 J. APPLIED
PSYCHOL. 482 (1981).
14. See the most recent meta-analysis (quantitative review) of the
sequential versus simultaneous difference. Steblay et al., supra
note 5, at 99-139.
15. Gary L. Wells, Mark Small, Roy S. Malpass, Steven Penrod,
Solomon Fulero, & C. A. Elizabeth Brimacombe, Eyewitness
Identification Procedures:  Recommendations for Lineups and
Photospreads, 23 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 603 (1998). 
16. Gary L. Wells & Amy L. Bradfield, “Good, You Identified the
Suspect”: Feedback to Eyewitnesses Distorts Their Reports of the
Witnessing Experience, 83 J. APPLIED PSYCHOL. 360 (1998).
the eyewitnesses were given this warning.13 And it is not the
case that witnesses were simply choosing less in general; 87%
of the eyewitnesses accurately identified the culprit from the
culprit-present lineup after receiving the warning. Rather, the
instruction serves to alert witnesses to the possibility that the
culprit is not in the lineup. Thus, in cases in which the lineup
does not contain the culprit, witnesses who receive this instruc-
tion may be less likely to rely on a relative-judgment process to
make an identification. It should be noted that research using
the removal-without-replacement procedure described above
always included the “may or may not be present” instruction,
and witnesses still sometimes failed to detect the absence of the
perpetrator in culprit-absent lineups, thereby making inaccu-
rate identifications. However, the rate at which these mistaken
identifications occur is much lower when witnesses are given
this pre-lineup admonition, leading researchers to recommend
that all lineups include this instruction. 
The underlying theme that has emerged through the scien-
tific study of eyewitness identifications is that witnesses’ iden-
tification behavior is a reflection of multiple other factors
besides the strength of their memory. The makeup of the photo
lineup and witnesses’ expectations regarding the presence of
the culprit greatly influence identification choices, and
although the “may or may not be present” instruction cuts
down on mistaken identifications, witnesses still have a ten-
dency to rely on relative judgments. In an attempt to reduce
this tendency, researchers developed an innovative lineup pro-
cedure called the sequential lineup, which involves presenting
the lineup photos in a sequential fashion rather than simulta-
neously.14 Hence, the eyewitness views only one lineup mem-
ber at a time and makes a decision regarding each person
before viewing another lineup member. The theoretical basis of
this method is that it reduces the natural propensity for eye-
witnesses to make relative judgments. Compared to the tradi-
tional simultaneous procedure, the sequential procedure pro-
duces a lower rate of mistaken identifications with little loss in
the rate of accurate identifications. 
CERTAINTY (AND VIEW AND ATTENTION)
MALLEABILITY
Mistaken identification per se does not put an innocent per-
son at risk for wrongful conviction. Instead, it is a mistaken
identification from an eyewitness who is highly certain that
runs the high risk of wrongfully convicting the identified per-
son. The certainty that an eyewitness expresses in his or her
identification during testimony is the most powerful single
determinant of whether or not observers will believe the eye-
witness made an accurate identification.15 Accordingly, psy-
chological scientists have devoted a great deal of work in
recent years to figuring out how mistaken eyewitnesses end up
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being sure that they have made
a correct identification. Indeed,
every DNA exoneration case is
exactly like that; the witness
was mistaken but certain. 
When an eyewitness says, “I
am positive that the man sitting
in court is the man who robbed
me,” people naturally presume
that the witness is saying, “That
person sitting there so closely
matches my very good memory
for the perpetrator that I can
only conclude it is one and the
same person.” In fact, however,
witnesses often express this
high certainty not only when
the witnesses are mistaken but
also when they have identified
someone who does not look very much like the actual perpe-
trator at all. The key to understanding this problem is to rec-
ognize that eyewitnesses’ expressions of certainty in an identi-
fication are actually beliefs or feelings that they are right or
wrong about the identification they made. As such, these
beliefs or feelings can be influenced by a large number of fac-
tors that have little or nothing to do with the accuracy of the
identifications or how good a witness’s memory is. And as we
will describe below, these factors often come into play after
witnesses have already made an identification for which they
were actually quite uncertain. 
Given that witnesses’ certainty reports reflect a belief in the
likely accuracy of their identification, it is not difficult to imag-
ine that witnesses would feel more certain if they were told by
the lineup administrator that they “correctly” picked out the
suspect. Indeed, confirming feedback of this sort has pervasive
effects on eyewitnesses’ memory; not only does it inflate wit-
nesses’ current certainty, but it also distorts witnesses’ retro-
spective reports of how certain they recall having been at the
time of the identification as well as distorting their recollections
about the witnessing experience. This “post-identification feed-
back effect” was first demonstrated in an experiment in 1998,
in which 352 witnesses viewed a crime video and made mis-
taken identifications from a culprit-absent lineup.  Following
their identification, some witnesses were told “Good, you iden-
tified the suspect,” whereas others were not told anything.16 All
witnesses then answered a number of testimony-relevant ques-
tions about view (“How good was the view you had of the cul-
prit?” “How well could you make out details of the culprit’s
face?”), attention (“How much attention did you pay to the cul-
prit’s face?”), and certainty (“At the time of your identification,
“The certainty that
an eyewitness
expresses... 
during testimony
is the most 
powerful single
determinant of
whether or not
observers will
believe the 
eyewitness made
an accurate 
identification.”
17. Gary. L. Wells, Tamara. J. Ferguson, & Roderick. C. L. Lindsay,
The Tractability of Eyewitness Confidence and Its Implications for
Triers of Fact, 66 J. APPLIED PSYCHOL. 688 (1981); Elizabeth Loftus
& Gary L. Wells, The Malleability of Eyewitness Confidence: Co-
Witness and Perseverance Effects, 79 J. APPLIED PSYCHOL. 714
(1994); John. S. Shaw III, & Kevin. A. McClure, Repeated
Postevent Questioning Can Lead to Elevated Levels of Eyewitness
Confidence, 20 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 629 (1996). 
18. Geoffrey R. Loftus & Erin M. Harley, Why Is It Easier to Identify
Someone Close Than Far Away?, 12 PSYCHONOMIC BULL. & REV., 43-
65 (2005).
19. Nancy M. Steblay, A Meta-Analytic Review of the Weapon Focus
Effect, 16 LAW & HUM. BEHAV., 413-24 (1992).
20. Christian A. Meissner & John C. Brigham, Thirty Years of
Investigating the Own Race Bias in Memory for Faces:  A Meta
Analytic Review, 7 PSYCHOL. PUB. POL’Y. & L. 3 (2001). One of the
best interpretations for the cross-race identification problem is
that when people see a face from their own race, they notice ways
in which it is different from other members of their own race,
whereas when they see a face from another race, they notice how
it differs from faces of people from other races. Daniel T. Levin,
Race as a Visual Feature:  Using Visual Search and Perceptual
Discrimination Tasks to Understand Face Categories and the Cross-
Race Recognition Deficit, 129 J. EXPERIMENTAL PSYCHOL.: GEN. 559
(2000). The latter strategy is, of course, totally ineffective for
picking the person from a lineup in which all members are the
same race as the perpetrator. 
21. Baruch Fischhoff, Hindsight ≠ Foresight: The Effect of Outcome
Knowledge on Judgment Under Uncertainty, 1 J. EXPERIMENTAL
PSYCHOL.:  HUM. PERCEPTION & PERFORMANCE 288 (1975).
how certain were you that you
identified the actual culprit?”).
Results of that first study and
dozens of subsequent studies
have shown that confirming
feedback strongly inflates wit-
nesses’ estimates of how good
their view was, how well they
could make out details of the
culprit’s face, how closely they
attended to the culprit during
the crime, and how certain they
recall having been at the time of
the identification. It is impor-
tant to note that these inflated
reports are distortions; after all, the feedback did not occur until
after the identification was made.
There are many other factors that can occur post-identifica-
tion that compromise the integrity of an eyewitness’s testi-
mony. For example, repeatedly questioning the witness, brief-
ing the witness about what questions might be encountered in
a cross-examination, and informing a witness that a co-witness
supposedly made the same identification decision have all
been found to inflate witness confidence, independent of iden-
tification accuracy.17 Furthermore, once a witness is exposed to
post-identification information of this nature, his or her ability
to revert to pre-feedback judgments regarding certainty, atten-
tion, view, etc., is, in effect, lost. And there is often no record
of whether this type of post-identification suggestion took
place, making it impossible to judge whether the witness’s ret-
rospective certainty report has been contaminated by new
information. For this reason, eyewitness researchers have
made two key recommendations in an effort to preserve wit-
ness confidence as an indicator of identification accuracy.
First, the lineup should always be administered by someone
who is kept “blind” to the identity of the suspect in the lineup.
It is well established in the psychological literature that a per-
son’s expectations can affect the behavior of others, whether it
be through inadvertent nonverbal communications or overt
suggestion. In the case of an identification task, the lineup
administrator’s knowledge or expectations about the suspect
could influence the manner in which the witness behaves. A
simple way to avoid this issue is to ensure that the person
administering the lineup is not aware of which lineup member
is the suspect (i.e., “double-blind” administration). Under
these conditions, the lineup administrator could not be a
source of external influence on the witness.  Second, a cer-
tainty statement should always be recorded immediately fol-
lowing the identification decision. A confidence measure taken
under double-blind conditions would provide a pure measure
of the eyewitness’s memory-based confidence. If the witness’s
certainty becomes inflated later on, then the initial measure of
certainty can provide a reference point for the witness’s true
confidence at the time of the identification.
THE ROLE OF MEMORY STRENGTH
As a general rule, all problems with eyewitness-identification
evidence are compounded when memory strength is weaker.
So, for example, the tendency to rely on relative judgments is
stronger when the witness has a weaker memory. Hence, the
removal-without-replacement effect, the influence of poorly
chosen lineup fillers, and the failure to properly instruct the
witness prior to the lineup are all more robust when the eye-
witness’s memory is weaker. Likewise, the post-identification
feedback effect is stronger when the witness has a weaker mem-
ory. Therefore, it is critical that trial judges appreciate the myr-
iad factors that contribute to weak memories. For instance, we
know that normal human vision does not permit a clear recog-
nition of faces from distances of more than about 200 feet (and
that assumes excellent lighting).18 The use of a weapon by a
perpetrator tends to impair memory for the perpetrator’s face
because it draws attention to the weapon and, hence, less time
is spent looking at the face.19 We know that cross-racial identi-
fication is less reliable than within-race identification because
of the ineffective strategies for processing faces of people from
another race than our own.20
Some variables that make eyewitness memory weaker might
seem at first glance to be common sense. But, as cognitive psy-
chologists have long documented, common sense has certain
illusory properties that permit it to “go both ways.”21 For
example, one might argue that if someone threatened or fright-
ened you, you would never forget that face and the person’s
image would become permanently ingrained in your memory.
It makes a certain common sense to accept that argument. But,
in fact, the opposite is true. Events that evoke fear and stress
actually impair memory for the details of the event, including
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the face of the person who evoked the reaction.22 This too
makes common sense if one realizes that the primary response
to fear is “fight or flight,” which is an automatic self-preserva-
tion mechanism that absorbs the cognitive capacity of the per-
son and leaves little brain capacity for forming long-term
memories. Part of the reason that people generally buy the idea
that stress and fear produce better memory (when in fact they
produce poorer memory) is because of a confusion about the
level of memory that is operating. It is true that if someone
threatens you or points a gun at you, you will never forget that
the event happened. But that is not the same as having formed
a reliable memory for the details of the event, such as the pre-
cise facial characteristics of the perpetrator. 
The general principle that suggestion (e.g., from a biased
lineup or from post-identification feedback) has its greatest
effects when the witness’s memory is weaker needs to be kept
in perspective. Suggestion effects are likely to be moderated
only when the memory is extremely good. So, for instance, a
victim who is abducted by an unmasked person and held cap-
tive for hours or days in which the abductor’s face is in full
view is not likely to be easily influenced by suggestion regard-
ing the identity of the abductor. Generally speaking, however,
eyewitnesses see the perpetrator for only minutes, sometimes
even seconds, often under poor viewing conditions, while
frightened or confused, under cross-racial conditions, and so
on. Hence, the failure to properly instruct a witness prior to a
lineup, the use of fillers who do not fit the description of the
perpetrator, the failure to use double-blind procedures, and the
failure to secure a certainty statement at the time of the identi-
fication are serious problems in almost any eyewitness-identi-
fication case. 
ASSESSING RELIABILITY AT THE TRIAL-COURT LEVEL
Trial courts across the United States tend to rely on one or
another version of the U.S. Supreme Court’s 1977 test as
spelled out in Manson v. Braithwaite23 (hereafter called Manson)
to make rulings in suppression hearings. Although many indi-
vidual states have their own version of Manson, the guidelines
all revolve around the same general proposition:  a two-
pronged test that inevitably rests on the “totality of the cir-
cumstances.” But within the language and process of the
Manson test rests a huge problem that has been identified by
eyewitness scientists.24 This problem helps explain why trial
courts are not likely to be able to weed out unreliable identifi-
cations using the Manson-type approach.
The Manson test functions as a two-pronged assessment
designed to evaluate the likely reliability of an eyewitness’s
identification. The first prong involves determining whether
the identification procedure was unnecessarily suggestive to
begin with. Suggestive procedures include using a show-up
procedure when the police could have conducted a lineup,
conducting a lineup in which the suspect stood out, failing to
tell the eyewitness that the cul-
prit might not be in the lineup,
showing the witness a photo of
the suspect before conducting a
lineup, telling a witness that his
or her choice was correct, or
conducting a second lineup
procedure in which the only
person in common was the sus-
pect. If the procedure is not
believed to have involved sug-
gestion, then the identification
evidence is admitted. If the pro-
cedure is found to have contained unnecessary suggestion,
then the second stage of the test pits the distorting influence of
the suggestive procedure against five criteria intended to assess
reliability. These criteria include the witness’s opportunity to
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FIGURE 1. THE POST-IDENTIFICATION FEEDBACK
EFFECT:  PERCENTAGES OF EYEWITNESSES WHO
SCORED AT THE EXTREME (E.G., RECALLING THAT
THEY WERE TOTALLY CERTAIN) WITH AND WITHOUT
CONFIRMING FEEDBACK
view the offender, the witness’s
degree of attention during the
crime, the level of certainty
demonstrated at the time of
identification, the accuracy of
the witness’s description of the
offender, and the time elapsed
between the crime and the pre-
trial identification. The Manson
test is intended to determine
whether the identification,
despite having involved sugges-
tive procedures, is nevertheless
reliable.
There is nothing inherently
wrong with the idea that deter-
minations regarding the reliability of an identification should
be made by weighing a set of reliability factors against the sug-
gestion itself. However, when Manson was decided by the U.S.
Supreme Court in 1977, there was no scientific literature on
eyewitness identification. The factors spelled out to assess reli-
ability were based on the commonsense notions of the court at
the time and have since been found to perform quite poorly in
predicting reliability, especially for cases in which the identifi-
cation involved suggestive procedures. 
The first thing to note about these criteria is that three of
the five criteria are self-reports from the witness (view, atten-
tion, and certainty). Although there are occasions in which a
witness’s statement about view might be contrasted with objec-
tive measures (such as when a witness claims to have been 30
feet away whereas reconstruction of the crime scene shows the
distance to have been 100 feet), view is generally assessed sim-
ply by asking witnesses if they had a good view and could
make out details of the face. Similarly, attention and certainty
are subjective judgments and cannot be gauged against objec-
tive measures. There are a number of problems with people’s
estimates of their view, attention, and certainty. But our pri-
mary concern about these three self-report variables is that
they are inflated by the suggestive procedures themselves. The
use of suggestive procedures can lead the eyewitness to
enhance (distort) his or her retrospective self-reports in ways
that help ensure the witness’s high standing on these Manson
criteria, thereby leading to a dismissal of the suggestiveness
concern. The consequence of this is that the presence of sug-
gestion is likely to always result in admission of the eyewit-
ness-identification evidence. Manson is flawed in such a way
that the very presence of suggestive procedures at the time of
the identification will make it almost certain the witness will
pass the admissibility test.
The other two Manson criteria (description and time
elapsed) are not much better predictors of reliability. Studies
examining the relations between descriptions and identification
accuracy have found no meaningful correlation between the
two.25 What is perhaps most puzzling about using the match of
the witness’s description to the identified person as a measure
of reliability is that one would expect the identified person to
match the description; after all, it was probably because he or
she fit the description that a person was placed in the lineup in
the first place. But sometimes, the witness manages to identify
from a lineup a suspect who does not fit the initial description
of the culprit (e.g., the identified person has an apparent scar or
a tattoo that was not included in the witness’s prior descrip-
tion). After the identification is made, however, the witness’s
description may begin to change, now incorporating this aspect
of the person’s appearance into descriptions that are given later
on. It is for this reason that the judge and the court must be
very careful when assessing the match between the identified
person and the witness’s description, ensuring that the descrip-
tion being examined is the description that was given prior to
the occurrence of an identification procedure. Otherwise, there
is no way to distinguish between parts of the description that
were actually recollected from the witnessed event and ones
that were gleaned from the identification. 
As for the criteria concerning the time elapsed between the
crime and the pretrial identification, this factor in and of itself
should not be a primary component upon which reliability
evaluations are made. It is possible for a witness to positively
identify the perpetrator from a lineup two years after the crime
occurred, just as it is possible for the witness to fail to identify
the perpetrator only minutes after the crime occurred. The
important thing to know about memory as it relates to the pas-
sage of time is that the greatest drop in memory occurs very
soon after the witnessed event—even within minutes. Thus,
there may be little difference between a 1- and 2-day delay or
even a 30- and 60-day delay. Although the time elapsed
between the crime and identification can provide a reference
point to assess likely memory strength, it should not be treated
as a sole determinant of reliability.
It is important to highlight that the 203 DNA exonerations
of individuals who were mistakenly identified and wrongfully
convicted had the benefit of Manson when they were tried. The
framework of Manson makes it absurdly difficult to pinpoint
and exclude identifications resulting from even the most egre-
gious forms of suggestion, and it fails to provide an incentive
for law enforcement to reduce suggestiveness. In fact, we argue
that it may actually create an incentive favoring suggestive pro-
cedures. Suggestive procedures almost guarantee that witnesses
will pass the Manson test (because it will inflate their certainty,
attention, and view “scores”). If the use of suggestive proce-
dures rarely results in suppression of the identification, then
there is no reason for law enforcement to avoid using these pro-
cedures, especially since suggestive identification procedures
lead the witness to be more credible to the judge and jury at the
time of trial.  Hence, what incentive is there for law enforce-
ment to avoid suggestive procedures and, conversely, what are
the incentives to continue to use suggestive procedures? 
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When considering the predicament that has resulted from
the reliance on a Manson-type test for determinations about
identification evidence, it is useful to remember that full sup-
pression is not the only option for dealing with the presence of
suggestion. There are many other case-tailored alternatives
that can limit the testimony to those elements of the identifi-
cation that were likely uncontaminated by the suggestion. For
example, defense attorneys have the option of crafting motions
in limine to limit rather than totally exclude the identification
(e.g., not permitting the witness to testify about his or her cer-
tainty when post-identification feedback has contaminated
certainty). Other remedies that defense attorneys can ask for
include judicial instructions or expert testimony. Full admis-
sion without factoring in a cost for the suggestion not only
puts the accused individual at a risk of wrongful conviction
but also imposes no repercussions for the use of suggestive
procedures, thereby perpetuating the failure to deter law
enforcement from using these procedures.
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS
Mistaken-eyewitness identification is the primary cause of
convictions of the innocent, and trial judges are one of the
safeguards that can prevent these miscarriages of justice. But
an effective trial judge needs more than a conventional legal
understanding of the problems associated with eyewitness-
identification evidence. A mature social science literature has
emerged that shows a tendency for conventional legal under-
standings (a) to fail to appreciate the power of suggestive pro-
cedures, (b) to rely too much on eyewitness-identification cer-
tainty, (c) to have faulty views of factors that impair memory,
and (d) to generally fail to create disincentives for suggestive
procedures.
Trial judges are the gatekeepers to the eyewitness-identifi-
cation evidence that is permitted in court. How are judges to
learn about the social science that can increase the sophistica-
tion of their admission decisions? Continuing judicial educa-
tion programs would be one way to learn more. The National
Center for State Courts, the American Judges Association, and
the American Judicature Society might also develop programs
that incorporate the social science literature on eyewitness
identification and disseminate that information through work-
shops, presentations, and written materials. For some eyewit-
ness cases, the use of eyewitness experts in court can be yet
another mechanism for judges to learn more about some of the
issues associated with eyewitness identification. But, the eye-
witness-identification literature is a highly specialized area in
scientific psychology, so simply drawing on the testimony of a
psychologist from a local community college would not neces-
sarily be a good idea. Generally speaking, a good eyewitness-
identification expert is one who has published research on eye-
witness issues in peer-reviewed journals and regularly
reviewed the published research of other eyewitness experts.
The use of an eyewitness expert at a pretrial hearing (rather
than or in addition to trial) can be particularly useful because
it affords the judge a relatively unconstrained setting (in the
absence of jurors) in which to question the expert.  In difficult
cases, the judge could then consider permitting the expert to
also testify at trial. 
There is a high cost to mistaken-eyewitness identifications.
Any time an innocent person is convicted, the guilty party goes
free, which is a fact that has played out visibly in the DNA
exoneration cases. Moreover, trust in the legal system hinges
very critically on its ability to avoid convicting the innocent, a
trust that has suffered some significant blows in the news sto-
ries that have surrounded the 203 (and counting) DNA exon-
eration mistaken-eyewitness cases. 
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Although no one knows precisely how many wrongfulconvictions occur each year, a study examining DNA-exoneration cases estimated that in 3.3% to 5% of the
capital rape-murder convictions in the U.S. from 1982-1989,
the defendants were innocent.1 If this percentage of wrongful
convictions applied to other types of crimes, there would be
33,000 to 50,000 wrongful felony convictions per year in the
U.S.2
Eyewitness error is the leading cause of wrongful convic-
tions.3 In fact, Professor Gary Wells and other prominent eye-
witness researchers stated that “cases of proven wrongful con-
victions of innocent people have consistently shown that mis-
taken eyewitness identification is responsible for more of these
wrongful convictions than all the other causes combined.”4
For example, in the first 271 DNA-exoneration cases, eyewit-
ness error occurred in 75% of the cases.5 In many of the DNA-
exoneration cases, multiple eyewitnesses identified the defen-
dant as the perpetrator of the crime and several of the defen-
dants were on death row when they were exonerated.6
Because eyewitness evidence is frequently the sole or pri-
mary evidence in a criminal case, the justice system needs to
enhance the ability of judges, other legal professionals, and
jurors to assess its accuracy.7  This article presents a method for
analyzing the accuracy of eyewitness testimony that can help
judges achieve this vital goal (hereafter referred to as
“Method”).
It consists of four steps. First, determine if during the inter-
views law enforcement obtained the maximum amount of
information from the eyewitness, did not contaminate the eye-
witness’s memory of the crime, or artificially increased the eye-
witness’s confidence. Second, ascertain if the identification
procedures in the case were fair and unbiased. Third, evaluate
how the eyewitness factors at the crime scene likely affected
accuracy. Finally, make conclusions about the probable accu-
racy of the eyewitness testimony. Scientific guidelines for mak-
ing these determinations are discussed.
This article also describes how judges can use this Method
to better perform judicial functions related to eyewitness testi-
mony in criminal cases, such as determining whether to grant
a motion to suppress an eyewitness identification, deciding
whether an eyewitness expert’s testimony should be admitted
at trial, and evaluating eyewitness accuracy in bench trials and
on appeal. 
THE CAUSES OF EYEWITNESS ERROR
To understand why eyewitness error occurs and what safe-
guards are needed to prevent and reduce eyewitness error, it is
first necessary to understand the nature of memory.8 Although
an eyewitness’s memory of a crime can be reasonably accurate,
it does not operate like a video camera.9 Accordingly, it is not
like a videotape passively created that the eyewitness can replay
at will to create an exact replica of the crime. Instead, memory
is an active, ongoing, dynamic process that consists of four
stages: perception, encoding, storage, and retrieval.10
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Perception involves noticing an event or object and paying
attention to it.11 Consequently, to recall a crime an eyewitness
must first notice and attend to it. Expectations, needs, attitudes,
interests, biases, and knowledge affect what an eyewitness
attends to during a crime.12 Thus, a hairstylist may pay more
attention to the perpetrator’s hair than other eyewitnesses. 
Encoding, the second stage of memory, consists of the men-
tal work required to transform an eyewitness’s perceptions into
a memory of the crime.13 Normally an eyewitness is unaware
of the process of encoding. Encoding involves interpretation
and making inferences, so encoding is colored by the meaning
the eyewitness gives to the crime.14 This meaning, like one’s
perceptions, is affected by one’s expectations, needs, attitudes,
interests, biases, and prior knowledge.15 Moreover, eyewitness
factors present during the crime, such as a weapon, disguise,
stress, etc., can interfere with the eyewitness’s encoding of the
crime. Eyewitnesses can also rapidly forget the details of a
crime.16
Storage, the third stage of memory, concerns the mainte-
nance of information encoded about the crime.17 The eyewit-
ness’s storage of information about a crime is an active and
dynamic process rather than a quiet, warehouse type of stor-
age.18 Consequently, post-event information from a variety of
different sources, such as other eyewitnesses, the police, the
prosecutor, or the media can permanently alter the eyewit-
ness’s memory of the crime.19 Generally an eyewitness is
unaware that his or her memory has been altered by post-event
information that may or may not be accurate.20 Moreover, the
post-event information may not only affect the eyewitness’s
memory of the crime, but also the eyewitness’s ability to iden-
tify the perpetrator of the crime.21
During retrieval, the final stage of memory, the eyewitness
recalls the crime or attempts to recognize the perpetrator dur-
ing an identification procedure.22 When an eyewitness recalls a
crime, he or she unconsciously reconstructs his or her memory
of the crime from several different sources of information.23
They include the eyewitness’s memory of the crime, and to fill
in gaps in his or her memory, the eyewitness unknowingly uses
his or her expectations, attitudes, beliefs, biases, knowledge of
similar events, and post-event information.24 The eyewitness
automatically blends these different sources of information
together to create a memory of the crime that appears seamless
and coherent but that may contain inaccuracies.25 Furthermore,
the eyewitness’s ability to recognize the perpetrator during an
identification procedure may be compromised by factors pre-
sent during the crime (e.g., weapon, disguise, stress, etc.), post-
event information, or the passage of time.26
Not only is an eyewitness’s memory of a crime malleable,
but so is an eyewitness’s confidence.27 Many factors can
increase an eyewitness’s confidence but not his or her accu-
racy,28 such as repeated questioning of an eyewitness, confirm-
ing feedback (e.g., “Good, you have identified the suspect.”),
or learning that another eyewitness has identified the sus-
pect.29 Thus, by the time of trial there is little or no relationship
between eyewitness confidence and accuracy. 
Post-event information has its greatest effect on an eyewit-
ness’s confidence for inaccurate information.30 Generally the
eyewitness is unaware that post-event information has
increased his or her confidence. Increases in eyewitness confi-
dence can cause wrongful convictions because eyewitness con-
fidence is usually the most important factor the trier of fact
relies upon in evaluating eyewitness accuracy.31
THE SAFEGUARDS THAT ARE NECESSARY TO PREVENT
AND REDUCE EYEWITNESS ERROR
Eyewitness researchers have not only discovered what fac-
tors affect eyewitness accuracy during the crime, but have also
discovered what safeguards are necessary to minimize eyewit-
ness errors during interviews and identification productions.32
Conducting fair and unbiased eyewitness interviews and iden-
tification procedures is the best means available to the criminal
justice system to reduce eyewitness error.33
For example, researchers have learned that during eyewit-
ness interviews, law enforcement officers frequently make three
types of errors: (1) they fail to obtain much of the information
that the eyewitness knows about the crime; (2) they contami-
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nate the eyewitness’s memory of the crime with post-event infor-
mation; and (3) they increase the eyewitness’s confidence.34
In the 1980s, Fisher and Geiselman began developing a
method of interviewing eyewitnesses that significantly reduced
law enforcement errors.35 Scientific studies comparing their
cognitive interview with the standard law enforcement inter-
view show that it increases accurate information obtained from
eyewitnesses by 35% to 75%.36 The cognitive interview also
decreases the probability that law enforcement will contami-
nate the eyewitness’s memory of the crime or increase the eye-
witness’s confidence.37
Because of the salient role identification procedures play in
eyewitness error, researchers have also devoted much time and
effort to studying them. In determining what safeguards are
necessary for fair and unbiased identification procedures,
researchers have learned that many of the same safeguards
needed for a valid experiment are also required for fair and
unbiased identification procedures.38 For instance, scientists
have long known that they must implement safeguards for
experiments to prevent their own biases and expectations from
unintentionally affecting the results.39 Biases and expectations
threaten the validity of an experiment because people tend to
test their hypotheses in a manner that will confirm them and
because of the self-fulfilling nature of expectations.40
Expectations and biases can also affect the validity of identifi-
cation procedures. 
The lineup-as-experiment analogy helps us identify errors
that law enforcement officers often make when conducting
identification procedures. They include:
[T]he presence of demand characteristic (e.g., pressur-
ing the eyewitness to make a choice), the influence of
confirmation biases (e.g., asking the eyewitness specifi-
cally about the suspect while not asking those same
questions about the distracters), the facilitation of
response biases (e.g., encouraging a loose recognition
criterion threshold in the eyewitness), making infer-
ences from small sample sizes (e.g., making strong judg-
ments of validity based on only one eyewitness), not
using control groups (e.g., failing to see if  people who
did not witness the crime [but who have the eyewitness’s
description of the perpetrator] can identify the suspect),
selective recording and interpretation of data (e.g., find-
ing significance in an identification of the suspect, but
ignoring the outcome if the eyewitness makes a non-
identification), leaking of the hypothesis (e.g., making it
obvious to the eyewitness which person in the lineup is
the suspect), and a host of other possible confounds.41
In sum, to prevent and reduce eyewitness errors, law
enforcement must implement safeguards that ensure that the
identification of a suspect is the product of the eyewitness’s
memory and not how the identification procedure was con-
ducted. 
The National Institute of Justice (hereafter “NIJ”), which is
the research arm of the U.S. Department of Justice, recognizes
the importance of eyewitness research in preventing eyewitness
error. Eyewitness research forms the basis for the NIJ’s recom-
mendations for conducting interviews and identification con-
tained in its Eyewitness Evidence: A Guide  for Law Enforcement
(hereafter “Guide”) and its Eyewitness Evidence: A Trainer’s
Manual for Law Enforcement (hereafter “Trainer’s Manual”).42
The purposes of the NIJ’s Guide and Trainer’s Manual are to
develop improved procedures for the collection and preserva-
tion of eyewitness evidence for U.S. law enforcement agencies43
and provide them with training in the guidelines.44
Finally, to significantly reduce eyewitness error, the crimi-
nal justice system must view eyewitness evidence as a type of
trace evidence.45 Like other types of trace evidence, such as fin-
gerprints, DNA, and firearm patterns, eyewitness evidence has
a physiological basis (i.e., biochemical changes in the eyewit-
ness’s brain).46 Consequently, the accuracy of eyewitness testi-
mony, like other types of trace evidence, depends in large part
on the use of proper scientific procedures in collecting and
preserving it. In short, before admitting eyewitness evidence, a
judge should always first determine if valid scientific proce-
dures were followed in producing it. If they were not followed,
this failure should generally weigh heavily against admitting
the eyewitness testimony at trial just as it would for DNA, fin-
gerprints, ballistics, and other types of trace evidence.47
WHY JUDGES NEED A METHOD FOR ANALYZING THE
ACCURACY OF EYEWITNESS TESTIMONY
Judges must be able to assess eyewitness accuracy so they
can better evaluate its probative value in criminal cases and
help prevent wrongful conviction from erroneous eyewitness
testimony. For example, trial judges need this ability when
determining whether to admit a pretrial eyewitness identifica-
tion at trial, to permit an eyewitness to make an in-court iden-
tification, and to allow an eyewitness expert to testify.48 They
also require this ability when deciding eyewitness evidentiary
issues, drafting jury instructions about eyewitness testimony,
and evaluating eyewitness accuracy in bench trials.49 Appellate
judges must assess eyewitness accuracy when deciding if the
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STEP 1: EVALUATING THE EYEWITNESS INTERVIEWS
A. Did the interviews obtain the maximum amount of information from the eyewitness?
B. Did the interviews contaminate the eyewitness’s memory?
1. Did they contaminate the eyewitness’s memory of the crime?
2. Did they contaminate the eyewitness’s memory of the perpetrator of the crime?
C. Did the interviews, identification procedures, other eyewitnesses, prosecutor, media, or some other factor significantly
increase the confidence of the eyewitness prior to taking a statement of the eyewitness’s confidence in the accuracy of his
or her identification?
STEP 2: EVALUATING THE IDENTIFICATION PROCEDURES AND IDENTIFICATION ACCURACY
A. Did one of the following circumstances occur that would make the eyewitness’s identification of the defendant presump-
tively inaccurate?
1. Was the eyewitness interview significantly biased and did the bias pertain to information concerning the description or
identity of the perpetrator? 
2. Was an identification procedure significantly biased?
B. Because of the nature of memory, the effects of biased interviews and identification procedures on identification accuracy
cannot be corrected by later conducting a fair interview and identification procedure. Accordingly, if an eyewitness’s mem-
ory of the perpetrator of a crime has been significantly contaminated, identification by the eyewitness of the defendant
should be considered presumptively inaccurate.  
C. Does one of the two exceptions apply to the general rule that an eyewitness’s identification is presumptively inaccurate if
an eyewitness interview or identification procedure was significantly biased? 
1. Did some unusual circumstance exist that overcomes the presumptive inaccuracy of the identification (e.g., the eyewit-
ness knew the perpetrator prior to the crime or had prolonged repeated exposure to the perpetrator)?
2. Was there reliable, valid corroborating evidence that establishes the veracity of the eyewitness testimony?
D. Were the eyewitness interviews and identification procedures fair and impartial or did one of the exceptions to biased inter-
views and identification procedures apply?
If so, go on to Step 3. If not, the eyewitness’s identification should be presumed to be inaccurate.
STEP 3: EVALUATING THE EYEWITNESS FACTORS PRESENT DURING THE CRIME
A. What eyewitness factors during the crime likely increased the accuracy of the eyewitness identification and testimony?
B. What eyewitness factors during the crime likely decreased the accuracy of the eyewitness identification and testimony?
STEP 4: CONCLUSIONS:
1. Was the maximum amount of information obtained from the eyewitness during the interviews?
2. Was a statement of the eyewitness’s confidence in the accuracy of his or her identification obtained prior to the eyewit-
ness receiving any feedback?
3. Is there a high, medium, or low probability that the eyewitness’s testimony was accurate?
4. Is there a high, medium, or low probability that the eyewitness identification was accurate?
TABLE 1: METHOD FOR ANALYZING THE ACCURACY OF EYEWITNESS TESTIMONY
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trial court erred in admitting a pretrial identification, permit-
ting an in-court identification, refusing to permit a jury
instruction about eyewitness testimony, or failing to admit an
eyewitness expert.50 This ability also helps appellate judges
assess whether the eyewitness testimony in a case is suffi-
ciently reliable to affirm a guilty verdict.51
Although the ability to assess eyewitness accuracy is essen-
tial to judges, scientific studies show that, like other legal pro-
fessionals and jurors, judges have limited knowledge of eye-
witness factors.52 For example, Wise and Safer surveyed 160
judges about what they know about eyewitness factors, what
they believe jurors know about eyewitness factors, and what
legal safeguards they would permit attorneys to use to educate
jurors about eyewitness factors.53 The latter two questions are
important because, though jurors have limited knowledge of
eyewitness factors, the most common reason judges exclude
eyewitness-expert testimony is because they believe jurors are
knowledgeable about eyewitness factors.54 Furthermore,
expert testimony is the only legal safeguard that has demon-
strated any efficacy in educating jurors about eyewitness testi-
mony.55 Because eight of the questions in the survey were the
same or similar to questions used in an earlier survey of eye-
witness experts, the judges’ responses for these questions were
compared to the experts’ responses. 
The judges in the survey averaged only 55% correct on the
14-item knowledge scale.56 They also lacked knowledge of
many key eyewitness facts, such as jurors’ inability to distin-
guish between accurate and inaccurate eyewitnesses; sequen-
tial lineups reduce erroneous eyewitness identification com-
pared with simultaneous lineups; and eyewitness confidence is
not related to accuracy at trial.57 The judges’ responses differed
significantly from the experts’ responses on 5 of 8 questions
that they both answered.58 They also tended to overestimate
jurors’ knowledge of eyewitness factors compared to the
experts and were reluctant to permit eyewitness-expert testi-
mony even though, as previously mentioned, it is the only
legal safeguard that has shown any effectiveness in educating
jurors about eyewitness factors.59
Other studies of judges’ knowledge of eyewitness factors
have produced similar results.60 Judges’ lack of knowledge is
not surprising. Judges receive little training about eyewitness
testimony, the effect of many eyewitness factors on eyewitness
accuracy is counterintuitive, and judges do not receive feed-
back on which eyewitness made inaccurate identification in
criminal cases and what factors caused their inaccuracy.61
More importantly, even if judges were knowledgeable about
eyewitness factors, they would still have difficulty assessing
eyewitness accuracy in criminal cases. This result would likely
occur because the ability to assess eyewitness accuracy is not
just a question of knowledge, but also the ability to integrate
that knowledge into the facts of a case.62 Research shows that
even experts have difficulty applying their knowledge to the
facts of a case.63 Accordingly, what judges need is a method for
analyzing the accuracy of eyewitness testimony that will
enable them to both identify the relevant eyewitness factors in
a criminal case and also apply them to the facts. The Method
described in the next several sections can help judges to
achieve these essential goals.
METHOD FOR ANALYZING THE ACCURACY OF
EYEWITNESS TESTIMONY
Professor Wise has developed a method for analyzing the
accuracy of eyewitness testimony that consists of four steps.64
In the first step, determine if during the interview law enforce-
ment: (a) obtained the maximum amount of accurate informa-
tion from the eyewitness; (b) contaminated the eyewitness’s
memory of the crime with post-event information; or (c)
increased the eyewitness’s confidence. 
Obtaining the maximum amount of accurate information
from an eyewitness helps prevent wrongful convictions. For
example, the most important determinant of whether a crime
is solved is the completeness and accuracy of the eyewitness
testimony.65 In addition, detailed and accurate eyewitness tes-
timony increases the probability that the trier of fact will ren-
der a correct verdict.66 It also aids law enforcement officers in
obtaining confessions from guilty suspects, allows defense
attorneys to more effectively represent innocent defendants,
and assists district attorneys in prosecuting guilty defen-
dants.67
Determining if an eyewitness’s memory has been contami-
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nated during the interview is crucial, because, as we have seen,
eyewitness memory is malleable. Moreover, once it is altered
by post-event information, the eyewitness’s original memory of
the crime cannot be restored.68 Post-event information not
only affects the eyewitness’s memory of the crime but can also
impair identification accuracy.69 Assessing if the eyewitness’s
confidence has been artificially increased prior to obtaining a
statement of the eyewitness’s confidence is critical because, as
previously mentioned, generally eyewitness confidence is the
most important factor the trier of fact uses in evaluating eye-
witness accuracy.70
The second step in the Method is to evaluate whether the
identification procedures in the case were fair and unbiased.
(See Table I, Step 2.)  The 11 scientific guidelines delineated
later in this article can be used to make this evaluation.
If significant bias existed in how the eyewitness interview or
identification procedures were conducted, the accuracy of the
eyewitness testimony is highly questionable unless an exception
applies. The exceptions include if the eyewitness conditions
were unusually good (e.g., the eyewitness had repeated pro-
longed exposure to the perpetrator or the eyewitness knew the
perpetrator prior to the crime) or if there is reliable, valid evi-
dence corroborating the accuracy of the eyewitness testimony. 
Because of the nature of memory, if a biased interview or
identification procedure is conducted, the error cannot be cor-
rected by later conducting a fair and unbiased interview or
identification procedure.71 Consequently, if a biased identifica-
tion was conducted, not only should the eyewitness’s identifi-
cation from the biased identification be presumed inaccurate,
but any subsequent identification, even from a fair identifica-
tion procedure, should also be presumed inaccurate. In con-
trast, if fair and unbiased interviews and identification proce-
dures were conducted, the eyewitness’s testimony and identifi-
cation are more likely to be accurate even if the eyewitness
conditions during the crime were somewhat less than ideal.
Therefore, when analyzing the accuracy of eyewitness testi-
mony, always first assess how the eyewitness interviews and
identification procedures were conducted. 
If no significant bias occurred in the eyewitness interviews
or identification procedures or if an exception applies, proceed
to the third step in the Method; however, if there was signifi-
cant bias and it likely affected both the accuracy of the eyewit-
ness testimony and the identification and no exception applies,
presume the eyewitness testimony is inaccurate and cease the
analysis.  
The third step in analyzing eyewitness accuracy assesses
how the eyewitness factors during the crime likely affected
eyewitness accuracy. Separately list factors that likely increased
and factors that likely decreased eyewitness accuracy during
the crime. The most common eyewitness factors that affect
accuracy are discussed later in this article.
In the final step of the Method, make conclusions about the
likely accuracy of the eyewitness testimony in the case by
answering the following questions: (a) Did law enforcement
obtain the maximum amount of information from the eyewit-
ness? (b) Was the eyewitness’s confidence increased prior to
taking a statement of confidence from the eyewitness? (c) Is
there a high, medium, or low probability that the eyewitness
testimony was accurate? (d) Is there a high, medium, or low
probability that the identification was accurate?
This Method has several benefits. For instance, it offers a
comprehensive analytical framework for both identifying and
organizing the many different types of eyewitness factors that
affect eyewitness accuracy. Perhaps most importantly, it also
helps integrate those eyewitness factors into the analysis of the
accuracy of the eyewitness testimony. Thus, the Method
divides eyewitness factors into three types: those that pertain
to interviews, identification procedures, and the crime scene.
It provides a specific order for analyzing the different types of
eyewitness factors, concrete guidelines for evaluating them,
and specific standards for assessing whether they were likely to
produce eyewitness error (i.e., if the interview and identifica-
tion procedures were substantially biased or the eyewitness
factors at the crime scene were poor).
Another advantage to using this Method is that it stresses
the importance of conducting fair and unbiased interviews and
identification procedures. The Method’s emphasis on fair and
unbiased interviews and identification procedures is warranted
for several reasons. First, not only is this emphasis logical and
supported by empirical evidence, but it is also justified because
the State can usually control how it conducts interviews and
identification procedures and can easily document how they
were conducted by videotaping them.72 In contrast, the State
cannot control the eyewitness factors at a crime scene, and
usually there is no objective record of them.
Second, requiring the State to conduct fair and unbiased
eyewitness interviews and identification procedures in crimi-
nal cases is congruent with evidentiary rules providing that
proper scientific procedures must be followed for trace evi-
dence to be admitted at trial.73
Third, this emphasis gives the State a strong incentive for
conducting fair and unbiased interviews and identification
procedures because they will substantially strengthen the
State’s case.
Fourth, the State can conduct fair and unbiased eyewitness
interviews without incurring either a significant financial or
administrative burden.74
Finally, the most potent means available to the legal system
to prevent and reduce eyewitness error is by conducting fair
and unbiased eyewitness interviews and identification proce-
dures.75
We recognize there will be limited circumstances when pol-
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icy considerations will necessitate the admission of eyewitness
testimony even though the Method indicates that the eyewit-
ness testimony should be presumed inaccurate. We are refer-
ring to circumstances where law enforcement acted in good
faith but was forced to use a suggestive procedure because of
exigent circumstances (e.g., when law enforcement used a
show-up rather than a photo array or lineup because a suspect
was apprehended shortly after the crime).
The next three sections discuss scientific guidelines for
evaluating the fairness of eyewitness interviews and identifica-
tion procedures and eyewitness factors that are commonly pre-
sent during a crime. The appendix contains a form that will
help judges apply this Method to criminal cases. 
EVALUATING THE EYEWITNESS INTERVIEW (TABLE 1,
STEP 1) 
As stated previously, law enforcement often makes three
types of errors when it interviews eyewitnesses: (1) It fails to
obtain the maximum amount of information from the eyewit-
ness; (2) it contaminates the eyewitness’s memory of the crime
with post-event information; and (3) it increases the eyewit-
ness’s confidence.
The following guidelines derived from scientific research,
and the Guide and Trainer’s Manual, can be used to assess
whether the eyewitness interviews were conducted properly.
The factors for evaluating if law enforcement obtained the
maximum amount of information from the eyewitness are
divided into three categories: doing pre-interview preparation,
conducting the interview, and concluding the interview.
A. FACTORS RELEVANT TO MAXIMIZING THE
INFORMATION OBTAINED FROM THE EYEWITNESS:76
1. Pre-interview preparation:
a. When circumstances permit, the interview should be
held as soon as possible after the crime.77
(Eyewitnesses forget the details of a crime very quickly,
so the interview should be conducted as soon as the eye-
witness is capable of being interviewed and the exigen-
cies of the investigation permit.78) 
b. The interviewer should review all information about
the crime prior to the interview.  (Preparation results
in a more thorough and complete interview.79) 
c. The interview should be conducted in a comfortable
environment, and distractions and interruptions
should be minimized. (Under these conditions, the
eyewitness will recall more information.)80
d. The resources necessary to conduct the interview
(e.g., pens, notepad, video recorder, interview room,
etc.) should be obtained prior to the interview so it
does not have to be interrupted to get these items.81
(Interruptions interfere with the eyewitness’s ability to
remember the crime.)
e. The eyewitness interview should be videotaped.82
(Videotaping ensures there is an accurate and complete
record of the eyewitness interview.)
2. When conducting the interview the interviewer should:
a. Establish and maintain rapport with the eyewitness
and minimize his or her anxiety. (Eyewitnesses are
often traumatized by a crime and a relaxed eyewitness
provides more information.83 The interviewer can estab-
lish rapport and minimize an eyewitness’s anxiety by
showing understanding and concern for the eyewitness,
personalizing the interview, and listening actively.84)
b. Inquire about the eyewitness’s condition. (It helps
build rapport and alerts the interviewer to any condition
that might impair the eyewitness’s memory, such as
intoxication, shock, drugs, etc..85)
c. Instruct the eyewitness to (1) volunteer informa-
tion86 and (2) report all details he or she remembers
about the crime even if the information seems trivial
and unimportant.87 Inform the eyewitness about the
type and degree of detail of information the inter-
viewer needs.88 (These rules encourage the eyewitness
to be active during the interview, which is important
because it is the eyewitness who has information about
the crime, not the interviewer, and volunteered informa-
tion is more accurate than information given in answers
to questions.89 These rules also encourage the eyewit-
ness to disclose all the information he or she knows
about the crime and helps the eyewitness understand
the kind of information and the degree of detail the
interviewer needs.90)
d. Ask the eyewitness to mentally recreate the crime.
(The eyewitness can recreate the crime by thinking
about his or her thoughts and feelings during the
crime—recreating the crime increases recall.91)
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e. Use primarily open-ended questions during the inter-
view (e.g., “What did the perpetrator look like?”).92
(Open-ended questions give the eyewitness control of
the interview, promote the full disclosure of the details
of a crime, produce more accurate information, and
improve listening.93) 
f. Ask closed-ended questions (e.g., “What color was
the perpetrator’s hair?”) only when they are needed
to augment open-ended questions. (Open-ended
questions are superior to closed-ended questions,
because they do not limit the amount and scope of the
information provided by the eyewitness.94 Nonetheless,
close-ended questions should be used to obtain infor-
mation omitted from answers to open-ended ques-
tions.95)
g. Avoid interrupting the eyewitness. (Interruptions
interfere with recall and discourage the eyewitness from
volunteering information.96)
h. Allow for pauses when an eyewitness stops talking
before asking the next question. (Pauses ensure the
eyewitness has completed his or her answer.97)
i. Tailor questions to the eyewitness’s narrative rather
than asking a standard set of questions. (Because each
eyewitness’s memory of a crime is unique, the inter-
viewer’s questions should track what the eyewitness is
talking about.98 For example, if the eyewitness is describ-
ing the crime scene, the interviewer should not be asking
questions about the perpetrator’s appearance.99)
j. Encourage nonverbal communications from the eye-
witness, such as drawings and gestures, especially
from children or eyewitnesses who are not fluent in
English.100 (Some information about a crime is difficult
to express verbally, and some eyewitnesses have limited
verbal skills.)
k. Ask the eyewitness, “Is there anything else I should
have asked you?”101 (This question helps ensure that
the eyewitness has disclosed all important information
about the crime.)      
3. Concluding the interview:
a. The eyewitness should be encouraged to contact the
interviewer if he or she remembers additional facts
about the crime. (Eyewitnesses frequently remember
other information about the crime after the interview is
completed.102)
b. The interviewer should review written documenta-
tion with the eyewitness and ask the eyewitness if he
or she wishes to change, add, or emphasize anything.
(The review ensures the information was recorded accu-
rately and gives the eyewitness an additional opportu-
nity to recall more information.103)
c. Thank the eyewitness for his or her time and coop-
eration. (This strengthens rapport with the eyewitness
and encourages future cooperation.104)
B. “CONTAMINATION” OF THE EYEWITNESS’S
MEMORY (TABLE 1, STEP I B. 2): TO AVOID
CONTAMINATING THE EYEWITNESS’S MEMORY AND
TO ASSESS WHETHER THE EYEWITNESS’S MEMORY
HAS BEEN CONTAMINATED, THE INTERVIEWER
SHOULD:
1. Separate the eyewitnesses and tell them not to discuss
the details of the crime with other eyewitnesses105 and
to avoid media accounts of the crime.106 (This helps pre-
vent post-event information from contaminating the eye-
witness’s memory.107) 
2. Determine if an eyewitness has spoken to another eye-
witness or anyone else about the crime or been exposed
to media accounts of the crime. (These sources may have
altered the eyewitness’s memory of the crime.108)
3. Ascertain the nature of the eyewitness’s prior law
enforcement contact related to the crime being investi-
gated. This includes any prior interviews by law
enforcement or participation in any type of identifica-
tion procedure. (This information allows the interviewer
to assess if post-event information or a biased identification
procedure has contaminated the eyewitness’s memory.109)
4. Avoid volunteering any information about the perpetra-
tor or the crime. (Volunteered information can alter the
eyewitness’s memory.110)
5. Tell the eyewitness not to guess and to indicate if he or
she feels any uncertainty about an answer. (Guessing
can contaminate the eyewitness’s memory.111)
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6. Refrain from: (a) using suggestive or leading questions
(e.g., “Was the car red?”);112 (b) disclosing information
to the eyewitness about the crime the interviewer
learned from other sources; or (c) using multiple-choice
questions. (They provide post-event information about
the crime, which can alter an eyewitness’s memory of the
crime and his or her ability to identify the perpetrator of
the crime.113)
C. EYEWITNESS CONFIDENCE (TABLE 1, STEP 1 C.): TO
PREVENT INCREASING THE EYEWITNESS’S
CONFIDENCE AND TO DETERMINE IF IT HAS BEEN
ARTIFICIALLY INCREASED, THE INTERVIEWER
SHOULD:
1. Avoid disclosing to the eyewitness: (a) that another eye-
witness has identified the same suspect; (b) what
another eyewitness said about the crime or the perpe-
trator; or (c) that other evidence confirms the eyewit-
ness’s testimony or identification. (All these factors
increase eyewitness confidence.114)
2. Determine whether the eyewitness had contact with
other eyewitnesses, the media, or other law enforce-
ment officers, and evaluate the nature of that contact to
assess whether it has increased the eyewitness’s confi-
dence (e.g., the eyewitness has been told that another
eyewitness also identified the suspect).115
3. Avoid giving the eyewitness any type of confirming feed-
back (e.g., “Good, you have identified the suspect.”) or
exposing the eyewitness to unnecessary, repeated ques-
tioning. (These factors can significantly increase eyewit-
ness confidence.116)
4. Take a statement of the eyewitness’s confidence in the
accuracy of his or her identification of the suspect as
the perpetrator of the crime immediately after the iden-
tification procedure and prior to the eyewitness receiv-
ing any feedback about his or her identification.117
(Eyewitness confidence can easily be increased. Therefore,
it is essential to take a statement of the eyewitness’s confi-
dence immediately after the identification and prior to any
feedback.118)
GUIDELINES FOR ANALYZING THE ACCURACY OF
IDENTIFICATION PROCEDURES (TABLE 1, STEP 2):
The following 11 scientific guidelines can be used to objec-
tively evaluate whether a lineup or photo array was fair and
unbiased.119 For scientific guidelines for mug books, composite
images, and show-ups, see the Guide and Trainer’s Manual.120
1. Whenever possible, law enforcement should use a
photo array or lineup only when there is probable cause
to believe the suspect committed the crime.121
Erroneous eyewitness identifications occur when the sus-
pect in the photo array or lineup is not the perpetrator. By
generally requiring probable cause before placing a suspect
in a line, the number of perpetrator-absent lineups will be
significantly reduced. 
2. Before conducting an identification procedure, deter-
mine whether the eyewitness has previously seen the
suspect.122
When an eyewitness has previously seen the suspect, such
as in a mug book, there is significantly greater probability
that the eyewitness will identify the suspect in a photo
array or lineup even when the suspect is not the perpetra-
tor. 
3. Only one suspect should be included in every identifi-
cation procedure.123
Including more than one suspect in an identification pro-
cedure significantly increases the probability of an erro-
neous eyewitness identification because it reduces the
number of fillers and increases the probability that a sus-
pect will be selected. 
4. The number of lineup participants should be
increased.124
The typical photo array or lineup contains only five or six
participants. Studies show that even if such identification
procedures are fair and unbiased they still pose a substantial
risk of an erroneous identification.125 Increasing the number
of participants in photo arrays and lineups to twelve reduces
erroneous identifications by 50% without a significant
decrease in accurate identifications.126
5. The suspect should not stand out from the foils.127
To prevent this from occurring, several procedures are nec-
essary. First, the foils should generally match the eyewit-
ness’s description of the perpetrator of the crime.128 Second,
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the suspect’s position in the lineup should be randomly
determined to prevent a suspect’s position in an identifica-
tion procedure from becoming common knowledge.129
Third, fillers should not be reused with the same eyewit-
ness, because when this occurs the suspect stands out
because he or she is the only person who did not appear in
a previous identification procedure.130 Finally, how the
lineup is conducted should not draw attention to the sus-
pect.131
6. Law enforcement should use sequential identification
procedures.132
Sequential lineups133 reduced the number of erroneous eye-
witness identification compared with simultaneous line-
ups.134
7. The lineup administrator should not know the identity
of the suspect.135
If a lineup administrator knows the suspect’s identity, he or
she can intentionally or unintentionally cause the eyewit-
ness to choose the suspect.136 The eyewitness is generally
unaware of the administrator’s influence on his or her iden-
tification.137
8. Eyewitnesses should be given cautionary instruc-
tions.138
The lineup administrator should give the following cau-
tionary instructions: (a) it is as important to clear innocent
suspects as it is to identify guilt suspects;139 (b) the perpe-
trator’s appearance may have changed since the crime;140
(c) the person who committed the crime may not be in the
photo array or lineup;141 (d) the lineup administrator does
not know the identity of the suspect;142 and (e) the investi-
gation will continue regardless of whether the eyewitness
makes an identification.143
9. All identifications should be video recorded.144
Videotaping ensures that judges, jurors, and attorneys have
a complete and accurate record of how the identifications
procedures were conducted.145
10. An eyewitness should make a clear statement of his or
her confidence at the time of the identification and
prior to receiving any feedback.146
As we have seen, confidence is malleable, and it is the
most important factor that the trier of fact relies on in eval-
uating eyewitness accuracy. Consequently, a statement of
confidence should be taken immediately after an identifi-
cation procedure.
11. Once a mistake is made in an identification procedure
it cannot be corrected.147
Because of the nature of memory, the effects of a biased
identification procedure usually cannot be corrected by
later conducting a fair identification procedure.
COMMON EYEWITNESS FACTORS DURING THE CRIME
THAT AFFECT EYEWITNESS ACCURACY (TABLE 1, STEP 3):
The following eyewitness factors are commonly present dur-
ing crimes and affect eyewitness accuracy. This list is not com-
prehensive. Accordingly, it will be necessary for judges in some
criminal cases to consult the eyewitness literature or to consult
an eyewitness expert to determine how eyewitness factors dur-
ing the crime likely affected eyewitness accuracy. The eyewitness
factors are divided into three categories: Eyewitness characteris-
tics, perpetrator characteristics, and crime characteristics.148
A. EYEWITNESS CHARACTERISTICS 
1. Child Eyewitnesses 
Children provide reasonably accurate answers to open-
ended questions, but they are much more susceptible to sug-
gestion and social influences than adults.149 Therefore, it is
crucial to not use suggestive questions, provide post-event
information, or in any other way influence the child’s
answers.150 Children are about as accurate as adults at making
identifications when the perpetrator is in the identification
procedure but make more erroneous eyewitness identifications
in perpetrator-absent lineups.151
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2. Elderly Eyewitnesses
Elderly eyewitnesses perform nearly as well as young adults
in identifying a perpetrator from a lineup.152 In perpetrator-
absent lineups, however, they make more mistaken identifica-
tions than young adults.153 Elderly adults appear to recall
fewer details about a crime than younger adults.154
3. Law Enforcement Officers 
Law enforcement officers are better than laypersons at
recalling the details of a crime, but contrary to what most peo-
ple expect, they are no better than lay persons at identifying
the perpetrator of a crime.155
4. Alcoholic Intoxication
Intoxicated eyewitnesses remember less about the crime
and the perpetrator than sober eyewitnesses, though the infor-
mation they recall tends to be almost as accurate as sober eye-
witnesses.156 Because they recall less about a crime, they are
more likely to make an erroneous identification in a perpetra-
tor-absent lineup than a sober eyewitness.157
5. Minor Details 
An eyewitness who attends to minor or peripheral details
during a crime has less attention available to encode the per-
petrator’s face.158 Consequently, an eyewitness’s ability to recall
such details about a crime is inversely related to eyewitness
accuracy.159
6. Unconscious Transference
An eyewitness sometimes identifies as the perpetrator a
bystander to the crime or an individual they saw in a different
context or situation.160 This error occurs because the eyewit-
ness makes a source-monitoring error. For example, the eye-
witness believes the suspect is familiar because he or she is the
perpetrator when in fact his or her familiarity results from the
eyewitness having previously seen a mug shot of the suspect.161
B. PERPETRATOR CHARACTERISTICS
1. Cross-Race Bias
Eyewitnesses make less accurate identifications of perpetra-
tors of crimes when the perpetrators are of another race than
when they are the same race as the eyewitness.162
2. Disguises 
Even a simple disguise such as a hat makes it much more
difficult for an eyewitness to accurately identify the perpetra-
tor.163 A hat impairs accuracy because it conceals the perpetra-
tor’s hair and facial shape, which are important cues to recog-
nizing a person.164
3. Face Distinctiveness 
Highly attractive or unattractive faces are easier to identify
than non-distinctive faces.165
4. Weapon Focus 
A weapon impairs identification accuracy166 because the
eyewitness tends to focus on the weapon, which detracts the
eyewitness’s attention from the perpetrator’s face.167
C. CRIME CHARACTERISTICS
1. Exposure Time 
The time an eyewitness has to observe a crime affects how
much the eyewitness remembers about a crime.168 The type or
amount of attention paid to the crime, however, is generally
more important than how much time an eyewitness had to
view the crime.169
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2. Forgetting Curve and Retention Interval
Memory loss is most rapid immediately after the crime.170
Consequently, eyewitness interviews and identification proce-
dures should be conducted as soon as possible.
3. Lighting
Poor lighting impairs an eyewitness’s ability to make an
accurate identification.171
4. Stress 
Different levels of stress have diverse effects on memory.
Mild stress may improve it. As stress increases, tunnel memory
may occur,172 which causes information central to the crime to
be vividly remembered while peripheral information is poorly
recalled.173 Very high levels of stress can cause a major deteri-
oration in memory because they activate the eyewitness’s fight-
or-flight mechanism, which causes the eyewitness to focus on
his or her survival rather than the crime.174
HOW JUDGES CAN USE THE METHOD
Besides using this Method to assess eyewitness accuracy,
judges can use it for a variety of other purposes. For example,
judges can use it when ruling on a motion to suppress an eye-
witness’s identification. The Method can help assess if there was
a substantial bias (i.e., suggestiveness) in either the eyewitness
interviews or identification procedures that likely affected iden-
tification accuracy. Accordingly, if the Method indicates sub-
stantial bias occurred and affected identification accuracy, the
motion to suppress should be granted unless the eyewitness
conditions were exceptionally good; reliable, valid evidence
corroborated the eyewitness identification; or exigent circum-
stances justified the use of a biased identification procedure. 
Furthermore, once a biased identification has been con-
ducted, the bias cannot be corrected by later conducting a fair
identification procedure. Accordingly, if a biased identification
procedure was conducted, any subsequent identification of the
defendant, including in-court identification, should also be
inadmissible. In sum, judges can use the Method to systemati-
cally and comprehensively determine what eyewitness factors
likely affected the accuracy of the eyewitness’s identification
and thus make a more informed decision about whether to
grant a motion to suppress. 
Judges can also use the Method to decide whether to admit
eyewitness-expert testimony in a criminal case. If the Method
indicates there was significant bias in how the eyewitness
interview or identification procedures were conducted or if the
eyewitness conditions were poor, a judge should admit eyewit-
ness-expert testimony, especially if the eyewitness testimony is
the sole or primary evidence of the defendant’s guilt. Thus the
Method, by identifying the relevant eyewitness factors in a
criminal case and how they likely affect eyewitness accuracy,
can help judges determine whether to admit eyewitness-expert
testimony in criminal cases. 
The Method can also facilitate the drafting of better eyewit-
ness jury instructions by ensuring they include all the relevant
eyewitness factors a jury needs to assess eyewitness accuracy
in a case. Moreover, by incorporating the Method itself into
jury instructions, judges may not only improve jurors’ assess-
ments of eyewitness accuracy, but they may also reduce the
need for eyewitness expert testimony in criminal cases. In
addition, the Method, when used with expert testimony, may
increase its efficacy. 
CONCLUSIONS
Eyewitness researchers are constantly discovering new
causes and remedies for eyewitness error. Consequently, the
guidelines in the Method will undoubtedly have to be updated
in the future to reflect new discoveries about eyewitness testi-
mony. We are currently empirically testing the Method, which
may lead to refinements and improvements in its procedures.
Nonetheless, we believe the Method in its current form pro-
vides judges with a powerful tool for deciding eyewitness
issues in criminal cases.
The Method indicates there needs to be a paradigm shift in
how the criminal justice system views and handles eyewitness
testimony. For example, as previously stated, eyewitness evi-
dence needs to be considered a type of trace evidence.
Accordingly, unless exigent circumstances existed or an excep-
tion applies, eyewitness testimony should be presumed inac-
curate if there was significant bias in how the eyewitness inter-
views or identification procedures were conducted and it likely
affected both the eyewitness’s memory of the crime and the
identification. This presumption is necessary because only by
conducting fair and unbiased eyewitness interviews and iden-
tification procedures can the criminal justice system signifi-
cantly reduce eyewitness error. 
Furthermore, though there can be some disagreement about
exactly what procedures are necessary,  judges should consider
the NIJ’s Guide and Training Manual as establishing the mini-
mum procedures necessary for fair and unbiased interviews
and identification procedures. A blue-ribbon panel of 34 law
enforcement officers, prosecutors, eyewitness researchers, and
defense attorneys wrote the Guide and Trainer’s Manual.
Moreover, only when there was a consensus that a procedure
was necessary for fair and unbiased interviews or identification
procedures was it incorporated into the Guide and Trainer’s
Manual.
Criminal cases where eyewitness testimony is the sole or
primary evidence of the defendant’s guilt pose the greatest dan-
ger that erroneous eyewitness testimony will result in a wrong-
ful conviction. Accordingly, the State should minimize the
number of cases it brings where eyewitness evidence is the sole
or primary evidence of the defendant’s guilt. Moreover, when
the State brings such a case, judges need to be especially care-
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ful that the eyewitness interviews and identification proce-
dures in the case were fair and unbiased and that the eyewit-
ness conditions during the crime were good. Finally, judges
need to be more cognizant of instances where an eyewitness
has identified a foil or did not identify the defendant as the per-
petrator of the crime. These misidentifications and non-identi-
fications often provide valuable evidence that should be con-
sidered when evaluating the defendant’s guilt. 
The greatest miscarriage of justice that any legal system can
make is to convict an innocent person of a crime. Wrongful
convictions also undermine the public’s faith in the criminal
justice system, especially when the system fails to institute
safeguards that could significantly reduce wrongful convic-
tions.  By using the Method for analyzing the accuracy of eye-
witness testimony discussed in this article, judges can signifi-
cantly reduce the number of wrongful convictions from eye-
witness error. 
Richard A. Wise is an associate professor of psy-
chology at the University of North Dakota.  He
graduated summa cum laude from John Carroll
University in 1975 and graduated cum laude
from Cleveland-Marshall College of Law in
1979. He received a Ph.D. in clinical psychology
from the Catholic University of America in
2003, and completed a postdoctoral fellowship in forensic psychol-
ogy at the University of Southern California in 2004. He has
worked in the legal department of the American Psychological
Association, as an associate in a law firm, as an assistant county
prosecutor, and as an attorney-law clerk to an appellate judge. He
primarily does research on psychological-legal issues, especially
eyewitness testimony. Email: richard.wise@und.edu 
Martin A. Safer is a professor of psychology at
the Catholic University of America, where he
has taught since 1979. He teaches seminars on
the topics of emotion and memory and has writ-
ten more than 100 professional articles and pre-
sentations, primarily on the relationship
between emotions and memory. He is particu-
larly interested in the effects of emotional
arousal on eyewitness memory and how individuals remember
prior emotional experiences. He has also provided expert consult-
ing in two criminal cases.  Dr. Safer earned his Ph.D. in psychol-
ogy from the University of Wisconsin-Madison in 1978. Email:
Safer@cua.edu 
I. EYEWITNESS INTERVIEW (EVALUATE SEPARATELY EACH INTERVIEW OF AN
EYEWITNESS.)
A. Factors That Indicate the Interview Was Complete, Fair, and
Did Not Increase Eyewitness Confidence:
1. List Factors that Indicate the Interview Obtained the
Maximum Amount of Information from the Eyewitness:
2. List Factors that Indicate the Interview Was Fair and Did
Not Contaminate the Eyewitness’s Memory of the Crime:
3. List Factors that Indicate the Interview Did Not Increase
the Eyewitness’s Confidence: 
B. Factors that Indicated the Interview Was Incomplete, Biased,
and Increased the Eyewitness’s Confidence:
1. List Factors that Indicate the Interview Did Not Obtain the
Maximum Amount of Information from the Eyewitness:
2. List Factors that Indicate the Interview Was Biased and
Contaminated the Eyewitness’s Memory of the Crime:
3. List Factors that Indicate the Interview Increased the
Eyewitness’s Confidence:
II. IDENTIFICATION PROCEDURES (CONDUCT A SEPARATE ANALYSIS FOR
EACH IDENTIFICATION PROCEDURE)
A. List Factors that Indicate the Identification Procedure Was
Fair and Impartial:
B. List Factors that Indicate the Identification Procedure Was
Biased :
If the interviews and identification procedures were sub-
stantially fair and unbiased or an exception applies (e.g., the
eyewitness knew the perpetrator prior to the crime or had
prolonged, repeated exposure to the perpetrator or there is
reliable, valid corroborating evidence of the accuracy of the
eyewitness testimony) go on to Part III. If an interview or
identification procedures were significantly unfair and biased
and no exception applies, the eyewitness testimony or any
subsequent identification of the defendant by the eyewitness
has no probative value and should not be considered in the
determination of the defendant’s guilt.
III. EYEWITNESS FACTORS DURING THE CRIME THAT LIKELY AFFECTED
IDENTIFICATION ACCURACY
A. List Eyewitness Factors During the Crime that Likely
Increased Eyewitness Accuracy:
B. List Eyewitness Factors During the Crime that Likely
Decreased Eyewitness Accuracy:
IV. CONCLUSIONS 
A. Was the maximum amount of information obtained from the
eyewitness during the interviews?
1. yes 2. no
B. Was a statement of the eyewitness’s confidence in the accu-
racy of the identification obtained prior to any feedback?
1. yes 2. no
C. Is there a high, medium, or low probability that the eyewit-
ness testimony was accurate?
1. high 2. medium 3. low
D. Is there a high, medium, or low probability that the eyewit-
ness identification was accurate?
1. high 2. medium 3. low
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More than a century of psychology research has shownthat memory is fallible. People’s memory can beinfluenced by information encountered after an inci-
dent has been witnessed—so-called postevent information, or
PEI.1 In everyday life, one of the most common ways to
encounter PEI is when individuals who have shared the same
experience discuss this with one another. In the case of wit-
nessing a crime, individuals might be particularly motivated
to discuss what happened, and who was involved, because of
the significance of the event. The PEI encountered during this
discussion with a co-witness might be largely consistent with
one’s own memories of the event. However, some details may
differ either because one witness has remembered something
differently, has paid attention to different details, or has sim-
ply made an honest mistake in his or her own account. A com-
mon finding within eyewitness-memory literature is that
exposure to PEI that is inconsistent with a person’s own mem-
ory can affect the ability to subsequently report details of the
originally encoded event.2
The following two examples show how the memory report
of one witness may influence that of another witness during a
discussion. Witness evidence in the Oklahoma bombing inci-
dent of 1995 came from employees working at Elliot’s Body
Shop where the perpetrator, Timothy McVeigh, rented the
truck used in the bombing. McVeigh was arrested for the mass
murder but there was a question as to who, if anyone, was his
accomplice when he rented the truck. One of the three
employees working in the shop that day claimed, with some
confidence, that McVeigh was accompanied by a second man.
Initially, the other witnesses gave no description of this alleged
accomplice. However, later they too claimed to remember
details of a second person. This led to a costly police hunt for
a person the FBI now believes does not exist. Several months
later, the witness who had confidently indicated the presence
of an accomplice acknowledged that he may have been recall-
ing another customer. So, why did all three witnesses provide
a description of an accomplice when McVeigh had actually
entered the shop alone? It is likely that the confident witness
unintentionally influenced the others, leading them to report
that they also recalled a second man.3 Indeed, the witnesses
admitted in testimony that they had discussed their memories
before being questioned by investigators.4
The more recent high-profile murder investigation of the
Swedish foreign minister, Anna Lindh, in September 2003,
provides a second example. Witnesses were all placed together
in a small room to prevent them leaving the scene of the crime
before being interviewed. The witnesses later admitted to dis-
cussing the event with one another while in the room.5 During
these discussions, one witness mentioned to the others present
that the perpetrator wore a camouflage-patterned military
jacket. As a result, a number of these witnesses subsequently
reported this clothing detail to the investigating officers. This
description was used in an immediate search for the perpetra-
tor in the surrounding area, and also featured in the release of
a national police alert. This detail, however, was incorrect,
resulting in wasted police time and resources. Footage from
surveillance cameras showed that the killer, Mijailo Mijailovic,
was in fact wearing a grey hooded sweatshirt. Given that wit-
nesses were free to discuss the incident with each other at
some length, it is reasonable to assume that co-witness influ-
ence was the main source of error in the immediate stages of
this investigation.6
These examples highlight that when witnesses discuss their
memories, their accounts of the witnessed event can become
similar, and hence, seemingly corroborative. This phenome-
non is referred to as “memory conformity.”7 When memory
conformity occurs in a formal investigation, whether criminal
or civil, there can be serious and costly implications for any
subsequent investigations. Of course, not all PEI shared
between witnesses will be misleading. There is the potential for
witnesses to share accurate PEI, which can have positive
effects on memory.8 Furthermore, collaborative remembering
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can help people remember details that would otherwise have
been forgotten. However, the notion that group members can
“cross-cue” one another to produce new memories that would
not have been generated if remembering alone is not supported
by research,9 even when attempts are made to increase the
opportunity for cross-cuing.10 In contrast, a large amount of
research has shown that people are easily influenced by mis-
leading PEI encountered from another person.11
Criminal events are often witnessed by more than one per-
son,12 and discussion between witnesses is common.13 For
example, an Australian survey of students who had witnessed
a crime found that where multiple witnesses had been present,
86% of respondents admitted to discussing the event with a co-
witness.14 More recently, a U.K. survey of eyewitnesses who
were interviewed after viewing a lineup revealed that the
majority had witnessed the crime with other people present,
and more than half of these people had discussed the event
with a co-witness.15 Although it is best practice for the police
to encourage witnesses to the same event not to discuss their
memories for fear of evidence contamination, it is likely that
many witnesses do enter into discussions about the event both
before the police arrive and afterward, even if police warned
them not to do so. In such circumstances investigators and
jurors may subsequently attach a false corroborative value to
any consistencies between witness statements obtained or any
evidence given in court thereafter, when the evidence may be
contaminated if the witnesses had discussed their memories
before being interviewed by the police.
EXPERIMENTAL RESEARCH ON MEMORY CONFORMITY
There are different approaches to studying memory.16 As
cognitive psychologists our approach is to understand the
processes that can lead to an individual reporting an event in a
certain way, such as reporting what another person has said
when asked to give an independent report. We try to isolate a
small number of factors and then vary those factors systemati-
cally to see how they affect response. This study is well suited
for the legal arena because the interest in this context is the
reliability of individual eyewitnesses and the factors that can
affect that reliability. 
The basic memory-conformity procedure is to show a small
group of people (often just a
pair) some set of stimuli or an
event, have the people interact
with each other, and then indi-
vidually test each person about
what he or she remembers. One
critical decision memory-con-
formity researchers have to
make is whether to have the
PEI delivered from one partici-
pant to another, or to have a
confederate (a person working
for the researcher but pretend-
ing to be a participant) deliver
the PEI. When participants are
presenting PEI to each other, it is common to show them
slightly different materials so that disagreements are likely.
Consider one study that used this approach:17 Two versions of
a crime event were made, each containing the same sequence of
events but filmed from different angles to simulate different wit-
ness vantage points. The different viewing angles allowed the
participants to see two different critical features of the event.
After viewing, participants had an opportunity to remember the
event together, where the critical features were often discussed.
An individual memory test followed and 71% of witnesses who
had discussed the event reported at least one of the two erro-
neous critical details acquired from their co-witness. 
Using a confederate has some advantages over other meth-
ods because well-trained confederates can impart the same
PEI, in the same manner, to all participants during the course
of a discussion. For example, Gabbert et al. used a confederate
to examine whether participants are more suggestible when
post-event misinformation is encountered socially via a face-
to-face discussion rather than when it is encountered via non-
social means.18 Participants viewed a simulated crime event
and were later exposed to four items of misleading PEI about
the event. This came within the context of a discussion with a
confederate whom they believed to be a fellow participant, or
within a written narrative allegedly written by a previous par-
ticipant. The confederate was trained to disclose the same
items of correct and misleading PEI that were present in the
9. Peter R. Meudell et al., Are Two Heads Better than One?:
Experimental Investigations of the Social Facilitation of Memory, 6
APPLIED COGNITIVE PSYCHOL. 525 (1992). 
10. Peter R. Meudell et al., Collaboration in Recall: Do Pairs of People
Cross-Cue Each Other to Produce New Memories?, 48A Q.J
EXPERIMENTAL PSYCHOL. 141 (1995).
11. See Gabbert et al, supra note 1; Fiona Gabbert et al., Say It to My
Face: Examining the Effects of Socially Encountered Misinformation,
9 LEGAL & CRIMINOLOGICAL PSYCHOL. 215 (2004); Fiona Gabbert et
al., Memory Conformity: Disentangling the Steps toward Influence
During a Discussion, 13 PSYCHONOMIC BULL. & REV. 480 (2006);
Matthew B. Reysen, The Effects of Conformity on Recognition
Judgments, 13 MEMORY & COGNITION 87 (2005); Dana M.
Schneider & Michael J. Watkins, Response Conformity in
Recognition Testing, 3 PSYCHONOMIC BULL. & REV. 481 (1996);
Wright et al., supra note 7.
12. See Tim Valentine et al., Characteristics of Eyewitness Identification
that Predict the Outcome of Real Lineups, 17 APPLIED COGNITIVE
PSYCHOL. 969 (2003); Daniel B. Wright & Anne T. McDaid,
Comparing System and Estimator Variables Using Data from Real
Line-Ups, 10 APPLIED COGNITIVE PSYCHOL. 75 (1996). 
13. See Paterson & Kemp, supra note 8; Daniel B. Wright et al.,
Changing the Criterion for Memory Conformity in Free Recall and
Recognition, 16 MEMORY 137 (2008).
14. Paterson & Kemp, supra note 8.
15. Elin M. Skagerberg & Daniel B. Wright, The Prevalence of Co-
Witnesses and Co-Witness Discussions in Real Eyewitnesses, 14
PSYCHOL. CRIME & L. 513 (2008).
16. See SUZANNE NALBANTIAN ET AL., THE MEMORY PROCESS (2010). 
17. Gabbert et al, supra note 1.
18. Gabbert et al., supra note 11. 
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misleading narrative. In a final
memory test about the crime
event, participants who had
encountered the misleading
PEI socially were more likely to
report this misinformation
than those who had encoun-
tered the same misinformation
while reading the narrative. 
Irrespective of the methods
utilized, the focus of memory-
conformity research is on
understanding why people
report information that has
merely been  suggested to
them, thus allowing for  possible predictions to be made as to
when these effects are most likely to occur. Furthermore, this
area of research also provides a grounding for predicting
whether certain people are particularly likely to conform to
another witness’s memory rather than relying on their own. 
Figure 1 shows a model of memory conformity with two
routes for reporting what another person has said rather than
reporting what one remembers.19 The top, normative route
involves the person comparing the cost of disagreeing with the
cost of making an error. People may agree with another person
because of normative pressures to conform even when they
believe the response is in error. Normative motivations to con-
form often reflect an individual’s need for social approval and
manifest as public declarations of agreement despite private dis-
agreement. Thus, people might outwardly agree with another
person’s recollected version of events when privately they do
not believe that is what actually happened.20 Normative influ-
ence can be shown by people reporting the same thing as some-
body else when the other person is present, but reverting to
their own belief when questioned privately.21 Normative influ-
ences are strongest when the costs of disagreeing are high.
Under these conditions, participants engaging in collaborative
retrieval may appear to be in agreement with each other when
in fact this behavior reveals little about social influences on
memory and more about motivations and behaviors to increase
social acceptance and to appear more likeable.22 For example,
Baron, Vandello, and Brunsman conducted an eyewitness-iden-
tification study and found that participants knowingly gave an
incorrect response so as not to disagree with a confederate
when they were told the results were of little importance (that
their responses would be used as pilot data) but were less likely
to conform when they were told the results were important
(that their responses would be used by the police and courts).23
The bottom, or informational, route in Figure 1 involves the
witness comparing how accurate they think they are with how
accurate they think the co-witness is. The person must decide
which source of information is more trustworthy.
Informational motivations to conform are reflected in a per-
son’s decision to accept and later report PEI encountered from
a co-witness if it is believed to be correct. This is particularly
likely in situations where an individual doubts the accuracy of
his or her own memory or when the information encountered
from another individual convinces them that his or her initial
judgment might be wrong, thus supporting Festinger’s24 asser-
tion that the need to feel certainty or confidence in one’s beliefs
drives much social influence.25
Several research laboratories have investigated how norma-
tive and informational influences affect the ways in which peo-
ple respond to memory probes. Most of the research is done by
altering one of the factors shown in the ellipses on the left of
Figure 1 (e.g., the cost of making an error). Altering each of
these produces systematic effects on how people respond.
Below we review some of these studies.
19. Daniel B. Wright et al., Social Anxiety Moderates Memory
Conformity in Adolescents, 24 APPLIED COGNITIVE PSYCHOL. 1034
(2010).
20. See Robert B. Cialdini & Noah J. Goldstein, Social Influence:
Compliance and Conformity, 55 ANN. REV. PSYCHOL. 591 (2004);
Morton Deutsch & Harold G. Gerard, A Study of Normative and
Informational Social Influence upon Individual Judgement, 59 J.
ABNORMAL SOC. PSYCHOL. 204 (1955).
21. See Kevin Allan & Fiona Gabbert, I Still Think It Was a Banana:
Memorable “Lies” and Forgettable “Truths,” 127 ACTA PSYCHOLOGICA
299 (2008); Schneider & Watkins, supra note 11; John S. Shaw et
al., Co-Witness Information Can Have Immediate Effects on
Eyewitness Memory Reports, 21 LAW &  HUM. BEHAV. 503 (1997).
22. See Henri Tajfel & John C. Turner, The Social Identity Theory of
Inter-Group Behaviour, in PSYCHOLOGY OF INTER-GROUP RELATIONS 7
(Stephen Worchel & William G. Austin eds., 2d ed., 1986).
23. Robert S. Baron, Joseph A. Vandello, & Bethany Brunsman, The
Forgotten Variable in Conformity Research: Impact of Task
Importance on Social Influence, 71 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL.
915 (1996).
24. Leon Festinger, A Theory of Social Comparison Processes, 7 HUM.
REL. 117 (1954).
25. See Curtis D. Hardin & E. Tory Higgins, Shared Reality: How Social
Verification Makes the Subjective Objective, in HANDBOOK OF
MOTIVATION AND COGNITION: THE INTERPERSONAL CONTEXT 28 (E.
Tory Higgins & Richard M Sorrentino eds.,vol. 3, 1996).
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FIGURE 1. A MODEL OF MEMORY CONFORMITY. 
ADAPTED FROM DANIEL B. WRIGHT ET AL., SOCIAL ANXIETY
MODERATES MEMORY CONFORMITY IN ADOLESCENTS, 24 APPLIED
COGNITIVE PSYCHOL. 1034 (2010).
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Acquaintance versus Stranger Studies
When a crime occurs there are often multiple witnesses.
Sometimes these witnesses are acquaintances, and sometimes
they are strangers. An important applied question is whether
the relationship between co-witnesses affects how susceptible
they are to each other’s influence. We expect that there is a
larger cost of disagreeing when one knows the other person. It
may also be that people think their acquaintances have better
memories than strangers. Thus, from Figure 1 we predict that
acquaintances should be more susceptible to memory-confor-
mity effects than strangers, and two studies offer support in
respect of these predictions. Hope, Ost, Gabbert, Healey, and
Lenton found that previously acquainted witnesses, in this
case pairs of friends and romantic partners, were more likely to
report information obtained from their co-witness than were
previously unacquainted strangers.26 French, Garry, and Mori
also found previously acquainted participants (romantic part-
ners) showed an increased susceptibility to memory confor-
mity than strangers.27
Thus, the more prepared we are to accept another person’s
judgments and value his or her opinion, the more we become
subject to his or her influence.28 From an applied perspective
the difference between acquaintances and strangers is likely to
be even larger because acquaintances are more likely to engage
in conversations in the days after viewing a crime. Thus, it is
important for the police to get independent testimony from
acquaintances as soon as possible after the event. In court it is
important that the types of relationships held among different
witnesses are considered. 
Beliefs in Own and Other Person’s Memory
Figure 1 shows that a person’s final belief about a memory
can be reached by comparing the belief he or she has in his or
her own memory with the belief he or she has in another per-
son’s memory. How this combination occurs is complex, but the
basic findings are that stronger beliefs in one’s own memory
inoculate a person from memory-conformity effects, and
stronger beliefs in another person’s memory can increase the
influence of that person’s memory report. Supporting this,
research has found that the overt confidence with which indi-
viduals make their assertions to each other can operate system-
atically as a cue that promotes conformity.29 This explains why
the confident memory of an accomplice in the Oklahoma
bombing case quickly spread to the reports given by the co-
workers. For example, Wright et al. investigated memory con-
formity between co-witnesses by showing pairs of participants
a storybook containing 21 color pictures depicting a crime tak-
ing place.30 The storybooks were identical, except in one the
culprit had an accomplice and
in one there was no accomplice.
Participants were then asked
true/false recognition questions
about what they had seen and
rated their confidence after each
question. Following this they
discussed their memories about
the sequence of events, includ-
ing whether there was an
accomplice, and then answered
the same questions. While the people within each pair initially
disagreed about there being an accomplice, after discussing the
event most of the pairs were in agreement. The person in the
pair who was initially more confident tended to persuade the
other person in the pair. More recently Allan and Gabbert sys-
tematically manipulated the confidence with which accurate
and misleading PEI was delivered to participants.31 They found
further support that a person’s confidence in what he or she has
to say can alter the immediate persuasiveness of its content, and
that people make use of their perceptions of confidence as a cue
when determining who is most likely to be correct.32
Tendencies to conform can also be affected by manipulating
the perceptions of each individual regarding the relative
knowledge each has of stimuli they encoded together. Gabbert,
Memon, and Wright showed pairs of people a series of com-
plex drawings, which they believed were exactly the same, but
in fact had some slight differences.33 The pair was told that one
of them had viewed slides for twice the length of time as the
other, though actual encoding duration was the same.
Participants who believed they had seen the slides for less time
than their partner were more likely to conform to their part-
ner’s memory for items than those who thought they had
viewed the slides longer. Thus, individuals who believe they
have an inferior memory quality to others are more likely to
become influenced by, and subsequently report, items of errant
PEI encountered from another person. 
An important application of this is that the roles witnesses
have will often differ, and sometimes these roles will determine
how influential a witness is when remembering an event
together with co-witnesses. For example, there are differences
between a bystander or observer and a witness who interacts
with a criminal. Carlucci, Kieckhaefer, Schwartz, Villalba, and
Wright showed bystanders can be more susceptible to mem-
ory-conformity effects than people who interact with a target
person.34 They had a male confederate approach a group of
people on a crowded beach in South Florida and ask one of the
people for the time. The confederate walked out of view, and a
26. Lorraine Hope et al., “With a Little Help from My Friends…”: The
Role of Co-Witness Relationship in Susceptibility to Misinformation,
127 ACTA PSYCHOLOGICA 476 (2008).
27. Lauren French et al., The MORI Techniques Produces Memory
Conformity in Western Subjects, 22 APPLIED COGNITIVE PSYCHOL.
431 (2007).
28. See LEON FESTINGER, A THEORY OF COGNITIVE DISSONANCE (1957).
29. Allan & Gabbert, supra note 21; Schneider & Watkins; supra note
11; Wright et al., supra note 7.
30. Wright et al., supra note 7.
31. Allan & Gabbert, supra note 21. 
32. See Schneider & Watkins, supra note 11.
33. Fiona Gabbert et al., I Saw It for Longer Than You: The Relationship
Between Encoding Duration and Memory Conformity, 124 ACTA
PSYCHOLOGICA 319 (2007).
34. Marianna Carlucci et al., The South Beach Study: Bystanders’
Memories are More Malleable, 25 APPLIED COGNITIVE PSYCHOL. 562
(2011).
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COGNITIVE PSYCHOL. 506 (2009).
37. See Allan & Gabbert, supra note 21; Helen M. Paterson et al., Co-
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Delay on Eyewitness Memory, 16, PSYCHIATRY, PSYCHOL. & L. 112
(2009); Reysen, supra note 11.
38. See Wright et al., supra note 13.
39. See Baron et al., supra note 23; Andrew L. Betz et al., Shared
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113 (1996); Wright et al., supra note 7.
40. See Alan Scoboria et al., Plausibility and Belief in Autobiographical
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41. See M.K. Johnson et al., Source Monitoring, 114 PSYCHOL. BULL. 3
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42. Id.
43. Linda A. Henkel & Nancy Franklin, Reality Monitoring of
Physically Similar and Conceptually Related Objects, 26 MEMORY &
COGNITION 659 (1998); Roslyn Markham & Lisa Hynes, The Effect
of Vividness of Imagery on Reality Monitoring, 17 J. MENTAL IMAGERY
159 (1993).
research assistant approached
either the person who inter-
acted with the confederate or
another person in the group.
The research assistant showed
the person a six-person target-
absent lineup. After that person
had made an identification, the
research assistant turned to
another person and asked that
she or he also make an identification. When responding sec-
ond, the bystander was more than twice as likely to conform
than the person who had previously interacted with the con-
federate. From a theoretical perspective, this suggests that peo-
ple believe bystanders have worse memories than those
directly involved with an interaction. From an applied per-
spective, it is important for investigators to consider the role of
all the witnesses and to take this into account when it is sus-
pected that the witnesses may have discussed the crime. 
Source Credibility
Further support for informational influence underlying
some of the observed memory-conformity effects comes from
research showing that the size of the memory-conformity effect
is moderated by person-perception factors, such as perceived
source credibility. For example, Kwong See, Hoffman, and
Wood showed participants (young adults) a slide show depict-
ing a theft and then presented them with a narrative summa-
rizing the incident.35 To manipulate source credibility, this nar-
rative was either introduced as being an account of the event
as remembered by a 28-year-old or an 82-year-old. In fact, the
narratives were the same, each including four items of mis-
leading PEI. Because the young adult participants trusted
young people’s memories more than the memories of older
adults, from Figure 1 we would predict that participants would
be more influenced by the young-adult reports. This is what
the researchers found. Participants were more likely to coa-
lesce with the younger adult’s memories than with those of the
older adult. Skagerberg and Wright found similar results.36
Participants were more influenced if the co-witness was a fel-
low student or a police officer than if the co-witness was a
child. These results have applied significance. Some groups of
people will be more influential than others. If a police officer
at the scene of a crime confidently states that “a red car passed
through the stop sign,” this will have a larger impact on co-wit-
nesses than if a young child gave the same statement. 
In summary, memory-conformity effects are often driven by
informational influences. People conform to another person’s
version of events when that person is perceived as more
knowledgeable, more confident, and/or more credible. Because
of this, conformity effects driven by informational influence
may persist over a delay,37 and people may report the suggested
information in private as well as public.38 Even in situations
where it is vital to provide an accurate and unbiased opinion,
research suggests that individuals who are uncertain are likely
to conform to another person’s decision or memories.39
Source Misattributions
Another explanation for the memory-conformity effect is
that people have made a source misattribution where a mem-
ory from one source (e.g., a discussion with a co-witness) is
mistakenly misattributed to another source (e.g., the witnessed
event), and thus reported as if it is a personal memory. In other
words, it is possible for people to construct a (false) memory
based on what the other person has said. This is not illustrated
in Figure 1 because we believe the processes and time-course
are different to that of normative or informational routes to
memory conformity. However, believing something is correct
(the informational route) can facilitate the creation of a false
memory.40
The source-monitoring framework describes the judgment
processes that individuals employ to accurately identify the
source of a memory, as well as specifying factors that are likely
to promote source-monitoring errors.41 For example, accord-
ing to the source-monitoring framework, our memories con-
tain various characteristics that provide clues as to their origin.
Memories from different sources tend to differ on average in
the quantity and quality of the characteristics associated with
them. Individuals use these differences in memory characteris-
tics as heuristics to attribute their memories to a particular
source. However, there is no single aspect of our memories that
specifies the true source without fail, and, as a consequence,
source misattributions can occur.42
Research and theory on the accuracy of source monitoring
has shown that source-confusion errors increase when there is
an overlap in the memory characteristics from two different
sources.43 This finding is particularly relevant, as there is a
large amount of contextual overlap between the encoding
phase and the misinformation phase within memory-confor-
mity experiments. Both phases of the experiment concern the
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witnessed stimuli and thus overlap in terms of content.
Furthermore, both phases (usually) take place within a limited
time frame and in the same experimental environment. In real
life, a similar amount of contextual overlap might be expected.
Co-witnesses are likely to talk about what they have just seen
(content overlap); they are likely to do this immediately after
the crime event (temporal overlap); and it is likely that this
discussion occurs at the scene, while waiting for the police to
arrive, rather than at a different location (environmental over-
lap). The consequences of source-monitoring errors can be
very serious in a criminal investigation, as they have the poten-
tial to lead to inaccurate testimony, biased evidence, and false
corroboration between witnesses. 
Gabbert et al. examined the extent to which source confu-
sions are accountable for the memory-conformity effect.44 Over
the course of the experiment, participants engaged in a series of
discussions with a co-witness about details featured in slides.
Each member of the pair had in fact viewed slightly different
versions of the slides—a manipulation that introduced the
potential for them to share items of misleading PEI. Following
each discussion, they were asked to provide an individual
account of what had been seen. At the end of the experiment a
source-monitoring task was administered where participants
were asked to review their free-recall responses and to (a) circle
the details that they remembered hearing from their co-witness
but not actually seeing themselves; (b) leave unmarked the
details that they did remember seeing in the pictures; and (c)
underline the details for which they could not remember the
source. About half of the errantly reported details were correctly
categorized as having been encountered in the co-witness dis-
cussions; however, about half were incorrectly attributed to
having been seen in the original slide presentation. 
Similar findings were reported in a study by Paterson et al.45
Participants discussed their recollections of a mock crime
event with a co-witness who had seen a slightly different ver-
sion. One week later they were interviewed separately about
what they could remember. Following the interview, partici-
pants were asked to read through their statements and indicate
the source of each item of information reported by attributing
it to one of four sources: video only, discussion only, both the
video and discussion, or unsure. If participants reported sug-
gested items at test and correctly attributed these to having
originated from the co-witness discussion, then the source-
monitoring decision was coded as being accurate. However, if
suggested items of information that had been reported at test
were attributed to (a) the video or (b) the video and discus-
sion, then the source-monitoring decision was coded as being
inaccurate. Participants frequently reported that they had seen
items of PEI that had in fact only been suggested to them in the
co-witness discussion. Accurate source-monitoring judgments
were made on only 43% of occasions. 
WHAT CAN BE DONE TO 
PROTECT AGAINST MEMORY
CONFORMITY?
Paterson et al. examined
whether a warning to disregard
PEI encountered from a co-witness
was effective in reducing memory
conformity.46 Participants viewed a
mock crime event that was either
the same or slightly different to the
event viewed by their partner.
Following this, they discussed
their memories together. One week later, half of the partici-
pants from each condition were given a warning that they may
have been exposed to misleading PEI from the co-witness with
whom they had discussed the event. Participants were then
individually interviewed about what they had seen in the
event. Paterson et al. found that 28% of participants who
received a warning reported at least one piece of misinforma-
tion in comparison to 32% of those who did not receive a
warning.47 Thus, warning participants about misinformation
one week after exposure did not appear to substantially reduce
the memory-conformity effect. 
It is known that people forget the source of the information
faster than the information itself, so perhaps the warning in
Paterson et al.’s study was given too late for the participants to
effectively monitor the source of information relating to a
crime event and to disregard items of PEI encountered from
the co-witness. To investigate this, the researchers ran a second
study to explore whether warning participants about potential
exposure to misinformation immediately after the co-witness
discussion was more effective than giving the warning after a
week. A control group received no warning. Once again,
researchers found that warning participants that they may have
been exposed to misleading PEI from their co-witness did not
significantly reduce their susceptibility to memory conformity. 
Bodner, Musch, and Azad had more success with warning
participants to disregard PEI from a co-witness.48 Their warn-
ing explicitly asked participants not to report details that they
acquired from their secondary source unless they also remem-
bered seeing the details. The warning was given to participants
in the same test session as viewing and discussing an event. In
contrast to Paterson et al.’s findings,49 Bodner et al. found that
the warning was effective and sharply reduced the rate of
reporting non-witnessed details. However, even with such
minimal delay between the co-witness discussion and the
instruction to disregard non-remembered items of PEI, the
warnings did not eliminate the memory-conformity effect.
Meade and Roediger have also found that warnings can reduce,
but not eliminate, the memory-conformity effect.50
In sum, research shows that post-warnings to disregard PEI
are not always successful because people often do not remem-
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ber where they heard informa-
tion. This is particularly true
long after the discussion with
co-witnesses. Police investiga-
tors and others in the criminal
justice system should ask wit-
nesses if they spoke with co-
witnesses about the crime.51
The problem with this is that
people may have forgotten if
they had engaged in discus-
sions with others, and it is
very likely they will have poor
memories for what was dis-
cussed. Warnings to disregard PEI will only work if individu-
als are able to remember the source of the information that
they are able to recall. Thus, the differences found between
studies that have and have not found warnings to be effective
probably reflect differences in the strength of people’s memo-
ries caused by encoding quality, the delay between study and
test, motivations to remember, etc. Where memory conformity
has occurred as a result of a genuine memory distortion,
namely, a source confusion, witnesses may be unable to accu-
rately retrieve the source of the information and may claim to
remember seeing items of information that have actually been
encountered from a co-witness.52 That some research has
found source judgments can be wrong, even with deliberate
consideration, highlights the fact that being able to recall
memories does not guarantee their authenticity.
Perhaps trying to prevent potentially contaminating interac-
tions and recording memories before any interactions is a bet-
ter approach than using post-event warnings. Police should
separate witnesses as much as possible and encourage them
not to discuss the crime. An alternative approach is to gather
memories from as many witnesses as possible before contami-
nation can occur (and also before memories have had much
time to weaken).
A novel way to obtain information from witnesses quickly,
and strengthen memory in the process, is to ask witnesses to
complete the “Self-Administered Interview” as soon after a wit-
nessed incident as possible.53 The Self-Administered Interview,
or SAI, is a recall tool, currently in booklet form, designed to
obtain high-quality information from witnesses quickly and
efficiently at the scene of an incident or shortly afterwards. It
contains information about what is expected of the witness,
instructions to facilitate the use of retrieval techniques, and
questions prompting the witness to disclose what happened
during the event and who was involved. The SAI is a generic
response tool in that it is suitable for obtaining evidence about
a wide range of different incidents. It is currently in opera-
tional use by some police forces in the U.K. 
During development and early testing of the SAI, mock wit-
nesses, comprising a sample of community volunteers, viewed
a simulated event and were required to report as much as they
could about what they had seen.54 Witnesses who completed
the SAI tool reported 42% more correct details than partici-
pants who were simply asked to report what they had seen. In
a second study, mock witnesses who completed the SAI
recalled approximately 30% more correct details after one
week than did witnesses who did not have an early recall
opportunity. These results suggest that the SAI facilitates the
retrieval and reporting of accurate information, as well as
strengthening and protecting memory for a witnessed incident
such that forgetting is minimized. 
Recent research by Gabbert and colleagues examined the
hypothesis that because the SAI seemingly works by strength-
ening the original episodic memory (the “Belief in own mem-
ory” from Figure 1), mock witnesses who complete an SAI
shortly after viewing a simulated crime event will be better
able to detect and resist items of misleading PEI encountered
subsequently.55 Findings were in line with predicted results.56
Research by Geiselman, Fisher, Cohen, Holland, and Surtes, as
well as Memon, Zaragoza, Clifford, and Kidd have also shown
that participants are better able to be vigilant against discrep-
ancies if their memory for a target event is strengthened.57
SUMMARY 
It is crucial to gain firsthand reports from witnesses during
any investigation. However, the research presented here has
shown that memories are malleable and that individuals are
vulnerable to conforming to other people’s memory reports.
People frequently report items at test that they have encoun-
tered during a discussion with a co-witness rather than per-
ceived themselves. Real-life cases highlight the serious conse-
quences of memory conformity occurring in the context of a
forensic investigation. Research therefore continues to use and
to refine methods that allow a controlled examination of the
effects of naturalistic interactions on subsequent memory
reports. Factors that increase, decrease, and possibly eliminate
the longer-term effects of memory conformity are investigated.
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“[Research] has
shown that 
memories are
malleable and
that individuals
are vulnerable to
conforming to
other people’s
memory reports.”
This body of research has revealed that memory conformity
occurs most often when individuals are not confident enough
in their own memory to notice and to reject discrepant PEI,
and when individuals believe that someone else’s memory for
a witnessed event is more reliable than their own. Police
should always ask witnesses if they have discussed the incident
with another witness and warn against reporting any informa-
tion that they do not remember themselves. Warnings to dis-
regard PEI from a co-witness are not always effective; however,
interviewing witnesses with minimal delay, using a tool such as
the SAI if necessary, may facilitate their ability to differentiate
between their own memories and someone else’s.
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It is widely understood among scientists and criminal andcivil lawyers that eyewitnesses are often inaccurate, and thatinaccurate information can contaminate memories of other
eyewitnesses.1 It is less widely known—although no less
true—that when misleading claims are repeated, they are more
likely to damage other people’s memories than when those
claims are made only once.2 But until recently, neither lawyers
nor scientists knew the answer to these questions: Does one
person repeating an inaccurate claim do more damage to the
memories of other eyewitnesses than that same person making
the claim only once? And when that inaccurate claim is
repeated, does it matter how many people make it? In this
paper, we address those questions.
Suppose a robbery occurs for which there were four eyewit-
nesses. If one eyewitness, let’s call him John, mistakenly tells
another eyewitness, Ringo, that the robber was wearing a blue
hat—when in fact the robber was wearing a black hat—than
we know Ringo may, inadvertently, remember later that the
robber was wearing a blue hat. But would Ringo be even more
likely to make this mistake if John had repeated that inaccurate
claim multiple times? By contrast, suppose that all of the eye-
witnesses—John, Paul, and George—mistakenly claimed it
was a blue hat. Would their converging evidence be more mis-
leading to Ringo than if John had simply repeated it multiple
times? Put another way, do inaccurate claims do more damage
when made by multiple sources, or is it the repetition of claims
that matters?
WHAT ROLE DOES THE NUMBER OF SOURCES TAKE IN
THE BELIEVABILITY OF A CLAIM?
On the one hand, it is intuitively appealing that a claim
would be more credible or more damaging when there is con-
sensus among eyewitnesses. Indeed, scientific research tells us
we put more trust in our own memories when other people
who were there remember it the same way,3 and we have more
trust in the details of a crime that multiple eyewitnesses
remember than the details of a crime that only one eyewitness
does.4 And not only is this trust intuitively appealing, but
research supports its validity: When a suspect is picked out of
a lineup by multiple eyewitnesses, their identification is more
likely to be accurate than when that suspect is picked by only
one eyewitness.5 In addition, people’s susceptibility to mis-
leading information changes in response to characteristics of
the person making the claim. For instance, an innocent
bystander is more misleading than the perpetrator of the
crime.6 And even more subtle characteristics of a misleading
eyewitness can influence people’s susceptibility to misinforma-
tion. In one study, eyewitnesses with more powerful and
socially attractive accents were more misleading than eyewit-
nesses with less powerful and socially attractive accents.7
Taken together, these findings suggest that the consensus of
multiple eyewitnesses should be more misleading than the
repeated claims of a single eyewitness.
On the other hand, we know that repeated information can
lead people to make mistakes. Trivia questions that require a
true/false response are more likely to be rated as true when
they are repeated;8 when people repeatedly view pictures of a
place they have never visited, they become more confident that
they have been there before;9 and when one person states an
opinion multiple times, other people are more likely to believe
that opinion is held by others as well.10 Considered together,
these findings suggest that the repetition of inaccurate claims
should be more important than the consensus of multiple eye-
witnesses. 
Repeated Information
in the Courtroom
Jeffrey L. Foster, Maryanne Garry, & Elizabeth F. Loftus
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WHY DOES REPETITION LEAD PEOPLE TO MAKE THESE
ERRORS? 
One possibility is that when we encounter information we
have seen before, our cognitive system processes that informa-
tion differently. Call it an adaptive shortcut: if you’ve seen x
before and it didn’t attack you the first time, then x is probably
safe enough for your brain to spend less effort making sense of
it. When information is processed with this shortcut, we do not
know it directly, but we often experience a feeling of familiar-
ity: “Ah, I have seen this before.” Cognitive scientists have dis-
covered that we also associate this kind of processing with a
feeling of truth.11 In other words, repeated information tends to
feel more familiar, and more true, than unrepeated information.
IS IT THE REPETITION OF MISLEADING CLAIMS THAT
MATTERS OR THE NUMBER OF PEOPLE WHO MAKE
THEM?
We addressed the effects of repetition and number of eye-
witnesses in two experiments. In our first experiment, we
asked if repeating misleading claims would change the way
people remembered a mock crime, regardless of how many
eyewitnesses repeated those claims. To answer this question,
people took part in an experiment based on a well-known 
eyewitness-memory error called the misinformation effect: They
watched an event, then read a misleading description of the
event, and finally were tested for what they remembered see-
ing.12 Typically, many people report seeing the misleading
details in the event.13
In our study, people first watched a video of an electrician
who stole items while doing repairs at a client’s house. Later,
they read three eyewitness police reports—ostensibly written
over three consecutive days—about the activities of the electri-
cian. Sometimes, all three reports misled people about what
happened in the video; other times only one of the three reports
misled people. To manipulate the source(s) of the reports, we
told half the people that three different eyewitnesses made these
reports; we told the other half that the same eyewitness made
all three reports. For example, people read three eyewitness
reports from Day 1, Day 2, and Day 3: For half of the people,
Eyewitness 5 made the Day 1 report; Eyewitness 9 made the
Day 2 report; and Eyewitness 16 made the Day 3 report. The
other half read the same reports—but all three reports were
attributed to Eyewitness 9. Later, people took a test asking them
about specific details they saw in the mock crime.14
In summary, people read the
reports in one of four conditions: 1)
three eyewitnesses, each making the
same misleading claims across the
three reports; 2) one eyewitness mak-
ing the same claims across the three
reports; 3) three eyewitnesses, only
one of who makes the claims in only
one report; and 4) one eyewitness who
makes the claims in only one report.15
If what matters most is the number
of fellow eyewitnesses giving innacu-
rate, misleading information, then
our results should show that people were the most misled
when they read misinformation three times from three eyewit-
nesses. But if what matters most is the repetition of innacurate
information, then our results should show that people became
more misled when misleading claims were repeated, regardless
of how many eyewitnesses made them. 
Our results suggest that it was repetition that mattered most.
We found three important results. First, and consistent with
research on the misinformation effect, when people read mis-
leading details about the crime they had witnessed, they incor-
porated some of those misleading details into their memory of
the original crime. Second, when the misinformation was
repeated, people became more misled than when the misinfor-
mation was not repeated. And third, people were similarly mis-
led regardless of whether that misinformation was attributed to
a single eyewitness who repeated it or to three independent eye-
witnesses converging on the same misleading claims. In short,
it was the repetition of misleading claims that mattered, not
how many sources the misinformation came from.16
Let’s return to our original example. Based on our results,
we can predict that if John repeatedly tells Ringo the incorrect
color of the robber’s hat, Ringo will more likely be misled than
if John tells him only once. But we can also predict that if that
claim were repeated, it would make little difference if John says
it, or if John, Paul, and George each make the same claim once:
Either way, Ringo would hear it three times and be similarly
misled. But what if Ringo had never seen the crime unfold in
the first place and was trying to determine the truth about
what occurred? How might John’s repeated testimony affect
Ringo’s belief about what really happened? That is the question
we addressed in our second study.
“[I]t was the
repetition of
misleading
claims that 
mattered, not
how many
sources the
information
came from.”
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IS IT THE REPETITION OF EYE-
WITNESS CLAIMS OR THE NUM-
BER OF PEOPLE WHO MAKE
THEM THAT AFFECT BELIEF IN
THEIR ACCURACY?
Although our first experiment
showed that repeating misinforma-
tion three times made people less
accurate about what they saw, we
still do not know if repeating inaccu-
rate information would change how
people might judge what happened
when they never saw the crime unfold in the first place—this,
of course, is the situation analogous to being a juror. It may be
that people who did not see the crime would be even more sus-
ceptible to the influence of repetition: After all, they never saw
the crime unfold and must rely entirely on the testimony of an
eyewitness. But on the other hand, people may be more likely
to scrutinize the sources of the claims when judging the accu-
racy of those claims, a behavior that should lead people to be
more confident in claims that reach a consensus among multi-
ple eyewitnesses.
In our second experiment, we wanted to know how the rep-
etition of a claim and the number of sources making that claim
might affect people’s beliefs about the claim’s accuracy. In our
second experiment, we asked people to read the same three
eyewitness reports from our first experiment, but in this case,
people did not watch the video of the original crime. Thus,
they could not know if claims about how the crime unfolded
were true. After they read the eyewitness reports, people
reported their confidence that each claim actually happened in
the original crime.
Once again, our data suggest that it was repetition that mat-
tered most. We found that when claims were repeated, people
became more confident about those claims than when they
were not repeated. In addition, people were similarly confident
about repeated claims regardless of whether they were attrib-
uted to a single eyewitness who repeated it or three indepen-
dent eyewitnesses all converging on the same claims. In short,
it was the repetition of misleading claims that mattered, not
how many sources the misinformation came from.17
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS
Across two experiments, we asked two questions: First,
does one person repeating inaccurate claims do more damage
to the memories of other eyewitnesses than that same person
making the claims only once? And second, when those inac-
curate claims are repeated, does it matter how many people
make them? The answers are yes and no, respectively. Our
findings converged on the important role of repetition—over
and above the role of how many people make the claims. More
specifically, we found that the misleading claims of a single
eyewitness were more damaging to fellow eyewitnesses’ mem-
ories when that eyewitness repeated them, and that the claims
of a single eyewitness were more credible to people who never
saw the crime when the eyewitness repeated them. Moreover,
a single eyewitness’s repeated claims were as influential as the
claims made by three eyewitnesses. 
Why would one eyewitness repeating a claim become just as
credible as three eyewitnesses? While the adaptive explanation
we presented earlier—that if x has not eaten you before then x
is probably safe—can explain why repeated information feels
more true, it does not explain why people didn’t put even more
stock in claims repeated by multiple eyewitnesses.18 We pro-
pose two possible explanations for this surprising finding.
First, it may be that people did in fact put more stock into the
repeated claims of multiple eyewitnesses,19 but that people also
saw a single eyewitness repeating claims as highly consistent.
Indeed, consistency is one attribute that makes people appear
more credible, and thus more accurate.20 In other words, one
eyewitness repeating a claim may make the claim more credi-
ble for a different reason than three eyewitnesses each stating
the same claim once does. On the other hand it may be that
people failed to attend to the source of the repeated claims
when judging their accuracy. Indeed, the likely explanation of
why repeated misinformation misleads subjects more than
unrepeated misinformation is that subjects’ increased feelings
of familiarity are not accompanied by increases in their ability
to monitor the source of that familiarity.21 Although both of
these mechanisms will produce the patterns we found here,
they provide different pathways to finding a way to reduce the
effects of repetition. As such, future research will need to dis-
entangle the effects of these mechanisms.
Of course, in the real world, multiple eyewitnesses may
stand out in a variety of ways that our written reports did not.
In our study the distinction between a single eyewitness and
multiple eyewitnesses was controlled so that they varied on
identification number only. In court, these eyewitnesses would
vary in superficial (accent, gender, etc.) and important (rela-
tionship to the suspect, motive, etc.) ways—distinctions that
jurors might use to determine the credibility of their claims.
But would these distinctions actually help to reduce the dele-
terious effects of repetition? That question is still one to be
answered by additional experimentation.
In the meantime, the problems with inaccurate eyewitnesses
during a trial are unquestionable.22 Indeed, looking back at the
289 wrongfully convicted people freed by The Innocence
Project to date shows that in more than 75% of cases, eyewit-
ness testimony played a role in their wrongful convictions.23
Our research suggests that a single person repeating inaccurate
“[A] single 
eyewitness’s
repeated
claims were as 
influential as 
the claims
made by three 
eyewitnesses.”
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claims can lead jurors and other eyewitnesses to put more faith
in those claims than they should—calling on us to be wary
about the power of a single, repeated voice.
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(Roderick C. L. Lindsay et al. eds., 2007); David Faigman et al.,
MODERN SCIENTIFIC EVIDENCE: THE LAW AND SCIENCE OF EXPERT
TESTIMONY VOL. 2: SOCIAL & BEHAVIORAL SCIENCE 449 (2005).
7. Lori van Wallandael et al., Mistaken Identification = Erroneous
Conviction? Assessing and Improving Legal Safeguards, in THE
HANDBOOK OF EYEWITNESS PSYCHOLOGY (VOL. 2): MEMORY FOR
PEOPLE 557 (Roderick C. L. Lindsay et al. eds., 2007); Jennifer L.
Devenport et al., Effectiveness of Traditional Safeguards Against
Erroneous Conviction Arising from Mistaken Eyewitness
Identification,” in EXPERT TESTIMONY ON THE PSYCHOLOGY OF
EYEWITNESS IDENTIFICATION 51 (Brian L. Cutler ed., 2009).
8. We would like to thank Ryan Anderson and Jenna Henkes for
their assistance in conducting the studies.
One of the most important things a judge does whenpresiding over a jury trial is instruct jurors on the law.No doubt judges themselves are well-versed in the law,
and the language of jury instructions is the source of much
pre-deliberation wrangling on the part of the attorneys. Yet
once judges settle on proper instructions, how effectively do
they communicate the law to jurors? What can courts do to
make jury instructions more effective? Do judges’ nonverbal
actions, as well as their words, influence jury decisions? 
These questions come up in any jury trial, but they are par-
ticularly important in trials relying heavily on witness-identifi-
cation testimony,1 for six reasons. First, misidentifications are
the most common cause of false convictions.2 Second, jurors
have strong intuitions about the factors that make witness
identifications more or less accurate, and many of those intu-
itions are erroneous.3 Third, judges themselves have limited
knowledge about the factors that do and do not affect identifi-
cation accuracy.4 Fourth, a vast amount of empirical research
has been conducted on witness identification, giving judges a
unique opportunity to guide juror decision making so that it
comports with relevant data on the issue.5 Fifth, testimony
about witness identifications can often be quite technical—
especially if it involves expert testimony, as these cases increas-
ingly do—placing challenges on juror decision making.6 And
sixth, traditional procedural safeguards designed to reduce
false identifications and convictions—such as voir dire,
motions to suppress suggestive identifications, and cross-
examination—have only limited effectiveness.7 Thus, judges
are well situated to aid jurors in making proper use of witness-
identification testimony.
The purpose of this article is to review psychological
research on the impact of jury instructions regarding witness
identification, and to present data from several experiments we
recently conducted on the topic.8 Part I covers the issue of
jurors’ comprehension of judges’ instructions, both generally
and with regard to identification issues in particular, and con-
cerning nonverbal as well as verbal behavior. Part II presents
the results of three jury-simulation studies examining the
effect of different kinds of jury instructions about witness-
identification testimony. Finally, Part III summarizes the liter-
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9. See  generally Nancy S. Marder, Bringing Jury Instructions into the
Twenty-First Century, 81 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 449, 454-58 (2006);
Prof. Marder provides a cogent analysis of the reasons why jury
instructions have remained resistant to change, as well as innova-
tive approaches to improving jury instructions. See also Joel D.
Lieberman, The Psychology of the Jury Instruction Process, in JURY
PSYCHOLOGY: SOCIAL ASPECTS OF TRIAL PROCESS: PSYCHOLOGY IN THE
COURTROOM, VOL. 1, 129 (Joel D. Lieberman & Daniel A. Krauss
eds., 2009).
10. E.g., Craig Haney & Mona Lynch, Comprehending Life and Death
Matters: A Preliminary Study of California’s Capital Penalty
Instructions, 18 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 411 (1994); Richard L.
Wiener et al., Comprehensibility of Approved Jury Instructions in
Capital Murder Cases, 80 J. APPLIED PSYCH. 455 (1995); Carolyn
Semmler & Neil Brewer, Using a Flow-Chart to Improve
Comprehension of Jury Instructions, 9 PSYCHIATRY PSYCHOL. & LAW
262 (2002); Richard L. Wiener et al., Guided Jury Discretion in
Capital Murder Cases: The Role of Declarative and Procedural
Knowledge, 10 PSYCHOL., PUB. POL’Y & LAW 516 (2004).
11. Alan Reifman et al., Real Jurors’ Understanding of the Law in Real
Cases, 16 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 539 (1992); Theodore Eisenberg &
Martin T. Wells, Deadly Confusion: Juror Instructions in Capital
Cases, 79 CORNELL L. REV. 1 (1993).
12. Reifman et al., supra note 11, at 544. Participants were surveyed
shortly after their service was over.
13. Id. at 546-49. Notably, the questions were true-false, so participants
should have been able to score 50% correct merely by chance.
14. The seminal study was conducted by Robert P. Charrow & Veda
R. Charrow, Making Legal Language Understandable: A
Psycholinguistic Study of Jury Instructions, 79 COLUMBIA L. REV.
1306 (1979). For review, see Joel D. Lieberman & Bruce D. Sales,
What Social Science Teaches Us about the Jury Instruction Process, 3
PSYCHOL., PUB. POL’Y & LAW 589 (1997); Michael T. Nietzel et al.,
Juries: The Current State of the Empirical Literature, in PSYCHOLOGY
& LAW: THE STATE OF THE DISCIPLINE 23 (Ronald Roesch et al. eds.,
1999); Lieberman, supra note 9.
15. Semmler & Brewer, supra note 10; Wiener et al., Guided Jury
Discretion, supra note 10.
16. AM. BAR ASSOC’N, PRINCIPLES FOR JURIES AND JURY TRIALS (2005).
Several of the principles address juror understanding, but the
most directly relevant is Principle 14: “The court should instruct
the jury in plain and understandable language regarding the
applicable law and the conduct of deliberations.” Id. at 20-21.
17. See Marder, supra note 9, at 475-81. Marder discusses the experi-
ence of several states, but she focuses on California’s “plain-lan-
guage” effort, which is probably the most ambitious attempt to
date.
18. See generally Peter D. Blanck et al., The Appearance of Justice:
Judges’ Verbal and Nonverbal Behavior in Criminal Trials, 38
STANFORD L. REV. 89 (1985); Robert Rosenthal, Covert
Communication in Classrooms, Clinics, Courtrooms, and Cubicles,
57 AMERICAN PSYCHOLOGIST 839 (2002).
19. Rosenthal, supra note 18, at 846.
20. Andrea M. Halvorsen et al., Reducing the Biasing Effects of Judges’
Nonverbal Behavior with Simplified Jury Instruction, 82 J. APPLIED
PSYCH. 590 (1997).
21. Id. at 595.
22. Id. It is also noteworthy that the authors did not observe an effect
of judges’ nonverbal behaviors when the mock jurors were stu-
dents, as opposed to nonstudent adults. Id. at 594. Thus, those
most likely to serve on actual juries—non-students—are most
likely to be affected by judge’s demeanor.
ature and offers recommendations for judges dealing with
cases involving witness identifications.
JURORS’ COMPREHENSION OF INSTRUCTIONS
General Comprehension
Empirical research consistently demonstrates that jurors
often struggle to comprehend judges’ instructions.9 This has
been found in both mock-jury studies10 and in post-trial inter-
views of actual jurors.11 For example, Reifman and colleagues
surveyed over 200 Michigan citizens summoned for jury duty,
comparing those who served on criminal trials, civil trials, and
those who ended up not serving.12 They questioned partici-
pants on various aspects of procedural and substantive law.
Performance varied somewhat depending on case and question
type, but overall it was less than 50%, and in some instances
jurors who actually received judges’ instructions performed no
better than uninstructed participants.13
Several jury-simulation studies have found that simplifying
jury instructions significantly improves jurors’ comprehen-
sion.14 The revising efforts rely primarily on techniques such as
using shorter sentences, replacing passive with active voice,
simplifying vocabulary and reading difficulty, and eliminating
legal jargon. Some studies have also found a benefit from
including instructional aids such as flowcharts.15 The success
of these empirical studies led the American Bar Association to
promote revising jury instructions for greater comprehensibil-
ity,16 and several states have recently overhauled their jury
instructions in part or in whole.17
Judges’ Nonverbal Behaviors
These studies show clearly that
the exact language judges use to
deliver jury instructions influ-
ences jurors’ comprehension. But
what about the things that judges
do not say, that is, their demeanor
and nonverbal behavior? It is a
well-known psychological phe-
nomenon that communicators’
expectations, transmitted nonver-
bally, can unintentionally affect
others’ responses to the mes-
sage.18 Jurors are not immune to
such effects.19 For example,
Andrea Halvorsen and colleagues
conducted a jury-simulation experiment that varied the judge’s
expectation regarding the defendant’s guilt: The judge believed
the defendant to be either guilty or not guilty.20 Although the
instructions were identical in both conditions, adult (non-stu-
dent) mock jurors were more likely to find the defendant guilty
when the judge believed the defendant to be guilty (79.2%)
than when the judge believed the defendant was not guilty
(66.7%).21 As the instructions were the same, the only possible
explanation is that judges somehow conveyed their expectation
via their demeanor. Importantly, the effect of judges’ nonverbal
behaviors was greater when they read standard jury instruc-
tions than when they read instructions that had been revised for
greater comprehensibility.22 Other research has found that
“S]tudies show
[the] language
judges use to
deliver jury
instructions
influences jurors’
comprehension.
But what about
the things that
judges do 
not say...?”
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23. Marisa E. Collett & Margaret B. Kovera, The Effects of British and
American Trial Procedures on the Quality of Juror Decision-Making,
27 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 403, 415-16 (2003).
24. 469 F.2d 552 (D.C. Cir. 1972).
25. Devenport et al., supra note 7, at 62.
26. See Benton et al., supra note 6, at 475-85.
27. Meta-analysis is a statistical technique by which relevant compar-
isons within similar studies are statistically aggregated to deter-
mine their overall effect.  
28. Nietzel et al., supra note 14, at 35 (Table 2.4). This meta-analytic
study compared “enhanced” to standard jury instructions, where
enhanced instructions included efforts to improve comprehensi-
bility, as well as other attempts to heighten the instructions’
impact (e.g., through multiple deliveries).
29. Id., at 35-36. 
30. Edie Greene, Judge’s Instruction on Eyewitness Testimony:
Evaluation and Revision, 18 J. APPLIED SOC. PSYCH. 252 (1988).
31. Id.
32. Id. These findings—that Telfaire instructions increase juror skep-
ticism but do not sensitize jurors to relevant evidence—have been
replicated elsewhere. See Gabriella Ramirez et al., Judges’
Cautionary Instructions on Eyewitness Testimony, 14 AMER. J.
FORENSIC PSYCH. 31 (1996). 
33. For example, Bollingmo and colleagues found that an instruction
informing participants that a victim-witness’s emotional expres-
sion is not a reliable cue to her credibility lessened the impact of
variations in the witness’s emotional expression. Guri Bollingmo
et al., The Effect of Biased and Non-biased Information on Judgments
of Witness Credibility, 15 PSYCH., CRIME & LAW 61 (2009).
Importantly, the witness was giving a statement during a police
interview, not testifying at trial; and the instruction came from the
experimenter, not the judge. Nonetheless, the content of her state-
ment—a description of an alleged rape scenario—was essentially
the same as what her trial testimony would have been, and
observers’ evaluation of the witness’s credibility was comparable
to the sort of credibility judgment that jurors would make at trial.
34. All studies were jury simulations, in which student participants
adopted the role of jurors and were presented with abbreviated case
facts and jury instructions. The trial was presented in written for-
mat, and data were collected online. These methodological charac-
teristics—especially the use of student mock jurors, abbreviated
trial materials, and online data collection—might raise questions
about the relevance of the findings to how “real” jurors decide
“real” cases. These are legitimate concerns, but they are beyond the
scope of the present article. Although little research shows that such
characteristics influence juror decision making, there is a paucity of
research that addresses the issue. See Brian H. Bornstein, The
Ecological Validity of Jury Simulations: Is the Jury Still Out? 23 LAW
judge’s nonverbal behavior influ-
ences mock jurors’ perceptions of
defendant liability in civil cases as
well.23
These studies demonstrate that
a judges’ demeanor can influence
trial outcomes, which is obviously
undesirable. The question remains
whether a judges’ demeanor can be
used for a good end, namely, to
enhance jurors’ comprehension or
to improve their application of
instructions. Our second study,
described infra, explores this possibility.
Comprehension of Witness-Identification Instructions
The studies discussed thus far concern simplifying instruc-
tions generally, and not instructions about witness-identifica-
tion testimony in particular. In identification cases, defense
counsel can request a cautionary instruction that addresses
concerns about identification accuracy. The best-known such
instruction derives from United States v. Telfaire.24 The Telfaire
instructions direct jurors to consider a limited number of spe-
cific factors when evaluating eyewitness testimony, such as
opportunity to observe the perpetrator, strength of the identi-
fication, viewing conditions that may have influenced the
identification, and the witness’s overall credibility.25
Importantly, the instructions identify these factors, but they do
not explain how they influence eyewitness memory. For exam-
ple, they direct jurors to consider the witness’s opportunity to
observe, but they fail to go further and explain that better
opportunity to observe is associated with more reliable mem-
ory. Some of these factors might seem like common sense, but,
as mentioned previously, jurors’ commonsense notions about
eyewitness behavior are often erroneous.26
Two issues come up with respect to instructions about iden-
tification witnesses. First, how well do jurors understand the
instructions? Second, what effect do the instructions have on
jurors’ decisions in cases that feature an identification witness?
With respect to the first question, a meta-analysis27 conducted
by Nietzel and colleagues found that revised instructions
improved mock jurors’ memory for the instructions, though
not their memory for trial facts.28 There is some evidence that
revised instructions are particularly effective at moderating
jurors’ evaluations of eyewitnesses.29
Professor Edie Greene conducted a series of jury simulation
studies to examine the second question.30 Greene compared
the standard Telfaire instructions to a revised Telfaire condi-
tion, which used simpler language and explained how various
factors influence eyewitness memory, as well as to a control
condition with no cautionary instructions. There was little dif-
ference between the control and standard Telfaire conditions;
however, the revised Telfaire instructions made mock jurors
more skeptical about eyewitness testimony, and they also had
a better understanding of eyewitness memory.31 Neither set of
instructions helped participants distinguish between good and
poor eyewitnesses.32 However, other research has found that
instructions about which factors specifically influence witness
credibility do moderate the influence of witness testimony.33
Thus, there is some cause for cautious optimism that instruc-
tions dealing specifically with witness-identification testimony
can improve juror decision making.
RESEARCH OVERVIEW
We conducted a series of mock-jury studies to examine dif-
ferent means of improving jurors’ comprehension and applica-
tion of witness-identification instructions. The techniques
included rewriting the instructions, adding written instruc-
tions, and varying the judge’s demeanor while delivering the
instructions.34 In addition to requesting a verdict, we assessed
“[Can judges’
demeanor] be
used... to
enhance jurors’
comprehension
or to 
improve their
application of
instructions[?]”
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& HUM. BEHAV. 75 (1999) (discussing mock-juror and trial-presen-
tation characteristics); Kevin M. O’Neil et al., Web-based Research:
Methodological Variables’ Effects on Dropout and Sample
Characteristics, 25 BEHAV. RES. METHODS, INSTRUMENTS, & COMPUTERS
217 (2003) (discussing online research methods); Brian H.
Bornstein & Sean G. McCabe, Jurors of the Absurd? The Role of
Consequentiality in Jury Simulation Research, 32 FLA. ST. UNIV. L.
REV. 443 (2005) (discussing real versus mock-juror decisions). 
35. The studies did not include an objective measure of comprehen-
sion.
36. Greene, supra note 30.
37. Laurence J. Severance et al., Toward Criminal Jury Instructions that
Jurors Can Understand, 75 J. CRIM. LAW & CRIMINOLOGY 198
(1984).
38. E.g., Devenport et al., supra note 7, at 62.
39. Earwitness identification refers to “the process of a witness hear-
ing the voice(s) of a perpetrator(s) and encoding that information
in memory, retrieving the stored information when called to
describe the speaker’s voice and/or identify the speaker in a voice
lineup, and finally, testifying or communicating those responses to
a police officer, trial judge, and/or jury.” A. Daniel Yarmey, The
Psychology of Speaker Identification and Earwitness Memory, in THE
HANDBOOK OF EYEWITNESS PSYCHOLOGY (VOL. 2): MEMORY FOR
PEOPLE 101 (Rod C. L. Lindsay et al. eds., 2007), at 101.
40. “In general, a witness bases any identification he makes on his
perception through the use of his senses. Usually the witness iden-
tifies an offender by the sense of sight—but this is not necessarily
so, and he may use other senses.” United States v Telfaire, supra
note 24 at 559.
41. United States v. Angleton, 269 F. Supp. 2d 868 (S.D.Tex. 2003). In
Angleton, the court was asked to rule regarding which aspects of
an expert witness’s testimony about the factors important for ear-
witness-identification accuracy were admissible in court. The
court accepted testimony about the negative effects of an identifi-
cation sample that is too long, the influence of conversations the
identifier had before identification, and the preference of using an
audio lineup versus a single voice. The court rejected testimony
about preexisting beliefs, the identifier’s familiarity with target,
the quality of the recording, and the influence of the police dur-
ing the identification.
42. This is often referred to as “sensitizing” jurors to the evidence. See
Devenport et al., supra note 7; Greene, supra note 30. Put another
way, revised instructions work if they reduce arbitrariness and
improve jurors’ application of the law and reliance on relevant evi-
dence. See Shari S. Diamond, Instructing on Death: Psychologists,
Juries, and Judges, 48 AMER. PSYCHOL. 423 (1993). Presumably,
simplified jury instructions have this effect via better comprehen-
sion, an assumption for which there is some empirical support.
See Richard L. Wiener et al., Guided Jury Discretion, supra note 10.
Of course, if revised instructions reduced jurors’ ability to apply
the law correctly, then that would be a compelling argument
against the revision.
43. F(1,91)=4.06, p=.047.
subjective comprehension, using the same three items in all of
the studies.35 Specifically, participants were asked how confi-
dent they were that they had followed the judge’s instructions,
how much difficulty they had in understanding the judge’s
instructions, and how effective the instructions were in help-
ing them reach their verdict.  
Study 1
The first study evaluated the method of simplifying Telfaire
instructions used in Greene’s work,36 and we compared this to
modifying the instructions further to present specific informa-
tion more directly relevant to the task at hand for the jury.
Although pattern instructions have the advantage of reducing
the likelihood of reversal on appeal,37 they are often criticized
as not fitting the considerations of the current case.38 The
Telfaire instructions provide a perfect example of this because
although they are most often thought of as eyewitness instruc-
tions, they are also applicable to other forms of sensory-witness
identification, like earwitness identification.39 Specifically, they
contain a statement that addresses the possibility that other
senses may be used.40 The present study therefore investigated
the applicability of Telfaire and modified Telfaire instructions to
a case involving earwitness, rather than eyewitness, testimony.
To compare these different instruction-improvement meth-
ods, 201 undergraduate students read an online trial summary
involving a home invasion in which the victim heard (but did
not see) the defendant. The victim and a police officer testified
about a voice lineup in which the victim identified the defen-
dant as the perpetrator. Participants then read reasonable-
doubt instructions and one of three versions of sensory-wit-
ness instructions (or a no-instruction control). To replicate
Greene’s work, one-quarter of participants were presented with
the standard Telfaire instruc-
tions, and another quarter
were presented with the
Telfaire instructions as simpli-
fied by Greene. To compare
this approach to a modifica-
tion containing information
more specific to earwitness
identification, another quarter
of the participants saw the
Telfaire instructions modified
to include the legally admissi-
ble issues involved with assessing earwitness identifications.41
The remaining quarter of the participants saw no identification
instructions and read only the instructions about reasonable
doubt. 
We also created two versions of the instructions in which
witnessing conditions (e.g., perpetrator’s voice disguise and the
delay between the crime and the identification) were either
more or less likely to elicit a correct identification. We did this
because it is important to assess the impact of the instructions
not only on comprehension itself, but also on jurors’ use of evi-
dence presented at trial. Ideally, simplified instructions should
improve jurors’ use of evidence; in the present trial, that would
mean relying more on the identification evidence when the
witnessing conditions were conducive to good memory for the
perpetrator than when they were not.42 After reading the ran-
domly assigned instructions, participants were asked to return
verdicts and complete subjective measures of comprehension. 
Analyses indicated that although participants felt more con-
fident in their verdict with the modified instructions than with
standard Telfaire instructions,43 there were no other differences
“[We] investigated
the applicability
of Telfaire...
instructions to a
case involving
earwitness, rather
than eyewitness,
testimony.”
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44. Participants who received written instructions were split further
into two different conditions: one that heard the instructions
orally both before and after trial, and one that heard oral instruc-
tions only after the trial. These two groups are combined into a
single “written-instructions” condition for present purposes.
45. See notes 18-23, supra, and accompanying text.
46. A pretest showed that participants found the encouraging judge
significantly more friendly, encouraging, supportive, fair, kind, and
approachable, and less stern and impatient, than the stoic judge.
47. F(1,129)=5.42, p = .021.
48. Of the participants who saw the good witnessing condition and
the written instructions, 10% convicted. Of the participants who
saw the poor witnessing condition and the written instructions,
39% convicted. Such a “desensitization” effect, if corroborated by
additional research, would be quite troubling.
49. Of the participants in the good witnessing condition, 25% con-
victed, compared to 19% in the poor witnessing condition.
50. 20% of participants convicted in the stoic condition, whereas 29%
convicted in the encouraging condition: F(1,131)=1.38, p = .24. 
51. E.g., Cathy W. Hall et al., Psychology of Computer Use: XXXIII.
Interactive Instructions with College-Level Science Courses, 76
PSYCHOL. REPORTS 963 (1995). Interactive instructions are instruc-
tions that are intended to move the learner from a passive to an
active role by requiring his or her input to proceed, much like the
questions that required a response in the current study. 
52. Confidence in following instructions, F(1,90) = 1.23, p = .27; dif-
ficulty in understanding instructions, F(1,89) = .004, p = .95;
effectiveness of the instructions, F(1,89) = .001, p = .97 
53. F(1,84) = 2.961, p = .09
by instruction condition on any
other measure of subjective com-
prehension. Additionally, the
instructions did not have an
effect on the mock jurors’ verdict,
nor did they sensitize them to
good-vs.-poor witnessing condi-
tions.
Study 2
A second study was conducted to evaluate how the presen-
tation of the instructions might affect jurors’ subjective experi-
ence with them. To better approximate the conditions under
which jurors experience trials, jury instructions were video-
taped and presented either with or without written transcripts
for the participant’s reference. One hundred and forty-one par-
ticipants were asked to read either the good or poor witnessing
version of the same trial summary used in the above study and
then presented with the general jury instructions regarding
their application of the law. Participants were also randomly
assigned to receive or not receive written versions of the
instructions and then asked to return verdicts and rate the
instructions.44
This study also examined the effects of the judge’s nonver-
bal communication. Because some research has shown that the
judge’s general demeanor can have an effect on the jury,45 two
versions of the jury instructions were videotaped and shown to
participants. In the first version, which we refer to as the
encouraging condition, the judge presented himself as inter-
ested and engaged in the trial and used language manipulated
to be encouraging to the jury (e.g., “It is extremely important
that you perform your duties,” and, “While the information
presented here today may seem overwhelming, I appreciate
your commitment to this trial.”). In the second condition, called
the stoic condition, the judge acted somewhat disinterested in
the case, refrained from using encouraging speech, and empha-
sized the imperatives in the instructions (e.g., “You must per-
form your duties,” and “You will not be concerned...”).46
Analyses uncovered no significant effects of whether the
participant was given written instructions on subjective
instruction ratings. However, they did uncover a significant
interaction with the witnessing condition on the measure of
verdict,47 such that participants who were able to reference a
written version of the instructions were significantly more
likely to convict the defendant in the poor witnessing condi-
tion, indicating that the written version of the instructions
actually decreased sensitivity to the relevant identification fac-
tors.48 Contrastingly, the verdicts of participants who did not
have the written instructions were not significantly affected by
the witnessing condition.49
No significant effects were identified for the judge’s nonver-
bal communication. Participants were equally likely to convict
regardless of whether they saw the stoic or encouraging
instructions.50 There was also no interaction of the stoic-vs.-
encouraging instructions with the good-vs.-bad witnessing
conditions, indicating that the judge’s demeanor did not
improve mock jurors’ decision making by making them more
sensitive to the witness-identification testimony. 
Study 3
Finally, because some research has shown that interactive
presentation of material increases its usefulness,51 we con-
ducted a third study to assess the effect of adding interactive
instructions. One hundred and two participants again read
either the good or poor witnessing version of the trial sum-
mary, followed by the same videotaped instructions from the
second study, which again either were or were not accompa-
nied by a written transcript. This time, however, the instruc-
tions were also manipulated either to include or not include
interactive instructions, creating a 2 (good-vs.-poor witness-
ing condition) by 2 (with or without interactive instructions)
by 2 (with or without the accompanying written transcript)
design. In the interactive-instruction condition, the video was
cut into sections, each of which was immediately followed by
a single multiple-choice question. Participants were unable to
continue until they provided the correct answer. This method
highlighted specific parts of the instructions relevant to their
decision (e.g., burden of proof, reasonable doubt) and was
expected to improve mock jurors’ subjective experience and
comprehension. 
Analyses again showed that the availability of written
instructions did not affect participants’ subjective estimate of
comprehension.52 Also, in contrast to Study 2, the written
instructions did not desensitize participants to differences in
the quality of the witness-identification testimony.53 Analyses
regarding the interactive-instructions manipulation indicated
“[W]e conducted
a third study 
to assess the
effect of adding 
interactive
instructions.”
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54. F(1,89) =5.31, p=.024.
55. Participants convicted less with interactive instructions (22%)
than without (41%), F(1,86)=3.79, p=.055.
56. Study 2 even found a desensitization effect, where written instruc-
tions made mock jurors worse at discriminating between good and
poor identification witnesses. Because Study 3 did not replicate this
finding, we consider it an anomaly and not a cause for concern.
57. It seems unlikely that simple modifications, such as simplifying
complex language, would have a detrimental effect on jury deci-
sion making. However, other modifications could. For example,
the inclusion of written and/or interactive instructions might con-
fuse jurors, and the judge’s demeanor could inadvertently send
nonverbal cues affecting jurors’ judgments (see notes 18-23,
supra, and accompanying text).
58. For example, jurors who feel better about their jury service will be
less likely to try and get out of jury duty in the future, and will
also generally show higher levels of civic engagement.
59. See notes 14-17, supra, and accompanying text.
60. On innovations in jury instructions generally, see Marder, supra
note 9.
61. See Wiener et al., Guided Jury Discretion, supra note 10.
62. See notes 24-33, supra, and accompanying text.
63. E.g., Boyce et al., supra note 3; Read & Desmarais, supra note 3.
64. On safeguards generally, and their pros and cons relative to expert
testimony, see Henderson, supra note 2; see also van Wallandael et
al., supra note 7; Devenport et al., supra note 7.
that although participants who saw the interactive instructions
perceived them as being significantly more effective,54 there
was only a marginally significant main effect on verdict55 and
no interaction with witnessing condition.
CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS
The findings of the present studies are largely consistent
with other research on jurors’ comprehension of jury instruc-
tions. Specifically, various revisions to the instructions—such
as modifying the language, providing written as well as oral
instructions, and including interactive instructions—had
slight effects on mock jurors’ subjective comprehension of the
instructions, but these effects were not consistent across stud-
ies or measures. The modifications did not exert an overall
effect on verdicts, but even more importantly—and distress-
ingly—they also did not, by and large, sensitize mock jurors to
relevant variations in trial testimony (i.e., good vs. bad wit-
nessing conditions).56 When the judge delivered instructions
in a friendlier and more approachable manner, mock jurors
perceived the judge more favorably; but the judge’s demeanor
likewise did not influence their verdicts or make them more
sensitive to identification witness testimony.
Importantly, we observed almost no evidence that these
modifications to jury instructions made mock jurors’ decisions
worse.57 There is a clear benefit to making jurors feel that they
understand the instructions better, even if that perception is
not borne out in their verdicts.58 Moreover, much research
indicates that revising jury instructions leads to better objec-
tive comprehension as well.59 Thus, modifying instructions
would seem to be well worth the effort; although some inno-
vations are costly, such as completely rewriting a jurisdiction’s
pattern jury instructions, others—such as making instructions
interactive—are not.60
The trickier problem is in modifying instructions not only
to improve comprehension—whether that is measured subjec-
tively or objectively—but also to improve the quality of jurors’
decision making. There is some evidence that this can occur,
as with revising capital jury instructions;61 however, the
research on modifying instructions about witness identifica-
tion has generally failed to accomplish this goal,62 and the pre-
sent studies do not afford a much more optimistic conclusion.
Identification might be particularly difficult to address via
instructions because of jurors’ strong, yet often erroneous,
intuitions about the topic.63 Therefore, it might be necessary to
educate jurors about the fallibility of identification witnesses
in more detail, by incorporating into jury instructions the sorts
of information that more commonly arise in expert testi-
mony.64 In light of the severe consequences of false identifica-
tions and resulting false convictions, further efforts on the part
of judges to sensitize jurors to the vagaries of identification tes-
timony would be highly worthwhile.
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RECENT COURT OPINIONS
Perry v. New Hampshire, 132 S. Ct. 716
(2012).
The United States Supreme Court
rejected a due-process challenge to the
admissibility of eyewitness testimony.
While police had the defendant in hand-
cuffs at the scene where someone had
been reported breaking into cars, a wit-
ness looked out her window and identi-
fied the defendant. Although the circum-
stances were suggestible, the Court said
there was no due-process issue since the
officers hadn’t acted improperly—the
officers didn’t try to arrange the witness’s
identification while the defendant was
handcuffed and at the crime scene.
State v. Henderson, 27 A.3d 872 (N.J.
2011).
The New Jersey Supreme Court took
this case—and the question of how
courts should handle the reliability of
eyewitness testimony—very seriously. As
part of the process of deciding the case,
the court appointed a special master, who
heard seven expert witnesses in more
than ten days of testimony and who
reviewed more than 200 published scien-
tific studies, articles, and books. (Two of
the expert witnesses are authors in this
issue, James Doyle and Gary Wells.) An
extensive section of the court’s opinion
summarizes this information, covering
how memory works, factors that may
enhance confidence in identifications
from lineups and showups, and factors
that affect identification accuracy in real-
life situations.
The court set out a new process for
determining the admissibility of identifi-
cation testimony. First, to obtain a pre-
trial hearing, the defendant must make
an initial showing that there’s “some evi-
dence of suggestiveness that could lead to
a mistaken identification.” Second, the
state must then show that the identifica-
tion is reliable. Third, the ultimate bur-
den to keep evidence out remains on the
defendant, who must show “a very sub-
stantial likelihood of irreparable misiden-
tification.” Fourth, if the evidence is
admitted, the court “should provide
appropriate, tailored jury instructions.”
27 A.3d at 919-20.  The court provided
guidance for trial courts about what fac-
tors should be considered in making
these determinations. The court specifi-
cally required that a jury instruction
about cross-racial-identification difficul-
ties be given in such cases. 27 A.3d at
926.
As reported by Thomson West, the
court’s opinion runs 59 pages. The special
master’s 88-page (typewritten) report to
the New Jersey Supreme Court is avail-
able online at http://www.judiciary.state.
nj.us/pressrel/HENDERSON%20FINAL%
20BRIEF%20.PDF%20%2800621142%29
.PDF. 
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RECENT ARTICLES OF NOTE
Brandon L. Garrett, Eyewitnesses and
Exclusion, 65 VANDERBILT L. REV. 451
(2012).
David A. Sonenshein & Robin Nilon,
Eyewitness Errors and Wrongful
Convictions: Let’s Give Science a Chance,
89 ORE. L. REV. 263 (2010).
Note, Evidence—Eyewitness Identifi-
cations—New Jersey Supreme Court Uses
Psychological Research to Update
Admissibility Standards for Out-of-Court
Identifications—State v. Henderson, 27
A.3d 872 (N.J. 2011), 125 HARV. L. REV.
1514 (2012). 
John Monahan & Laurens Walker, A
Judges’ Guide to Using Social Science, 43
COURT REVIEW 156 (2007).
This article from Court Review pro-
vides a framework for courts to consider
social-science information, including
what’s contained in this special issue of
Court Review on eyewitness testimony.
(Professor Monahan was one of the
expert witnesses who testified before the
special master during the New Jersey
Supreme Court’s consideration of eyewit-
ness testimony.) You can find this Court
Review article on the web at
http://aja.ncsc.dni.us/publications/courtr
v/cr43-4/CR43-4Monahan.pdf. 
d
RECENT BOOKS OF INTEREST
BRANDON L. GARRETT, CONVICTING THE
INNOCENT: WHERE CRIMINAL PROSECUTIONS
GO WRONG. Harvard Univ. Press, 376 pp.,
2011 ($39.95 hardcover; $18.95 paper-
back).
University of Virginia law professor
Brandon Garrett considers what went
wrong in the first 250 cases in which con-
victions were overturned based on DNA
exonerations. Garrett contends that these
wrongful convictions are the result of
entrenched practices that go on regularly
in our criminal courts. One chapter
examines cases of eyewitness misidentifi-
cation; another chapter sets out proposals
to lessen the chances of wrongful convic-
tions. If you’d prefer to read a book
review rather than the 367-page book,
University of Texas law professor Jennifer
E. Laurin wrote a good one for the Texas
Law Review, which you can find at 90 Tex.
L. Rev. 1473 (2012).
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OTHER RECENT DEVELOPMENTS
New Jersey Supreme Court Issues
New Jury Instructions and Court Rules
on Eyewitness Testimony
http://www.judiciary.state.nj.us/
pressrel/2012/pr120719a.htm
Following up on its decision in
Henderson (see above), the New Jersey
Supreme Court released some new court
rules and jury instructions on July 19,
2012. After the Henderson decision was
issued in 2011, a committee drafted pro-
posals for new jury instructions. The new
instructions in New Jersey have been
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designed to be tailored for use in a given
case, with a list of factors jurors might
consider in determining the reliability of
eyewitness testimony; judges are to
include only the factors appropriate in
each case.  The instructions are also tai-
lored to the social-science research the
court reviewed in Henderson.
The court also adopted a new rule that
provides that out-of-court identifications
resulting from lineups or showups won’t
be admissible unless a record of the pro-
cedures followed is made. The court also
amended a rule regarding discovery in
criminal cases, giving defendants a right
to all notes and records regarding identi-
fication procedures and identifications
made or attempted to be made. Both rules
go into effect September 4, 2012.
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WEBSITES OF INTEREST
The Innocence Project
http://www.innocenceproject.org
The Innocence Project is a national lit-
igation and public-policy organization
that works to exonerate wrongfully con-
victed defendants through DNA testing
and to reform the criminal-justice system
to prevent wrongful convictions. Its web-
site has a wealth of information, includ-
ing separate interactive educational pages
on the most common causes of wrongful
convictions: eyewitness misidentifica-
tion, unvalidated or poor forensic sci-
ence, false confessions, government mis-
conduct, informants or snitches with
incentives to lie, and bad lawyering.
To get to the information on these
causes of wrongful convictions and how
to prevent them, click on “Understanding
the Causes” on the Innocence Project’s
home page.  Each section has interactive
materials, with video, etc.  The video
materials on eyewitness errors include an
interview with a rape victim who identi-
fied the wrong man, even though she
tried hard during the crime to concen-
trate on details so that she could identify
her rapist. The interviews with her, one
of the police officers involved in her iden-
tification of the defendant, and with
researchers, showed how the misidentifi-
cation in this rape case occurred. Also
included are suggested best practices and
links to further materials. This part of the
website was jointly prepared by the
Innocence Project and University of
Virginia law professor Brandon Garrett.
Professor Gary Wells’s Home Page
http://www.psychology.iastate.edu/
~glwells/
The first thing that strikes you when
you go to Professor Gary Wells’s home
page is that he’s an expert in psychology,
not web design. But he posts news and
links regarding eyewitness-testimony
research and developments here, and
there are lots of links along with lots of
good information. It’s an eclectic collec-
tion, but a useful one. If you go to Google
and type in “Gary Wells home page,”
you’ll get links to some of the materials
on his cite. Click on “The Eyewitness
Test” to observe an event on video. You’ll
then have a chance to look at a lineup to
see if you can pick out the person who
committed the crime shown in the video.
National Association of 
Criminal Defense Lawyers 
Eyewitness ID Reform Overview
http://www.nacdl.org/criminaldefense.as
px?id=14779&fid=2154
The National Association of Criminal
Defense Lawyers keeps a separate area on
its website devoted to eyewitness-identi-
fication issues. Their collection is espe-
cially useful because it has been kept up
to date. One part of the collection is a set
of links to media coverage of eyewitness
issues; the media coverage provides a
good overview of recent developments in
the area. Another section provides links
to reports and papers about eyewitness-
identification issues:  a 2011 American
Judicature Society report, a 2004
American Bar Association resolution
about best practices, and several
Innocence Project reports among them.
The site isn’t comprehensive, and it’s
defense-oriented, but it’s worth a look.
Professor Jon Mueller’s Resources 
on Psychology in the Courtroom
http://jfmueller.faculty.noctrl.edu/crow/
topiccourtroom.htm
Professor Jon Mueller at North Central
College in Naperville, Illinois, has put
together an interesting collection of
materials aimed at those who teach about
psychology in the courtroom. There are
links to lots of interesting studies on top-
ics like why it’s so hard to tell if someone
is lying, how often those who evaluate
mental competency of defendants agree
with one another, and how memory can
be manipulated. There are separate sec-
tions with links to articles about eyewit-
ness testimony and false confessions. The
site isn’t comprehensive, but the refer-
ences that have been selected are gener-
ally both interesting and written so as to
make scientific concepts understandable.
In addition, the site is frequently
updated.
AMERICAN JUDGES ASSOCIATION FUTURE CONFERENCES
2012 Annual Conference
New Orleans, Louisiana
Sheraton New Orleans
September 30-October 5
$169 single/double
2013 Midyear Meeting
Orlando, Florida
Royal Plaza Hotel
May 2-4
Rate TBD
2013 Annual Conference
Kohala Coast, Hawaii
The Fairmont Orchid
September 22-27
$219 single/double
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WEBSITES OF INTEREST
Traffic Resource Center for Judges
www.trafficresourcecenter.org 
The Traffic Resource Center for Judges
provides background reports, articles,
and recommendations regarding many of
the situations judges handling traffic
cases will face.  Most of the site is acces-
sible through two tabs—“Impaired
Driving” and “Traffic.” Under “Impaired
Driving,” you can find materials related
to drunk driving, drugged driving, field-
sobriety testing, alternative sentencing,
DWI/DUI court evaluations, and trans-
dermal monitoring systems. Under
“Traffic,” you can find materials about
aggressive driving, bicycles, child safety,
distracted driving, driver education, teen
driving, and pedestrian safety. The web-
site was put together by the National
Center for State Courts with funding
from the National Highway Transporta-
tion and Safety Administration (NHTSA).
To get an idea of what’s on the site, we
checked out the materials under field-
sobriety testing. You’ll find three studies
from the 1990s validating field-sobriety
tests as an indicator that a person’s blood-
alcohol concentration is above specified
levels. Included is a final report submit-
ted to NHTSA in 1998 that validated the
measures for the .08 level that was then
being adopted by many states.  Also
included are three government reports
supporting the use of the horizontal-
gaze-nystagmus test. 
Not included are materials that might
be used by the defense bar in these cases
to challenge the reliability of these tests
or the training manuals used to train law-
enforcement officers (which are pub-
lished by NHTSA). For a review of the lit-
erature and studies about the field-sobri-
ety tests, see Steven J. Rubenzer, The
Standardized Field Sobriety Tests: A Review
of Scientific and Legal Issues, 32 LAW &
HUMAN BEHAV. 293 (2008). 
Even so, the website contains a wealth
of useful material. On many issues, there
are links to some appellate opinions on
the topic, which can provide an easy start
to research in the area. In other areas, like
distracted driving, the site contains links
to multiple reports—by government and
nongovernment researchers—that would
provide ready background facts for a pre-
sentation to a local civic club or student
group, as well as background for the
judge handling such cases.
In addition to the website, the Traffic
Resource Center for Judges will respond
to requests for information from judges
and court staff.  According to the news
release announcing the Center’s creation,
its staff also can supply educational mate-
rials, such as PowerPoint slides and video
clips from presentations on a variety of
topics.
c
NEW REPORTS
Navigating the Hazards of 
E-Discovery: A Manual for Judges 
in State Courts Across the Nation 
(2d ed. 2012).
http://iaals.du.edu/images/wygwam/
documents/publications/Navigating_eDis
covery_2nd_Edition.pdf
For many state-court judges, even
ones handling regular civil dockets, you
may not end up very often in the middle
of a dispute involving the discovery of
electronic materials (email, voicemails,
documents on hard drives, and things
like metadata). But when you do, it’s nice
to have a helpful guide to the issues and
the process. The Institute for the
Advancement of the American Legal
System (IAALS) at the University of
Denver has prepared a great guide, and
it’s tailored for state-court judges.
The guide has four parts: Part I pro-
vides a brief background on the vocabu-
lary and technical aspects of electronic
discovery. Part II looks at issues of con-
cern to the litigants, including the cost of
production and the preservation of evi-
dence. Part III looks specifically at e-dis-
covery challenges from the lawyer’s per-
spective. Part IV looks at those issues
from the court’s perspective, including
suggestions for courts to handle e-discov-
ery disputes fairly but efficiently. Another
section at the end of the manual provides
a glossary of key terms and a list of mate-
rials for further reading.
The guide is easy to read, but it con-
tains citations to all the key cases from
around the United States on e-discovery,
as well as references to leading articles
and studies in the area. But the guide
does a good job of summarizing the key
points so that—at least in getting an
overall understanding of the problems
normally encountered in e-discovery—
you’ll be in pretty good shape after just
reading this guide, which runs 30 pages
(not including the appendices). 
The section specifically addressed to
judges is practical. For example, the
guide encourages judges to start with
whether the information is needed in the
first place when it seems of marginal rel-
evance and complicated balancing tests
would have to be applied to determine
who should pay the large costs that
might be associated with retrieval,
checking for privileged contents, and
production: “It may well be that e-mails
from ten years ago, or a legacy database
[that] would require expensive restora-
tion, is relevant, but before going
through a complicated balancing test to
determine who should pay, let the parties
convince you that the information is
needed in the first place.” 
If you handle e-discovery disputes
from time to time, download the manual
and keep it on your computer for refer-
ence. It won’t answer all the questions in
this area, but it’s a good starting point,
with plenty of references for more
detailed information.
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FOCUS ON 
EYEWITNESS EVIDENCE
Court Review surveys resources on
eyewitness evidence at page 55.
The Resource Page
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